List with reservations: I A N A L !
The country which invented the "right to silence" in 1898 has been curtailing it for some time - a few references below. Whether this law falls under the competence and thus can be challenged as an infringement of the basic legal rights of citizens at the "supreme court" of the EU - the European court of justice - and/or whether UK courts will uphold or reverse it remains to be seen. Albert some references: Cape, Ed., The Right To Silence : New Developments In England And Wales , The 12th Commonwealth Law Conference papers, Kuala Lumpur. www.afp.gov.au/about/publications/platypus_magazine/march_2000/silence.html The Eleventh Report, supra N.19. See O'reilly, G. W., "Criminal Law: England Limits The Right To Silence And Moves Towards An Inquisitorial System Of Justice" [1994] 85 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 402 http://mpk.rmp.gov.my/jurnal/2004b/righttosilence.pdf "EFFECT OF THE CURTAILMENT Crime statistics in UK showed that the new provisions curtailing the right to silence have not produced any discernable increase in charges and convictions of criminals.Singapore's figures also suggested that the amendments per se have not been perceived by potential offenders as sufficiently increasing their risk of detection to deter them from crime. There was no visible decrease in the crime rate after the amendments were introduced in 1977. Generally, the new provisions have also not significantly changed the way accused persons respond to police questioning. Vast majority of suspects when given the right to remain silent did not exercise that right when questioned by the police. However Buckle et al. (2000) reported that the provisions have had a marked positive impact on the efficiencies of the investigation and prosecution process. As a result of greater openness between police and legal advisers about the evidence, police questioning has become more productive. Suspects in turn have provided greater scope for the investigation of accounts following their disclosures of defence. And where silence augmented the other available evidence, prosecutors were rewarded with greater certainty of convictions. While the overall rate of conviction has not increased, the hope was that the provisions would make it easier to secure "appropriate" convictions and the conviction of professional criminals" 2007/10/2, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Send FDE mailing list submissions to > [email protected] > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > You can reach the person managing the list at > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of FDE digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Contested UK encryption disclosure law takes effect > (John Washburn) > 2. Re: Tor is an Anonymizer NOT a VPN (Dave Jevans) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2007 17:00:06 -0500 > From: "John Washburn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [FDE] Contested UK encryption disclosure law takes effect > To: <[email protected]> > Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Would this be prevented in the USA because of the fourth and fifth > amendments of the current US Constitution? > > My theory (untested in the courts) is that providing decryption keys would > be providing testimony. This is because the government is asking you to > say > something, write something, or otherwise communicate information to the > investigators. Forcing testimony you consider self-incriminating is > prohibited by the fifth amendment. > > The analogy is my shed in the back yard which is locked by a combination > lock and the police have presented me with a valid, judge-signed search > warrant. I am under no obligation to unlock the shed nor can I be > compelled > to recite the lock combination. If the police want to search fine, they > can > get out the bolt cutters and search the shed named in the warrant. > > This is analogous to when the search warrant calls for the seizure of my > hard disk and the data therein. I am under no obligation to decrypt the > data nor am I under any obligation to recite the description key. Let the > police use the access technology and programs (electronic version of bolt > cutters) on the market to access the hard disk named in the warrant. > > But, as I said earlier this theory is untested by the 9 demi-gods in black > dresses, so relying on the protection that their interpretation of the > fifth > amendment is substantially similar to mine is a dicey proposition at best. > > BTW, did you notice in the article that Blackberry seems to be the only > internet PDA device which routinely encrypts your email traffic while the > message is en route? Does the section 49 directives only target > Blackberry > because the other PDA software (e.g. iPhone, eMailMan, etc.) send your > email > traffic in the clear so all the police need to do is go to your ISP for > the > emails of interest? > > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On > Behalf Of Saqib Ali > Sent: Monday, October 01, 2007 12:58 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: [FDE] Contested UK encryption disclosure law takes effect > > British law enforcement gained new powers on Monday to compel individuals > and businesses to decrypt data wanted by authorities for investigations. > ...... > Failure to comply could mean a prison sentence of up to two years for > cases > not involving national security or five years for those that do. > > Read the entire story at: > > http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/01/AR2007100100 > 511.html > _______________________________________________ > FDE mailing list > [email protected] > http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2007 14:52:26 -0700 > From: Dave Jevans <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [FDE] Tor is an Anonymizer NOT a VPN > To: Patrick Cahalan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [email protected] > Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" > > Exit-node authentication would be needed to keep the rabble out of > your network! :-) > > At 11:03 AM -0700 9/25/07, Patrick Cahalan wrote: > >>Theoretically you could create an end-to-end encrypted tunnel using > >>tor by running an exit node inside your network and selecting your > >>exit node to be that node. > > > >And thus no longer be anonymous... and let random other Tor users exit > >traffic inside your network? > > > >I guess you could theoretically do this, but by gum I can't imagine why > >you would want to :) > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > FDE mailing list > [email protected] > http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde > > > End of FDE Digest, Vol 13, Issue 2 > ********************************** >
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