As my last for this week:
Replying to Walter -- The dark matter and dark energy examples are not very
strong as examples of demonstrating discoveries rather than invention!
These are stand-ins, just names, for disparities between predictions and
observations. They are provisionally (I hope!) accepted because they fit
into the current 'standard model'. In my view, a much neater way to solve
the disparity leading to the dark matter idea would be too accept that the
gravitation constant, g, is not constant everywhere or at al times. But
that would not fit well into the Standard Model, and would impair the
ability to do certain calculations because one needs some constants in order
to solve equations.
who replies:
Stan,
Your notes help me to make my point much clear, thanks.
These cases are not truly adequate, I accept that, but they would if they
were actually confirmed.
What I wanted to refer to is about the power of conditionals:
“If dark matter and dark energy are not provisional, but becomes highly
confirmed then the Standard Model needs important revisions”
And also, I wanted to draw attention to the conceptual changes:
- One interesting example is the discovery that speed of light is a
fundamental constant of the universe and its impact in the way it produces a
change (from Newtonian to Relativity theories).
- The case of second law of thermodynamics in times of Maxwell is an
interesting one.
- Another is the case in times of Kepler: his elliptical orbits and the
conflict with the more accepted celestial circularity
I guess this capacity is inherent in science (to be open to changes
fundamentally by the discovery of new facts) it is certainly not the case in
other human activity.
Sincerely,
Walter
ORIGINAL MESSAGE:
On Sun, Dec 12, 2010 at 8:10 PM, <walter.riof...@terra.com.pe> wrote:
Dear Loet, Stan, Pedro, colleagues,
In these topics there are a number of different approaches but the central
issue is referred to on what could be a science (or a scientific discourse)
and what is not (and what are the criteria to discern between them).
In the human world we have many activities: ordinary activities, political
activities, sportive activities, religious activities, hobby activities,
and…..academic activities (one of them is the scientific activity).
It would be a “great confusion” (to say the least) display all the behaviors
associated with the religious activities in, for instance, a tennis match…
Accordingly, we have certain preliminary criteria that you are taking into
account in your notes --some internalist and some externalist--, referred to
the human scientific activity.
Our scientific products are “just stories” or “narratives”, equivalent to
the story about himself of a storyteller in the Nobel Banquet?
I suppose that many (if not all) of us have diverse reasons to answer with a
resounding negative response.
Although we can say that as all the other human activities that are also
constrained by our capacities and limitations, the scientific (and
philosophical) activities have the advantage that its products are under the
public scrutiny of people with very high academic abilities (and maybe with
a methodological skeptic view).
These people look at the rationale of the proposals and/or results of
scientific products and its consequences in reality.
The scientific activities aim to increase our knowledge of nature and about
ourselves --or I suppose that it is the ideal.
For instance, nobody could know around 1998 that almost five percent of the
universe is matter and energy and the rest something that we now call as
dark-matter and dark-energy…
How these *facts* would affect our theories and knowledge in physics and
chemistry?
What could be nowadays the epistemological and metaphysical status of “The
Universal”?
It seems that these kinds of questions not arise in other human activities…I
think…
Sincerely,
Walter
--------------------------
Replying to Loet -- I will post this to fis later in the week
Your distinction between the backward looking institutional viewpoint
and the forward looking evolutionary perspective is cogent, but it plays
down the fact that the evolutionary one is restrained by current hegemonies
of theory and interpretation, always linking new discoveries to the
already-accepted 'facts'. So, I think that, for example, the parcelling of
energi expenditures between these viewpoints is rather something like 80%
institutional (including education in discovery techniques} and 20&%
evolutionary.
On Mon, Dec 13, 2010 at 4:20 AM, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net>
wrote:
Dear Stan and colleagues,
I agree with Joseph Brenner that we need both, but the status of the two
theories is different. Behavior of agents (scholars) and relations among
texts can be mapped. In this case, we use a theory of the measurement and
focus on the retention mechanism of the evolving science system. At the
substantive level, however, the science system(s) evolves in terms of
rationalized expectations that can be expected to differ in terms of their
dynamics and structures from belief systems. Of course, one can neglect this
differentia specifica and then subsume everything under “religion” (a la
Bloor) or “politics” (a la Latour), but the reduction of substantive
theorizing to a theory of the measurement unnecessarily sacrifices
explanatory power.
Similarly, one should not reduce the trias politica to the text of the
American Constitution in which it was sedimented or reduce the
Roman-Catholic Church to its instantiations when the cardinals meet in the
Vatican (a la Giddens). Content matters! Even if it is difficult to measure.
J Thus, I agree that we need both substantive theories and theories of the
measurement. (Of course, one can also wish to explain belief-structures
among scientists, but that is a different research question. That would be
really sociology of science because one can also study gender or age
structures, equivalently.)
The question of how the dynamics of normative expectations (religion,
politics) differ from the dynamics of cognitive expectations entertained in
scholarly discourses has to do with the time axis. In normative expectations
one tends to recur towards an origin in the past (e.g., a holy book);
normative expectations are community-based (e.g., churches and political
parties). Cognitive expectations refer to other possibilities which could be
realized in the future. The next version of a textbook is better than the
previous one (as different from a holy book). Thus, cognitive expectations
enlarge the number of possibilities and hence the redundancy in the system
of expectations beyond its current state and states which were realized in
the past. This make the theory and computation of anticipatory systems
(Rosen, Dubois) most relevant for the modeling of such systems. From this
knowledge-based perspective, belief structures and textual structures can be
considered as retention mechanisms. In other words, this distinction can
only be made fruitful after having used Wittgenstein’s ladder. J
In practices, we find mixtures of the various dynamics which can be
analytically distinguished. One needs the distinctions for the explanation.
I elaborate on the differences in a paper of which I did not distribute the
abstract on this list because the list-owner (Pedro) asked me no longer to
do this. But in this context, the reference may be appropriate because the
distinction corresponds to the distinction between a neo-evolutionary and a
neo-institutional model when discussing the Triple Helix of
University-Industry-Government relations. In this case, the assumption of an
innovation system is focal to the research question (as explanandum).
*The Triple Helix, Quadruple Helix, . . ., and an N-tuple of Helices:
Explanatory Models for Analyzing the Knowledge-based Economy?*
http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.1937
Using the Triple Helix model of university-industry-government relations,
one can measure the extent to which innovation has become systemic instead
of assuming the existence of national (or regional) systems of innovations
on a priori grounds. Systemness of innovation patterns, however, can be
expected to remain in transition because of integrating and differentiating
forces. Integration among the functions of wealth creation, knowledge
production, and normative control takes place at the interfaces in
organizations, while exchanges on the market, scholarly communication in
knowledge production, and political discourse tend to differentiate
globally. The neo-institutional and the neo-evolutionary versions of the
Triple Helix model enable us to capture this tension reflexively. Empirical
studies inform us whether more than three helices are needed for the
explanation. The Triple Helix indicator can be extended algorithmically, for
example, with local-global as a fourth dimension or, more generally, to an *
N*-tuple of helices.
Hopefully, I did not use my second chance this week on this Monday morning.
J
Best wishes,
Loet
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