Cari colleghi, come ho scritto altre volte senza tanto successo, forse perché com-unico con la lingua italiana, è la mia "Nuova economia" a mediare il rapporto tra biologia e fisica. Difatti nel capitolo 14. di "Valore e valutazioni" (FrancoAngeli, Milano 1999) dichiaro: "In conclusione, ribadisco la necessità di una svolta (?) epistemologica basata sulla compresenza e sulla complementarità della coppia empatia-astrazione e della coppia senso-simbolo, nei processi scientifici, per le tre dimensioni: personale, intersoggettiva e macro-sistemica. Ciò si può ottenere adottando un modello ontogenetico-dialogico centrato sull'ambivalenza o dualità dell'essere, dell'agire e del conoscere, caratterizzato, cioè, dalla coppia differenza-uguaglianza, interno-esterno, astrazione-empatia, soggettivo-oggettivo, senso-simbolo: a partire da Luhmann bisogna andare oltre Luhmann utilizzando il pensiero di Husserl e di Stein". La mia teoria del valore economica, basata sulla combinazione creativa di energia e informazione o sulla combinazione creativa delle tre neg-entropie (termodinamica, eco-biologica o genealogica e matematico-semantica), è intersoggettiva e consente di determinare in modo oggettivo i valori (inter-)soggettivi. "In questa logica definisco i beni culturali e/o naturali in funzione della: testimonianza materiale avente valore di civiltà o meglio la civiltà presente testimonia, conserva, valorizza e gestisce i beni culturali passati; creazione di neg-entropia; soddisfazione del più importante bisogno (economico) di godimento della vita" (F.Rizzo, "Economia del patrimonio architettonico-ambientale", FrancoAngeli, Milano 1983-99). L'armonia che governa il mondo è meravigliosa: bisogna saperla cogliere. Il disaccordo è un'armonia non facilmente compresa. Buone vacanze a Pedro e a tutti. Francesco Rizzo
2015-08-02 9:54 GMT+02:00 Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov < plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com>: > Dear colleagues, > > I think that this discussion about phenomenology, or better said > "phenomenological philosophy", is essential, but may go in the wrong > direction. As for the common grounds that Loet addressed in his note, I > assume that some of us are continuing the path of Varela’s naturalisation > of phenomenology. If you are a bit patient, you can see the results of our > effort in this direction by the end of the year: > > > http://www.journals.elsevier.com/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology/call-for-papers/special-theme-issue-on-integral-biomathics-life-sciences-mat/ > > This special volume is a collection of 41 papers discussing the aspects of > phenomenological philosophy in mathematics, physics, biology and > biosemiotics, incl. FIS contributors (Marijuan, Matsuno, Marchal, Goranson) > and other prominent scientists representing their fields. > > I suggest to continue this discussion next year on the grounds of this > volume. > > Best wishes, > > Plamen > > > > On Sun, Aug 2, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net> > wrote: > >> Dear colleagues, >> >> >> >> Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is >> according to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the >> transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our >> reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction >> between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Intersubjectivity is *res >> cogitans*. It is not "being" like in the Latin *esse*, but it remains >> reflexively available. Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science >> which follows (in "*The Crisis*") is anti-positivistic. The >> intersubjectivity is constructed and we live in these constructions. >> >> >> >> Descartes focused on the subjective *Cogito*. According to him, we meet >> in the doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained, >> that is, God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the >> *cogitatum*: that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold >> in Transcendency, but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to >> one another not only in "being", but also in terms of expectations. This >> was elaborated as "dual contingency" (among others, by Parsons). The >> dynamics of inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly >> discourses, but also stock exchanges. >> >> >> >> Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept >> the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: "As long as we are born from >> mothers ..." He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and >> others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to >> Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences >> sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the >> sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned >> that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of >> the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind >> of materialism. >> >> >> >> Luhmann "criticized" Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider >> meaning ("*Sinn*") as constructed in and by communication. In my >> opinion, this is an important step because it opens the realm of a >> communication theory based on interhuman interactions as different from >> basing theories (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the *homo >> economicus* or agent-based modelling). The communications can be >> considered as first-order attributes to agents; the analysis of >> communications is in terms of second-order attributes; for example, codes >> of communication. This is very much the domain of the information sciences >> (although Luhmann did not see this connection). >> >> >> >> In sum, “phenomenological” is sometimes used as an appeal to return to >> the phenomena without invoking explaining principles *a priori*. The >> question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are >> also part of this “reality”. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by >> material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl’s >> critique of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of >> “reality” to *res extensa* (that what “is”). Derivatives of *esse* such >> as ontology dominate the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the >> *expected* uncertainty in a distribution. Thus, we stand on common >> ground that does not exist. J >> >> >> >> Note that this discussion is different from the one about “being” versus >> “becoming” (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is >> “life”/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies >> “nature” as a given? How can one perhaps distinguish scientific domains in >> these terms? >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Loet >> >> >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Robert E. >> Ulanowicz >> Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 1:04 AM >> To: Joseph Brenner >> Cc: fis >> Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism >> >> >> >> Dear Joseph et al., >> >> >> >> I'm afraid I can't comment on the adequacy Husserlian phenomenology, as I >> never could get very far into Hursserl. I would just add that there is also >> a variety of phenomenology associated with thermodynamics and engineering. >> >> >> >> The generic meaning of phenomenology is the study of phenomena in >> abstraction of their eliciting causes. This applies to almost all of >> classical thermodynamics and much of engineering. The idea is to describe >> the behavior of systems in quantitative fashion. If the resulting >> mathematical description proves reliable, it becomes a phenomenological >> description. PV=nRT is such a description. Too often physicists try to >> identify thermodynamics with statistical mechanics, an action that is >> vigorously eschewed by engineers, who claim the field as their own. >> >> >> >> I have spent most of my career with the phenomenology of quantified >> networks, where phenomena such as intersubjectivity (if I correctly >> understand what is meant by the term) thoroughly pervades events. >> >> >> >> Of course, I'm feathering my own nest when I say that I believe that the >> only *current* fruitful way to approach systems biology is via such >> phenomenology! (See Section 3 in >> >> <http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/files/Reckon.pdf>.) >> >> >> >> The best, >> >> Bob >> >> >> >> > Dear Mark, >> >> > >> >> > Thank you for this note, which points correctly to the fact that there >> >> > was something missing in the debate. Intersubjectivity is a good word >> >> > for it, but phenomenology in general is probably no longer the answer, >> >> > if it ever was. Check out the new book by Tom Sparrow, The End of >> >> > Phenomenology, Edinburgh, 2014; Sparrow is a key player in a new >> >> > 'movement' called Speculative Realism which is proposed as a >> replacement. >> >> > >> >> > What does this have to do with information? I think a great deal and >> >> > worth a new debate, even in extremis. The problem with Husserlian >> >> > phenomenology is that it fails to deliver an adequate picture of >> >> > reality, but speculative realism is too anti-scientific to do any >> >> > better. What I think is possible, however, is to reconcile the key >> >> > insights of Heidegger with science, especially, with information >> >> > science. This places information science in a proper intersubjective >> context where its utility can be seen. >> >> > For discussion, I hope. >> >> > >> >> > Best, >> >> > >> >> > Joseph >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Fis mailing list >> >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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