On Sunday, March 6, 2022 at 5:57:28 AM UTC-6 Lawrence Crowell wrote:

> On Friday, March 4, 2022 at 4:34:12 PM UTC-6 Bruce wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Mar 5, 2022 at 2:50 AM John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 3, 2022 at 7:03 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>> >> Just exchange the 2 slits in the experiments that I described with a 
>>>>> polarizer and then the world would split because of polarization 
>>>>> differences not because of which slip the photon went through, or if you 
>>>>> prefer exchange the photons with electrons and the 2 slits with a 
>>>>> Stern-Gerlach magnet, and then the world will split because of 
>>>>> differences 
>>>>> in spin of the electron; after that everything I said was still hold 
>>>>> true, 
>>>>> and nowhere would there be a need to invoke non-local influences. And you 
>>>>> can build any Bell-type experiment you like with polarization or with 
>>>>> spin,
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *> Yes. But you have to show how non-separable states can exhibit 
>>>> locality. Or, at least, you are required to show in detail how 
>>>> the correlation arise locally, in many worlds, or in any other theory.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> Well OK but.... if you want all the details this is going to be a long 
>>> post, you asked for it.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, I asked for a detailed account of how MWI produces the correlations 
>> for  the entangled singlet state. The trouble is that you have not provided 
>> this. Your post is long and rambling, full of a lot of unnecessary detail, 
>> but the bottom line is the claim that since MWI is not realistic, it can be 
>> local. You have made that claim many times before, but the current post 
>> comes no nearer to giving a local explanation than any of your previous 
>> posts.
>>
>> What is required is a local account, invoking many worlds as necessary, 
>> that can explain how the correlations are built up. In the usual Alice/Bob 
>> setup, when Alice measures her particle, she splits into two branches: in 
>> one of which she sees spin_up and in the other, spin_down. Similarly, Bob 
>> splits on his measurement into Bob_up and Bob_down branches. When Alice and 
>> Bob come together, each splits again according to which branch of the other 
>> they meet. So there are then four branches, up-up, up-down, down-up, and 
>> down-down for the results of Alice and Bob respectively. For all 
>> polarizer orientations apart from parallel or orthogonal, these four 
>> branches must exist. But for parallel or orthogonal polarizers only two 
>> branches are possible for an initial singlet state -- Alice and Bob must 
>> get opposite results, for parallel polarizers, and the same result for 
>> orthogonal polarizers. In other words the up-up and down-down branches do 
>> not exist for parallel polarizers. How is this magic achieved in many 
>> worlds?
>>
>> Things are more complicated in the general case of polarizers at an 
>> arbitrary relative angle, theta. The question then is how do we manage the 
>> correlations between consecutive trials in order to preserve the 
>> cos^2(theta/2) probability. (Over a sequence of N trials, the proportion of 
>> up-down branches for polarizers at the relative angle theta must be 
>> approximately cos^2(theta/2)).
>>
>> In a sequence of N trials, both Alice and Bob split into 2^N copies, each 
>> copy has a unique sequence of up and down results. When Alice and Bob meet, 
>> the usual MWI procedure means that there are (2^N)^(2^N) branches, as each 
>> of the 2^N branches for Alice meets the 2^N branches for Bob. Out of all 
>> these branches, only one has the matching sequence of up and down from each 
>> end required to get the correlations correct, How does MWI get rid of all 
>> the (2^N)^(2^N)-1 incorrect branches?
>>
>> This is the question you are required to answer in detail,  without 
>> generalized fudging or appeals to magic.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>>
> The issue is the extent to which there is subjectivity. With MWI we have 
> this idea an observer is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along 
> eigenstates corresponding to all possible measurements, but is able to make 
> a conscious account of only one. This observer witnesses this 
> post-measurement state as a separable state that is local. However, if the 
> observer is frame dragged along all possible paths there is a statistical 
> ensemble of separable states, but we know this is not a separable state in 
> total. What is an account of a separable state is then subjective to the 
> observer.
>
> This is to be compared to qubism, where the probability outcome is a 
> subjective Bayesian update. There are some things to be said for Qubism 
> IMO, though it has some almost solipsistic implications. Qubism is a 
> ψ-epistemic interpretation while MWI is ψ-ontological, in that with qubism  
> assigns no particular existence to the wave function. The quantum wave of 
> course has no operator assigned to it that gives an eigenvalue, but there 
> is the density operator ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| that defines probabilities. Probability 
> is in qubism based again on Bayesian statistics considers these subjective. 
> With MWI the wave function is treated more as a real, real in the 
> existential sense than mathematical, object, but it is highly nonlocal. 
> This splitting off of worlds is not tied to any point in space or 
> spacetime, and if the wave is determined by field operators acting on a 
> Fock basis, then field locality is not global. The subjectivity of the wave 
> as separable means we have a conflict with the QFT axioms. This 
> subjectivity is not with the probabilities, so much as it is with the 
> interpretation of post-measurement states relative to re-measurement 
> states. 
>

I meant pre-measurement. It is still early in the morning and my morning 
coffee has not fully kicked in. Sorry if the language is a bit garbled.

