On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:14:16AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 10:35 AM Russell Standish <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> 
>     On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 10:05:56AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>     > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 9:30 AM Russell Standish <[email protected]>
>     wrote:
>     >
>     >     On Sat, Nov 16, 2024 at 03:52:25PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>     >     >
>     >     > On Sat, Nov 16, 2024 at 3:28 PM Russell Standish <
>     [email protected]>
>     >     wrote:
>     >     >
>     >     >     On Sat, Nov 16, 2024 at 03:08:03PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>     >     >     > On Sat, Nov 16, 2024 at 2:41 PM Russell Standish <
>     >     [email protected] wrote:
>     >     >     >
>     >     >     >     I don't think it requires this assumption. In fact
>     "physically
>     >     real"
>     >     >     >     is a rather nebulous concept anyway.
>     >     >     >
>     >     >     >
>     >     >     > If you want the 'other worlds' to be physically real, then
>     the original  wave
>     >     >     > function must be physically real.
>     >     >
>     >     >     That's a non-sequitur. The 'other worlds' are as real as this
>     one. The
>     >     >     reality of the wave function doesn't enter into it.
>     >     >
>     >     >
>     >     > It does if the wave function is purely epistemic. In other words,
>     if it  is
>     >     > merely a means of calculating probabilities, then the supposed
>     'other worlds'
>     >     > do not exist. The probabilities are the probability that one, and
>     only one,
>     >     > outcome is realized for each experiment.
>     >
>     >     You've lost me here. Even if the wf is epistemic, it has no bearing
>     on
>     >     whether other branches are as real as this one or not.
>     >
>     >
>     > It does have a significant bearing on the reality of the other branches.
>     One of
>     > the frequently stated arguments for many worlds is that it avoids the
>     problem
>     > of the wave function collapse. The collapse of the wave function is only
>     a
>     > problem if the wave function is a physical object, because then you run
>     into
>     > problems with instantaneous action at a distance or FTL physical action.
>     If the
>     > wave function is purely epistemic, namely, nothing more than a summary 
> of
>     our
>     > knowledge about the physical system, there is no problem with collapse,
>     because
>     > the result of an experiment merely updates our knowledge, and the wave
>     function
>     > is updated to reflect this change in knowledge. This is exactly what
>     happens in
>     > classical probability.
>     >
>     > If the wave function is purely epistemic, there is no problem with
>     collapse,
>     > and the additional worlds that MWI introduces play no useful role and 
> can
>     > readily be discarded. The other worlds need be real only if the wave
>     function
>     > itself is real, and some way of avoiding a physical collapse is 
> required.
>     Once
>     > you avoid the collapse problem, the many-worlds scenario becomes otiose.
> 
>     I do agree with you that an epistemic wave function has no problem
>     with collapse, but I've always said the collapse issue was rather
>     secondary compared with the issue of what privileges one branch over
>     all the others as being "real".
> 
> 
> Not a problem if the branches do not exist. All we have on the epistemic
> interpretation is the probabilities that the future will be one way or 
> another.
> 
> 
>     Stating that all branches are equally real with the one we observer
>     obviates the need for something to say one branch is more real than
>     the others, without committing to saying whether anything is real, or
>     even what "real" really means.
> 
> 
> But there are no branches to be "equally real". You are fond of calling sound
> arguments "non sequitur".

If the arguments were sound, I would not call them non-sequitur. There
is the possibility I missed something you consider obvious, but in
that case, I just ask you to dig deeper to join the dots.

> Your claim that all branches are equally real is
> indeed a non sequitur, in that it does not follow from anything at all.
>

Indeed. As is that there is only a single reality. But one is simpler than
the other. A lot of people get Occam's razor wrong here.

But my claim was "Stating that all branches are equally real with the
one we observe [sic] obviates the need for something to say one branch is
more real than the others". This is a pretty logical statement, some
would say of the bleeding obvious, but it does seem necesseary to point it
out.

> 
>     In contrast to your last statement, I find "single world
>     interpretations" otiose, in much the same way as I find Christian
>     theology otiose.
> 
> 
> That is among the sillier remarks that you have made.

In order to have a single world interpretation, you need a something
that privileges that single world. It is remarkably analogous to
saying "God did it", and equally as mysterious. It is certainly not
intended as a silly remark.


-- 

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Dr Russell Standish                    Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders     [email protected]
                      http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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