Dear Mark Thanks for your commentaries. Our use of the term "foundational" is more philosophical than practical. You are right; the term contradicts in some sense our intentions which are "very" practical. (This is a term which we could leave behind without hesitation.) In fact, we have no intentions in "instituting" a new concept of "information". Our work is "foundational" only in one aspect, and that is in searching for methods to measure the informational value of collective acts in everyday life. We found that it was necessary to classify human acts in such a way that their informational value could be "operative" (useful in practical tasks); we did that, grouping the acts in types depending on their complexity. We found that these acts could also be distinguished in relation to their consequences on the everyday world. We noticed that the movement from the very complex acts to the simplest acts follows a reduction of the surrounding world and that the human body is the natural reference in the understanding of this reduction. We knew that we could express informational value in relation to probabilities and found in the von Mises/Popper frequency series a possible and easy solution (an accessible mathematics). We insist; we have been working only with practical problems and we have not been thinking so much of which concept of information we are using; we believe that cybernetics does not address the practical problems we confront. However, we are sure that if we succeed, some cybernetic theorem will explain our success. The question is that the state of knowledge we have today is insufficient to understand the simplest informational problems in our surrounding world. Informational theory and cybernetics have been developed in the world of Physics; instead, we try to develop solutions that work in everyday life. If you understand as "variety" the measure of the "states of a system", the series of von Mises/Popper could be our kind of variety, but we are not sure. You are certain, our "acts" are neither "actions" nor "events", but they are not the hybrids of Latour either. Our acts are phenomenological; they are intended to be congruent with concepts as "work", "money", "culture", "thing", "market", and the like. The concept "informational value" for example, is very close to the concept of "information" without meaning exact the same.
Fernando Flores PhD Associate Professor History of Ideas and Sciences Lund University
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