LC
 

>
> I am not particularly an upholder of any interpretation of quantum 
> mechanics. At best either one uses the one which makes the best sense of 
> some problem, or you just "shut up and calculate." Since quantum mechanics 
> has this funny issue with the reduction of quantum states, the 
> discontinuous transition of a pure quantum state to statistical mixtures or 
> a single separable state, it all involves the issue to what extent the 
> decoherence of quantum states by coupling a larger quantum system 
> (measurement apparatus or observer) is at all computable. This is 
> ultimately a process of encoding quantum numbers within a system of quantum 
> numbers. Can this emulate the system observed, think of this as a Turing 
> machine encoding other Turing machines, or a process of Gödel numbering 
> that then act as the subject of a predicate. The shut-up-and-calculate 
> approach might be compared to the Euclid 5th axiom that is not decidable, 
> consistent but not complete, but where the negation of this axiom leads to 
> a bouquet of alternate models that are complete but not consistent with 
> each other. 
>
> LC
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> First I'm gonna have to show that any theory (except for superdeterminism 
>>> which is idiotic) that is deterministic, local and realistic cannot 
>>> possibly explain the violation of Bell's Inequality that we see in our 
>>> experiments, and then show why a theory like Many Worlds witch is 
>>> deterministic and local but NOT realistic can. 
>>>
>>> The hidden variable concept was Einstein's idea, he thought there was a 
>>> local 
>>> reason all events happened, even quantum mechanical events, but we just 
>>> can't see what they are. It was a reasonable guess at the time but today 
>>> experiments have shown that Einstein was wrong, to do that I'm gonna 
>>> illustrate some of the details of Bell's inequality with an example. 
>>>
>>> When a photon of undetermined polarization hits a polarizing filter 
>>> there is a 50% chance it will make it through. For many years physicists 
>>> like Einstein who disliked the idea that God played dice with the universe 
>>> figured there must be a hidden variable inside the photon that told it what 
>>> to do. By "hidden variable" they meant something different about that 
>>> particular photon that we just don't know about. They meant something 
>>> equivalent to a look-up table inside the photon that for one reason or 
>>> another we are unable to access but the photon can when it wants to know if 
>>> it should go through a filter or be stopped by one. We now understand that 
>>> is impossible. In 1964 (but not published until 1967) John Bell showed that 
>>> correlations that work by hidden variables must be less than or equal to a 
>>> certain value, this is called Bell's inequality. In experiment it was found 
>>> that some correlations are actually greater than that value. Quantum 
>>> Mechanics can explain this, classical physics or even classical logic can 
>>> not.
>>>
>>> Even if Quantum Mechanics is someday proven to be untrue Bell's 
>>> argument is still valid, in fact his original paper had no Quantum 
>>> Mechanics in it and can be derived with high school algebra; his point was 
>>> that any successful theory about how the world works must explain why his 
>>> inequality is violated, and today we know for a fact from experiments 
>>> that it is indeed violated. Nature just refuses to be sensible and doesn't 
>>> work the way you'd think it should.            
>>>
>>> I have a black box, it has a red light and a blue light on it, it also 
>>> has a rotary switch with 6 connections at the 12,2,4,6,8 and 10 o'clock 
>>> positions. The red and blue light blink in a manner that passes all known 
>>> tests for being completely random, this is true regardless of what position 
>>> the rotary switch is in. Such a box could be made and still be completely 
>>> deterministic by just pre-computing 6 different random sequences and 
>>> recording them as a look-up table in the box. Now the box would know which 
>>> light to flash.
>>>
>>> I have another black box. When both boxes have the same setting on their 
>>> rotary switch they both produce the same random sequence of light flashes. 
>>> This would also be easy to reproduce in a classical physics world, just 
>>> record the same 6 random sequences in both boxes. 
>>>
>>> The set of boxes has another property, if the switches on the 2 boxes 
>>> are set to opposite positions, 12 and 6 o'clock for example, there is a 
>>> total negative correlation; when one flashes red the other box flashes blue 
>>> and when one box flashes blue the other flashes red. This just makes it all 
>>> the easier to make the boxes because now you only need to pre-calculate 3 
>>> random sequences, then just change every 1 to 0 and every 0 to 1 to get the 
>>> other 3 sequences and record all 6 in both boxes.
>>>
>>> The boxes have one more feature that makes things very interesting, if 
>>> the rotary switch on a box is one notch different from the setting on the 
>>> other box then the sequence of light flashes will on average be different 1 
>>> time in 4. How on Earth could I make the boxes behave like that? Well, I 
>>> could change on average one entry in 4 of the 12 o'clock look-up table 
