On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 4:17 PM PGC <[email protected]> wrote:
> Your response presents strong points but contains some redundancies and > overlapping arguments. Here's a revised version with greater focus, while > maintaining the original’s precision and accuracy: > ------------------------------ > > Bruce, let’s directly address the epistemic interpretation of the > wavefunction. While this view neatly avoids ontological commitments and > sidesteps issues like FTL action, it doesn’t fully account for > experimentally observed phenomena such as violations of Bell’s inequalities. > The violation of Bell inequalities implies non-locality, and the epistemic interpretation of the wave function is perfectly compatible with non-locality. > These correlations are not just statistical artifacts of knowledge > updates; they point to an underlying structure that resists dismissal as > mere epistemic bookkeeping. The wavefunction’s role in consistently > modeling entanglement and its statistical implications suggests questioning > the existence of a deeper reality, challenging the sufficiency of an > epistemic-only framework. > Unfortunately, Everettian QM, or MWI, cannot even account for the correlations, much less the violations of the Bell inequalities. I have made this argument before, but failed to make any impact. Let me try again. The essence of Everett, as I see it, is that every possible outcome is realized on every experiment, albeit on separate branches, or in disjoint worlds. Given this interpretation, when Alice and Bob each separately measure their particles, say spin one-half particles, they split at random on to two branches, one getting spin-up and the other branch seeing spin-down. This happens for both Alice and Bob, independent of their particular polarization orientations. If this were not so, the correlations could be used to send messages at spacelike separations, i.e, FTL. If N entangled pairs are exchanged, each of Alice and Bob split into 2^N branches, covering all possible combinations of UP and DOWN. When Alice and Bob meet, there is no control over which Alice-branch meets which Bob-branch. If the branch meet-up is random, then in general there will be zero correlation, since out of the 2^N Bob branches for each Alice branch, only one will give the observed correlations -- a 1/2^N chance. In the literature, some attempts have been made to solve this problem: for instance, it is sometimes claimed that Alice and Bob interact when they meet, and this interaction sorts out the relevant branches. But no account of any suitable interaction has ever been given, and also, one can reduce the possible interaction between Alice and Bob to as little as desired, say by having them exchange their data by email, or some such. Another suggestion has been that since the original particles are entangled, some magic keeps everything straight. I do not find either line of attempted explanation in the least convincing, so I conclude that Everettian QM cannot account for any correlations, much less those that are observed to violate the Bell inequalities. Attempts to relate Everettian many worlds to computationalism, or theories of everything, are just disingenuous. There is no reason why these many-worlds theories should have anything in common. Bruce Your dismissal of the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) as "otiose" seems to > rest on the assumption that collapse problems vanish within an epistemic > interpretation. However, this presumes that the wavefunction need not be > universal, a presumption computationalism challenges by treating the > wavefunction as a measure over all computations. These computations are > integral to the self-referential experiences of observers supported by > them. MWI coherently explains quantum phenomena without relying on ad hoc > collapse mechanisms, aligning seamlessly with observation and the > mathematical structure of quantum theory. > > While you assert that "science trumps speculative philosophy," > computationalism reframes this dichotomy. The scientific method remains > central but is contextualized as a study of observable phenomena emerging > from the constraints of self-referentially correct systems. > Computationalism is firmly grounded in formal structures such as > arithmetic, computer science, mathematical self-reference, and modal > logics, all of which have demonstrable explanatory power in areas like > quantum mechanics with lots of open problems. Everett’s MWI aligns > naturally with these foundations, dispensing with external collapse > mechanisms and treating the universal wavefunction as the generator of > first-person phenomenological experiences. > > Solomonoff-Levi induction, while dismissed by some as speculative, > provides a rigorous framework for algorithmic modeling of phenomena. > Extending this into computational metaphysics reveals reality as > fundamentally mathematical, with physicality arising as a projection > supported by universal computation. Ignoring this recursive and > hierarchical view of knowledge—where phenomenological "worlds" emerge from > simpler computational interactions—has potential to limit our grasp of the > conjunction between physics and consciousness. At least, that’s how it > seems to me. > > Critiques suggesting that computationalism or MWI are disconnected from > quantum mechanics misrepresent their relevance. Computationalism doesn’t > dismiss quantum