On Thu, 25 May 2023 at 04:08, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 5/24/2023 10:41 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Thu, 25 May 2023 at 02:14, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 5/24/2023 12:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wed, 24 May 2023 at 15:37, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 24, 2023, 1:15 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, 24 May 2023 at 04:03, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, May 23, 2023 at 7:15 AM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 21:09, Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> As I see this thread, Terren and Stathis are both talking past each >>>>>>> other. Please either of you correct me if i am wrong, but in an effort >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> clarify and perhaps resolve this situation: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I believe Stathis is saying the functional substitution having the >>>>>>> same fine-grained causal organization *would* have the same >>>>>>> phenomenology, >>>>>>> the same experience, and the same qualia as the brain with the same >>>>>>> fine-grained causal organization. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Therefore, there is no disagreement between your positions with >>>>>>> regards to symbols groundings, mappings, etc. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> When you both discuss the problem of symbology, or bits, etc. I >>>>>>> believe this is partly responsible for why you are both talking past >>>>>>> each >>>>>>> other, because there are many levels involved in brains (and >>>>>>> computational >>>>>>> systems). I believe you were discussing completely different levels in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> hierarchical organization. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There are high-level parts of minds, such as ideas, thoughts, >>>>>>> feelings, quale, etc. and there are low-level, be they neurons, >>>>>>> neurotransmitters, atoms, quantum fields, and laws of physics as in >>>>>>> human >>>>>>> brains, or circuits, logic gates, bits, and instructions as in >>>>>>> computers. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think when Terren mentions a "symbol for the smell of >>>>>>> grandmother's kitchen" (GMK) the trouble is we are crossing a myriad of >>>>>>> levels. The quale or idea or memory of the smell of GMK is a very >>>>>>> high-level feature of a mind. When Terren asks for or discusses a symbol >>>>>>> for it, a complete answer/description for it can only be supplied in >>>>>>> terms >>>>>>> of a vast amount of information concerning low level structures, be they >>>>>>> patterns of neuron firings, or patterns of bits being processed. When we >>>>>>> consider things down at this low level, however, we lose all context for >>>>>>> what the meaning, idea, and quale are or where or how they come in. We >>>>>>> cannot see or find the idea of GMK in any neuron, no more than we can >>>>>>> see >>>>>>> or find it in any neuron. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Of course then it should seem deeply mysterious, if not impossible, >>>>>>> how we get "it" (GMK or otherwise) from "bit", but to me, this is no >>>>>>> greater a leap from how we get "it" from a bunch of cells squirting ions >>>>>>> back and forth. Trying to understand a smartphone by looking at the >>>>>>> flows >>>>>>> of electrons is a similar kind of problem, it would seem just as >>>>>>> difficult >>>>>>> or impossible to explain and understand the high-level features and >>>>>>> complexity out of the low-level simplicity. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is why it's crucial to bear in mind and explicitly discuss the >>>>>>> level one is operation on when one discusses symbols, substrates, or >>>>>>> quale. >>>>>>> In summary, I think a chief reason you have been talking past each >>>>>>> other is >>>>>>> because you are each operating on different assumed levels. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Please correct me if you believe I am mistaken and know I only offer >>>>>>> my perspective in the hope it might help the conversation. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I think you’ve captured my position. But in addition I think >>>>>> replicating the fine-grained causal organisation is not necessary in >>>>>> order >>>>>> to replicate higher level phenomena such as GMK. By extension of >>>>>> Chalmers’ >>>>>> substitution experiment, >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Note that Chalmers's argument is based on assuming the functional >>>>> substitution occurs at a certain level of fine-grained-ness. If you lose >>>>> this step, and look at only the top-most input-output of the mind as black >>>>> box, then you can no longer distinguish a rock from a dreaming person, nor >>>>> a calculator computing 2+3 and a human computing 2+3, and one also runs >>>>> into the Blockhead "lookup table" argument against functionalism. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, those are perhaps problems with functionalism. But a major point >>>> in Chalmers' argument is that if qualia were substrate-specific (hence, >>>> functionalism false) it would be possible to make a partial zombie or an >>>> entity whose consciousness and behaviour diverged from the point the >>>> substitution was made. And this argument works not just by replacing the >>>> neurons with silicon chips, but by replacing any part of the human with >>>> anything that reproduces the interactions with the remaining parts. >>>> >>> >>> >>> How deeply do you have to go when you consider or define those "other >>> parts" though? That seems to be a critical but unstated assumption, and >>> something that depends on how finely grained you consider the >>> relevant/important parts of a brain to be. >>> >>> For reference, this is what Chalmers says: >>> >>> >>> "In this paper I defend this view. Specifically, I defend a principle of >>> organizational invariance, holding that experience is invariant across >>> systems with the same fine-grained functional organization. More precisely, >>> the principle states that given any system that has conscious experiences, >>> then any system that has the same functional organization at a fine enough >>> grain will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. A full >>> specification of a system's fine-grained functional organization will fully >>> determine any conscious experiences that arise." >>> https://consc.net/papers/qualia.html >>> >>> By substituting a fine-grained functional organization for a >>> coarse-grained one, you change the functional definition and can no longer >>> guarantee identical experiences, nor identical behaviors in all possible >>> situations. They're no longer"functional isomorphs" as Chalmers's argument >>> requires. >>> >>> By substituting a recording of a computation for a computation, you >>> replace a conscious mind with a tape recording of the prior behavior of a >>> conscious mind. This is what happens in the Blockhead thought experiment. >>> The result is something that passes a Turing test, but which is itself not >>> conscious (though creating such a recording requires prior invocation of a >>> conscious mind or extraordinary luck). >>> >> >> The replaced part must of course be functionally identical, otherwise >> both the behaviour and the qualia could change. But this does not mean that >> it must replicate the functional organisation at a particular scale. If a >> volume of brain tissue is removed, in order to guarantee identical >> behaviour the replacement part must interact at the cut surfaces of the >> surrounding tissue in the same way as the original. It is at these surfaces >> that the interactions must be sufficiently fine-grained, but what goes >> inside the volume doesn't matter: it could be conventional simulation of >> neurons, it could be a giant lookup table. Also, the volume could be any >> size, and could comprise an arbitrarily large proportion of the subject. >> >> >> Doesn't it need to be able to change in order to have memory and to learn? >> > > Yes, I meant change from what the original parts would do. If you get a > neural implant you would want it to leave your brain functioning as it was > originally, which means all the remaining neurons firing in the same way as > they were originally. This would guarantee that your consciousness would > also continue as it was originally. > > Except I couldn't learn anything or form any new memories; at least not if > they depended on the implant. Right? > It wouldn’t be functionally equivalent in that case. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWrypF1ejdKraf3pkXau9icDrjSSzApRmjZ5Q__ePiXhw%40mail.gmail.com.
