http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.16.040
Revised Code of Washington 9A.16.040
*Legislative recognition: *"The legislature recognizes that RCW
9A.16.040
<http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.16&full=true#9A.16.040>
establishes a dual standard with respect to the use of deadly force by
peace officers and private citizens, and further recognizes that private
citizens' permissible use of deadly force under the authority of RCW
9.01.200 <http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9.01.200>,
9A.16.020
<http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.16&full=true#9A.16.020>, or
9A.16.050
<http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.16&full=true#9A.16.050>
is not restricted and remains broader than the limitations imposed on
peace officers." [1986 c 209 ยง 3.]
Sometimes being -- and living in -- a "liberal" state is a good thing.
JW
On 5/8/2013 8:12 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
(1) The fundamental constitutional right to life appears, I think, in
the Due Process Clauses. I agree, though, that it protects against
governmental deprivations, not against private deprivations.
(2) Also, while I agree (without having read the article, though)
that generally allowing the use of deadly force in response to various
intrusions is constitutionally permissible, I think the reason is the
traditional latitude offered for self-defense; I'm not sure that the
argument that private self-defense is just "the conduct of private
individuals" itself carries the day, when it is the government that is
announcing an exception from the general protection that it offers
against killing.
A hypothetical: Say that the legislature concludes, without a trial,
that John Doe is a bad person, and announces that he may be killed
without legal consequence. Would we say that this is constitutionally
permissible (even if otherwise improper), on the grounds that the
legislature is simply freeing people to do what they please? Or would
we say that stripping from this person the legal protection against
murder that all of possess is unconstitutional? I could be persuaded
otherwise, but I'm inclined to say the latter. If I'm right, this of
course doesn't mean that allowing deadly force in defense of person or
even property is unconstitutional; but it does suggest that the
constitutionality stems from the tradition of such allowance (and
might be in some measure limited by this tradition), and not by a
positive rights vs. negative rights distinction.
Eugene
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