The 9th failed to properly define "sensitive places", leaving the
implication that all public property constitutes sensitive places,
including public roadways, sidewalks, and other areas to which access is
not restricted, as it might be for government offices or warehouses.
Clearly, the notion in /Heller/ on this was that it only meant
restricted access places, not public commons or right-of-ways. Unless
clarified on this point, the finding on incorporation is really only
dictum, even if called a conclusion. It could be cited on a case
involving prohibition of firearms on private property, but without the
ability to get to private property across a public commons or
right-of-way the RKBA would be restricted to contiguous private parcels,
and most private parcels are not connected except across public
rights-of-way.
This case should be appealed to get the clarification that the ordinance
is only properly applied to restricted access government property, not
to public commons or rights-of-way.
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2009/04/20/0715763.pdf
-- Jon
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