mechanics; it reinterprets it as a statistical and > phenomenological consequence of universal computation. The many-worlds > framework naturally incorporates first-person indeterminacy and avoids > introducing unexplained collapse phenomena. By adhering to mathematical > completeness and Occam’s razor, MWI addresses the same quantum phenomena > while offering a broader explanatory scope. > > While physicalism and phenomenology contribute valuable insights, they > often fail to account for the structures underpinning experience. Now, > regarding your can of beans: it’s undeniably nutritious, and its taste > surely arises from... well, something. Skipping over such questions feels > like an oddly flavorless game. The divide between science and metaphysics, > much like the divide between bland food and flavorful cuisine, could be > artificial. Computationalism bridges this gap by situating observable > physicality upon a logically consistent, mathematical foundation that > respects both third-person objectivity and first-person experiential > realities. If you prefer your meals devoid of taste, no one will stop > you—but to others, it’s hardly an inspiring feast. For example, how would > we ever explain why the cheap can imparts the same metallic tang in all > those Everett branches and why fresha could be betta in the meta? > > Maybe the real mystery here is why we keep coming back to the same > beans—and not a single collapse has spilled them yet. > > Just a matter of taste. > On Monday, November 18, 2024 at 2:39:40 AM UTC+1 Bruce Kellett wrote: > >> On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 12:16 PM Russell Standish <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:48:28AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:35 AM Russell Standish < >>> [email protected]> >>> > wrote: >>> > >>> > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:14:16AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> > > >>> > > But there are no branches to be "equally real". You are fond of >>> calling >>> > sound >>> > > arguments "non sequitur". >>> > >>> > If the arguments were sound, I would not call them non-sequitur. >>> There >>> > is the possibility I missed something you consider obvious, but in >>> > that case, I just ask you to dig deeper to join the dots. >>> > >>> > >>> > The epistemic interpretation says that the wave function is merely a >>> summary of >>> > our knowledge of the physical situation. And it gives the >>> probabilities for >>> > various future outcomes. There are no "branches", so there is nothing >>> to be >>> > "equally real". >>> > >>> >>> There is observational evidence for at least one branch. To say an >>> epistemic interpretion implies there are no branches is a >>> misinterpretation of epistemic interpretation, if not a complete >>> strawman. >>> >> >> Possibly the trouble here is that your argument really has nothing to do >> with quantum mechanics. So arguments about interpretations of quantum >> mechanics, and the difference between Everett and the epistemic >> interpretation, are beside the point as far as you are concerned. >> >> > > Your claim that all branches are equally real is >>> > > indeed a non sequitur, in that it does not follow from anything >>> at all. >>> > >>> > Indeed. As is that there is only a single reality. But one is >>> simpler than >>> > the other. A lot of people get Occam's razor wrong here. >>> > >>> > >>> > There is only one reality, and a set of probabilities for future >>> outcomes. The >>> > simplest solution is that the so-called "other worlds" do not exist. >>> They are >>> > just a figment of your imagination. I know that your starting point is >>> that >>> > "everything exists" is simpler than any other proposition. But if you >>> do not >>> > start from there, you can see that this position is indeed otiose. >>> > >>> >>> But I do start from there. Because it is a consequence of Solomonoff-Levi >>> induction, sometimes known as Occam's razor theorem. >>> >> >> Any so-called theorem depends on its assumptions. And Solomonoff >> induction may not amount to a hill of beans. >> >> I know that your position stems from many years of discussions on the >> "everything" list, but I have never bought into the idea that everything is >> simpler than the scientific approach based on the phenomenology of the >> world around us. Science trumps speculative philosophy every time, and this >> thread started as a discussion of interpretations of quantum mechanics. So >> arguments from quantum mechanics are relevant, and not "non sequiturs" as >> you so frequently claim. >> >> Bruce >> >> In order to get to your "There is only one reality", you _have_ to add >>> a mysterious something, call it what you will. My assertion is that >>> that "something" is probably a figment of imagination. Nobody in 20 >>> odd years of arguing about this has been able to point their finger at >>> anything that will do the job. The closest I've seen is an appeal to >>> Goedel incompleteness, that (if believed) would privilege the integers >>> as something more real than anything else, but that seems to lead to >>> an even deeper multiverse than the MWI. >>> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/13de80c3-82ed-41e5-91c8-2bb9c174451dn%40googlegroups.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/13de80c3-82ed-41e5-91c8-2bb9c174451dn%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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