>>> (hidden variable) sequence and make that the 2 o'clock table. Then change 1 
>>> in 4 of the 2 o'clock and make that the 4 o'clock, and change 1 in 4 of the 
>>> 4 o'clock and make that the 6 o'clock. So now the light flashes on the box 
>>> set at 2 o'clock is different from the box set at 12 o'clock on average by 
>>> 1 flash in 4. The box set at 4 o'clock differs from the one set at 12 by 2 
>>> flashes in 4, and the one set at 6 differs from the one set at 12 by 3 
>>> flashes in 4.
>>>
>>> BUT I said before that boxes with opposite settings should have a 100% 
>>> anti-correlation, the flashes on the box set at 12 o'clock should differ 
>>> from the box set at 6 o'clock by 4 flashes in 4 NOT 3 flashes in 4. Thus if 
>>> the boxes work by hidden variables then when one is set to 12 o'clock and 
>>> the other to 2 there MUST be a 2/3 correlation, at 4 a 1/3 correlation, and 
>>> of course at 6 no correlation at all.  A correlation greater than 2/3, such 
>>> as 3/4, for adjacent settings produces paradoxes, at least it would if you 
>>> expected everything to work mechanistically because of some local hidden 
>>> variable involved. 
>>>
>>> Does this mean it's impossible to make two boxes that have those 
>>> specifications? Nope, but it does mean hidden variables can not be involved 
>>> and that means something very weird is going on. Actually it would be quite 
>>> easy to make a couple of boxes that behave like that, it's just not easy to 
>>> understand how that could be. 
>>>
>>> Photons behave in just this spooky manner, so to make the boxes all you 
>>> need it 4 things:
>>>
>>> 1) A glorified light bulb, something that will make two photons of 
>>> unspecified but identical polarizations moving in opposite directions so 
>>> you can send one to each box. An excited calcium atom would do the trick, 
>>> or you could turn a green photon into two identical lower energy red 
>>> photons with a crystal of potassium dihydrogen phosphate.
>>>
>>> 2) A light detector sensitive enough to observe just one photon. 
>>> Incidentally the human eye is not quite good enough to do that but frogs 
>>> can, for frogs when light gets very weak it must stop getting dimmer and 
>>> appear to flash instead. 
>>>
>>> 3) A polarizing filter, we've had these for well over a century.
>>>
>>> 4) Some gears and pulleys so that each time the rotary switch is 
>>> advanced one position the filter is advanced by 30 degrees. This is because 
>>> it's been known for many years that the amount of light polarized at 0 
>>> degrees that will make it through a polarizing filter set at X is [COS 
>>> (x)]^2; and if X = 30 DEGREES (π/6 radians) then the value is .75; if the 
>>> light is so dim that only one photon is sent at a time then that translates 
>>> to the probability that any individual photon will make it through the 
>>> filter is 75%.
>>>
>>> The bottom line of all this is that there can not be something special 
>>> about a specific photon, some internal difference, some hidden local 
>>> variable that determines if it makes it through a filter or not. Thus if we 
>>> ignore a superdeterministic conspiracy, as we should, then one of two 
>>> things MUST be true:
>>>
>>> 1) the universe is not realistic, that is, things do NOT exist in one 
>>> and only one state both before and after they are observed. In the case of 
>>> Many Worlds it means the very look up table as described in the above 
>>> cannot be printed in indelible ink but, because Many Worlds assumes that 
>>> Schrodinger's Equation means what it says, the look up table itself not 
>>> only can but must exist in many different versions both before and after a 
>>> measurement is made. 
>>>
>>> 2) The universe is non-local, that is, everything influences everything 
>>> else and does so without regard for the distances involved or amount of 
>>> time involved or even if the events happen in the past or the future; the 
>>> future could influence the past. But *because Many Worlds is 
>>> non-realistic, and thus doesn't have a static lookup table, it has no need 
>>> to resort to any of these non-local influences to explain experimental 
>>> results.*
>>>
>>> Einstein liked non-locality even less than nondeterminism, I'm not sure 
>>> how he'd feel about non-realistic theories like Many Worlds, the idea 
>>> wasn't discovered until about 10 years after his death.  
>>>
>>>  >> for these purposes the words "world" and "universe" are 
>>>>> interchangeable and have exactly the same meaning they have when used in 
>>>>> any other context. I meant nothing new or exotic in the words.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *> Worlds are disjoint and do not interact.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> There's no reason they can't be if the difference between the worlds is 
>>> tiny because they've only been separated for a tiny amount of time.  If the 
>>> difference between the worlds is very very small it's not statistically 
>>> improbable that they could evolve into the same state and thus merge, but 
>>> if the difference is large it becomes ridiculously improbable for that to 
>>> happen. 
>>>
>>> John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
>>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>
>>>
>>

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