Message from Karl Javorszky
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Dear Qiao Tian-qing,
thank you for inviting my opinion in your viewpoints re information.
To the cultural embedding of the term "information": this cannot be
otherwise. If we had a clear and precise definition of any one logical
term, we would posses that fixed point that Archimedes has looked for in
order to displace the Earth from. All logical terms are interdependent
and give/receive their meaning by their relations to other logical
terms. Which perspective a culture takes while regarding the
interdependences determines, which aspects are relevant for the definition.
Your idea that "...information is the collection of three kinds of
things´ attributes: things themselves (including cause or effect formed
through their interaction), the attributes of things that someone thinks
and simulates, and the attributes of tools someone or something uses
when considers, expresses, or simulates something. " can be found in
that system of references that is coming from a+b=c in the following ways:
1) Your basic - axiomatic - set of different facts, which you describe
as "... properties of things, irrefutable and objective, which have
nothing to do with any expressive way related to the thing ..." would be
the basic set of arguments {1,1,...,1,2,2,...,16}.
2) Your set of primary relations is built on this basic set. You
describe it as "... some attributes of things that someone can find...
...Among which some are true to the facts, but some are incompletely,
while others are not in any way." The attributes of things that
someone can find are here distinguished from the things. (This goes
slightly against Wittgenstein, who says that "the thing is the
collection of the possibilities of being included in a relation", so he
thinks there is no real difference between the mental image of a number
and that of what additions this number can take place in.) In actual
fact, it may be that you are more profound than Wittgenstein, because:
the additive model makes a difference between the numbers that are
sorted and the sorting order, and - more importantly - among different
sorting orders among each other. The orders are in a different way
distinct to each other than the numbers.
Also, order concepts mirror your idea very well, that some orders are
congruent - even identical -, while some are only partly, and under some
specific circumstances, congruent with each other, while there are
collections of order concepts that are contradictory and cannot yield an
existing result. This is mirrored exactly in the numbers.
3) Your set of meta-orders you describe as: "... attributes of tools
used by someone." The tools are the order concepts by means of which
[the matches between place and amount being the result of an order
concept being relevant, that is, in existence] the facts become visible
as true or false (congruent or contradictory). We choose an order
concept by which we try to explain the world. (We have a geographical, a
sociological, an economical way of explaining some parts of History, and
the explaining perspectives do not contradict, rather extend the other
way of ordering the facts.) This is also very well reflected in the
numbers. So far, we have talked about the relevance of the ordering
aspects (primary relations, your Nr. 2), and now we investigate how the
set of ordering aspects has come about. This is the importance property
of the additions. Within a system, we have the discussion, which aspect
is relevant, while the comparison of systems is maybe even more
important. The importance brings the past and the future into the play,
as it is the sequence of logical arguments that creates (individuates,
makes unique) the three-dimensional picture's contents. It matters now,
whether X has been or has not been the case.
Now, how do you add information in three levels? That the things are
ordered in such a basic fashion (primary facts) may or may not depend on
that these ordering aspects (primary relations, Nr. 2) have been
selected as relevant from among the ordering aspects of this perspective
point, while the fact that this perspective point has been selected is
important.
This seems to be well-defined and translatable into each other. There
may be some more detail needed to be worked out, but the general idea
that Info= info1+info2+info3 appears to be accessible to calculations.
Thank you for asking my insignificant opinion, and of course I am always
ready to assist if there are steps planned to dissect this idea of
information is additive over three levels: (facts, relations,history).
With great respect:
Karl
2011/2/28 <whhbs...@sina.com <mailto:whhbs...@sina.com>>
Dear Karl,
These are my viewpoints, please correct my viewpoints.
Please allow me to frankly state my point of view:
Professor Y.X.Zhong wrote that we should define information
systematically. For example, information in the sense of ontology
and information in a sense of theory of knowledge, etc.. This idea
sounds beautiful, but unpractical, for there are too many sons and
daughters to information. Statistics shows, there were no less
than 130 definitions of information until 1980. Information, as a
word, has been followed for decades and is hard to change for people
are used to their conventional conceptions.
Information becomes undefinable, because the present fact is: the
concept of information has become a self–contradictory and common
term used confusedly, universally. I wonder whether we can build new
relevant conceptions which are simpler and more effective. What we
need to research is the common features of information in its old use.
According to my idea, the customarily named information is the
collection of three kinds of things´ attributes: things themselves
(including cause or effect formed through their interaction), the
attributes of things that someone thinks and simulates, and the
attributes of tools someone or something uses when considers,
expresses, or simulates something. The first kind of attributes of
things is based on facts, for example, the three states of water.
This are physical, chemical, biological, social or any other
properties of things, irrefutable and objective, which have nothing
to do with any expressive way related to the thing (such spoken and
written languages, music or pictures). The second kind is related
with the inner thoughts, or expressions through talk, or sentence,
namely, some attributes of things that someone can find; or the
attributes of things that could be simulate according to science and
technology. Among which some are true to the facts, but some are
incompletely, while others are not in any way. The third kind is the
attributes of tools used by someone (or something) when he himself
thinks, or expresses, or simulates something, i.e. the state of
brain neurons when he thinks, the line trend of words when writes,
the vibration frequency and intensity of sound when speaks, the bit
of circuit devices in a computer, or the models of devices used in
an experiment, etc.. Supposing that the sign X represents the first
kind of attributes, X’ the second, and X_nlfb the third, and info
represents the information, we can simply express the customarily
named information as follows:
info = X +X ’+X _nlfb (FIS2010, in Beijing Conference).
Common features of information, i.e. things’ attributes.
Moreover, please take care of those false information based on nothing.
Thanking the patience!
Qiao Tian-qing
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QTQ
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