Dear Soren, I will respond to your letter by adding comments below. This will be my last entry in this discussion until next week. Best, Lou K.
>> >> >> >> Dear Lou >> You wrote: “ I am interested in how Soren Brier will react to these, perhaps >> seen as indirect, remarks on mind and meaning. I take thought and the realm >> of discrimination as the start of epistemology and I do not regard the >> immediate apparent objects of our worlds as anything but incredibly >> decorated entities appearing after a long history of indicative shift. What >> is their original nature? It is empty. Emptiness is form and form is >> emptiness. The form we take to exist arises from framing nothing.” >> >> Answer: Can I deduce that the “we” that takes the form to exist by framing >> nothing is also something that arose by framing nothing? [If I were to be consistent and absolutist about these metaphors, then indeed the we also arises by framing nothing. That is consistent with ‘I’ as a fill-in or empty nexus. You can ask who did that? But I say it is ungrammatical to ask the question at the inception of a distinction where the distinction and the observer arise together.] >> Who did that? How do you get from your self-organizing logical thinking to >> experiential consciousness and it’s dynamics of making distinctions from >> cybernetics and without stipulating a philosophical framework with an >> epistemology an ontology? [I do not have a story to tell that shows how to get something from nothing. I only observe that it is the case. All creation stories have a gap at the beginning.] >> And an anthropology? >> >> I do see that a theory of form is essential for you as it is for Spencer >> Brown and Peirce as well. But Peirce is open enough to infer to a Cosmogony >> when he writes: >> >> … the immaterial contained in the material. … Now the meaning of a thing is >> what it conveys. Thus, when a child burns his finger at the candle, he has >> not only excited a disagreeable sensation, but has also learned a lesson in >> prudence. Now the mere matter cannot have given him this notion, since >> matter has no notions to give. Who originated it then? It must be that this >> thought was put into nature at the beginning of the world. It must have been >> meant because it was conveyed. Further, what is the necessary condition to >> matter’s conveying a notion. It is that it shall present a sensible and >> distinct form. … It must be sensible to be anything to us and it must be >> distinct or distinguished to be a form to us…. Thus it is the form of a >> thing that carries its meaning. But the same thing conveys different >> meanings to different faculties. So there are different orders of meaning in >> nature. The poet with his esthetic eye reads the secret of the sea. ... The >> man of science with the eye of reason reads the secret of Nature as a >> system. (W 1 50) >> [Well, he says “this thought was put into Nature at the beginning of the World. As I said, all creation stories have a JUMP at the beginning.] >> When I read your cybernetic arguing I wonder how man can read the secrets of >> nature? In CP 5.488 Peirce makes a crucial ontological distinction; namely >> that: “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed >> exclusively of signs”. [I say the distinguished universe of man is perfused with signs. I find it romantic to imagine that this is all there is. I do not know if that is all there is. I doubt it. When you wash away all the signs then ….NOTHING IS EVERYTHING!] >> Only the latter idea implies Peirce’s thesis that signs are not restricted >> to the living world, in the sense that semiosis is also at work already in >> the pre-living development of the universe. This is what John Deely calls >> physiosemiosis. The idea is not pansemiotic, but that signs develop within >> cosmogony, as part of the development of the universe’s reasoning >> capability. Thus, it accepts the physical description of the processes in >> the early universe before life emerged, but it is not physicalist, as it is >> encompassed in a greater semiotic cosmogony. This is not pansemiotics since >> it only implies that the possibility of semiosis lies in physics, – but not >> that those possibilities are realized in all physical processes. >> Physiosemiosis explores the question of exactly where and how the >> possibility of semiosis lies in physics. This means that the overall view of >> evolution is the connection between man and the universe. The connection >> between outer and inner nature was driven by the universal development of >> semiotic reasoning in cosmogony (CP 1.615). [I summarize all of this by saying that every distinction is accompanied by an awareness. Every distinction is semiotic.] >> Overall, this gives Peirce the alternative view of Cosmogony expressed in “A >> Guess at the Riddle” that might be compatible for both science and religion >> if they accept the semiotic pragmaticist framework. He starts in the usual >> thycistic way with absolute change with the tendency to take habits. Then he >> writes about the development of the universe in a way that is compatible >> with the modern theories of multiverses (Carr 2007): >> Our conceptions of the first stages of the development, before time yet >> existed, must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of the first >> chapter of Genesis. Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there >> would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call >> a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second >> flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some >> sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come >> other successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the >> tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events would >> have been bound together into something like a continuous flow. We have no >> reason to think that even now time is quite perfectly continuous and uniform >> in its flow. The quasi-flow which would result would, however, differ >> essentially from time in this respect that it would not necessarily be in a >> single stream. Different flashes might start different streams, between >> which there should be no relations of contemporaneity or succession. So one >> stream might branch into two, or two might coalesce. But the further result >> of habit would inevitably be to separate utterly those that were long >> separated, and to make those which presented frequent common points coalesce >> into perfect union. Those that were completely separated would be so many >> different worlds which would know nothing of one another; so that the effect >> would be just what we actually observe… >> >> Pairs of states will also begin to take habits, and thus each state having >> different habits with reference to the different other states will give rise >> to bundles of habits, which will be substances. Some of these states will >> chance to take habits of persistency, and will get to be less and less >> liable to disappear; while those that fail to take such habits will fall out >> of existence. Thus, substances will get to be permanent. >> >> In fact, habits, from the mode of their formation, necessarily consist in >> the permanence of some relation, and therefore, on this theory, each law of >> nature would consist in some permanence, such as the permanence of mass, >> momentum, and energy. In this respect, the theory suits the facts admirably. >> (CP 1.412-15) >> >> Adding to this construction of categories and cosmogony, Peirce also >> establishes his metaphysical framework based on pure mathematics, >> <x-msg://11/#_ftn1> phenomenology, aesthetics, ethics and logic as >> semiotics. He writes in his Cambridge Lectures (Peirce 1898): “metaphysics >> must draw its principles from logic, … logic must draw its principles ... >> from mathematics” (Peirce 1992:123). Since all cognition, thinking and >> communication is done with and through signs, and since the processes in the >> natural environment (geology and ecology) work dynamically on sign >> processes, there is no reason to suppose any limits to our knowledge on one >> hand and on the other that we know the whole truth in any precise detail. >> Logic is semiotics. Peirce writes: >> >> Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another >> name for semiotic (σημειωτική), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of >> signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary”, or formal, I mean >> that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an >> observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we >> are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no >> means necessary, as to what must be the characters of all signs used by a >> “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of >> learning by experience. As to that process of abstraction, it is itself a >> sort of observation. ( CP 2.227) >> [You are right that i do not disagree with Peirce, not at all] >> I do not think you disagree very much with Peirce here Lou, but I think the >> cybernetic background you are coming from has skipped important parts of the >> philosophical work to put up an adequate metaphysical framework. [Naw. I am not speaking from cybernetics. What the heck is cybernetics? I am speaking from contemplating a distinction. You could take me as an afficianado of the Peirce Calculus written in Spencer-Brown form and influenced by both early and late Wittgenstein. I am skeptical of cosmology. I think we make a lot out of very little and indeed our worlds are built from our signing and the limits of our signing are the limits of our world.] >> This is what lead me on to Luhmann and from him to Peirce. I have a short >> column in CHK on that >> http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:FLPGS9TfROIJ:www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brier/integration.doc+&cd=13&hl=da&ct=clnk&gl=dk >> >> <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:FLPGS9TfROIJ:www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brier/integration.doc+&cd=13&hl=da&ct=clnk&gl=dk> >> I have discussed this with Maturana now and then over the last 20 >> years and with Heinz von Foerster for whom I wrote a paper analyzing his >> theory development to his 70 years festschrift: “The construction of >> information and communication: A cybersemiotic reentry into Heinz von >> Foerster's metaphysical construction of second-order cybernetics” it can be >> downloaded here >> https://www.academia.edu/3140705/The_construction_of_information_and_communication_A_cybersemiotic_reentry_into_Heinz_von_Foersters_metaphysical_construction_of_second-order_cybernetics >> >> <https://www.academia.edu/3140705/The_construction_of_information_and_communication_A_cybersemiotic_reentry_into_Heinz_von_Foersters_metaphysical_construction_of_second-order_cybernetics> >> >> There is much more Peirce stuff on cosmogenesis where he is very close to >> Spencer Brow’s conceptions. But this mail is already too long. >> >> Best >> Søren >> Fra: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es >> <mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>] På vegne af Louis H Kauffman >> Sendt: 16. april 2016 06:58 >> Til: FIS Webinar >> Cc: Maxine Sheets-Johnstone >> Emne: [Fis] _ Re: _ Discussion >> >> Dear Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, >> I would like to make a remark on your comment below. >> >> "(4). References made to Gödel’s theorem to uphold certain theses can be >> definitively >> questioned. The claim that Gödel makes on behalf of his theorem is >> inaccurate. >> Three articles that demonstrate the inaccuracy, one from a phenomenological >> perspective, two others from a logical-analytical perspective, warrant >> clear-headed >> study. In brief, self-referential statements are vacuous, hence neither true >> nor false. >> Moreover the sentences expressing the statements may be used to make two >> quite >> different statements, a fact ignored by Gödel.(See Note #4: “Self-Reference >> and >> Gödel’s Theorem,” “The Liar Syndrome,” and “Doctor’s Diagnosis Sustained”)” >> >> My remark takes the form of a partially linguistic analysis of reference and >> it will be a bit technical/symbolic. >> My point is to show that reference naturally leads to self-reference in >> domains where there is a sufficiently rich structure of reference. >> I also have a question for you in that you say that "The claim that Gödel >> makes on behalf of his theorem is inaccurate.”. Can you please articulate >> your view of >> Goedel’s claim. There are many claims about Goedel that are inaccurate, but >> I would not say that the inaccuracies are his! >> >> Now to get to my analysis. First let A——> B denote a reference from A to B. >> You can think of A as the name of B. But it can be just an ordered >> relationship from A to B and in that case >> A and B can be physical entities or symbolic entities. Usually in naming we >> think of A as symbolic and B as physical, but we mix them in our language. >> For example, if I am introduced to you >> then I acquire a pointer Maxine ——> SJ where I use SJ to denote the person >> you are. This might be the person sensed visually upon being met. Before we >> were introduced, there was SJ in my sight, but now I know her name. >> >> This situation shifts almost immediately. I learn to associate the name >> Maxine with SJ the person, and so when I see you next I see you as “SJ - >> Maxine” and it seems that your name comes along with you. I call this shift >> the Indicative Shift and denote it as follows. >> A ——> B shifts to >> #A ——> BA. >> #Maxine is my internally indexed name for that entity SJ-Maxine who is seen >> with a name associated with her. >> You could call #Maxine the ‘meta-name’ of SJ-Maxine. Of course in our actual >> language #Maxine is still pronounced and wrote as Maxine. >> The indicative shift occurs in all levels of our language and thought. The >> objects of our thought and perception are so laden with the names and >> symbols that have been shifted to them, that their ‘original nature’ is >> nearly invisible. I will not involve this to a discussion of the >> ding-an-sich or with meditation practice, but these are important avenues to >> pursue. >> >> I am imagining a human being (or another organism) as a very big entity with >> the perceptual and naming capabilities who is endowed with this ability to >> make indicative shifts. >> >> Such a being would notice its own shifting operation. >> >> The being may then engage in a naming process such as M ——> #. >> M would be the being’s name for its own operation (so observed) of shifting >> reference. >> It does require a certain age for this to occur. >> But then this naming would be shifted and we would go from >> M ——> # >> to >> #M ——> #M. >> At this point the being has attained linguistic self-reference. The being >> can say “I am the meta-name of my own naming process.” >> This nexus or fixed point of self-reference can occur naturally in a being >> that has sufficient ability to distinguish, name and create. >> >> In this way, I convince myself that there is nothing special about >> self-reference. It arises naturally in observing systems. And I convince >> myself that self-reference is central to an organized and reflective >> cognition. Even though it is empty to say that “I am the one who says I.” >> this emptiness becomes though language an organizing center for our >> explorations of our own world and the worlds of others. The beauty of “I am >> the one who says I.” is that it is indeed a vacuous reference. Anyone can >> take it on. The “I” can refer to any observing system sophisticated enough >> to give it meaning. >> >> My example should be expanded into a discussion of the role and creation of >> meaning in observing systems, but I shall stop here. >> >> I am interested in how Soren Brier will react to these, perhaps seen as >> indirect, remarks on mind and meaning. >> I take thought and the realm of discrimination as the start of epistemology >> and I do not regard the immediate apparent objects of our worlds as anything >> but incredibly decorated entities >> appearing after a long history of indicative shift. What is their original >> nature? It is empty. Emptiness is form and form is emptiness. The form we >> take to exist arises from framing nothing. >> >> Now, I caution you in replying to please read carefully what I have written >> here. >> I will not reply directly to the discussion for another week or so. >> >> Best, >> Lou Kauffman >> P.S. The indicative shift is precisely the formalism in back of the workings >> of Goedel’s Theorem. >> See “Categorical Pairs and the Indicative Shift”, >> http://arxiv.org/pdf/1102.2048.pdf <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1102.2048.pdf> >> >> >> >> On Apr 11, 2016, at 11:41 PM, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone <m...@uoregon.edu >> <mailto:m...@uoregon.edu>> wrote: >> >> To all colleagues, >> >> I hope I may voice a number of concerns that have arisen in the course >> of the ongoing discussions that are ostensibly about phenomenology and >> the life sciences. >> >> The concerns begin with a non-recognition of what is surely the ground >> floor of real-life, real-time realities, namely, animation, not in the >> sense of being alive or in opposition to the inanimate, but in the sense >> of motion, movement, kinetics. As Aristotle cogently remarked, >> “Nature is a principle of motion and change. . . . We must therefore see >> that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too >> would be unknown” (Physics 200b12-14). >> >> Through and through--from animate organisms to an ever-changing world-- >> movement is foundational to understandings of subject and world, and of >> subject/world relationships, and this whether subject and world are >> examined phenomenologically or scientifically. In short, movement is at >> the core of information and meaning, at the core of mind and consciousness, >> at the core of both gestural and verbal language, at the core of nervous >> system and organic functionings, at the core of molecular transformations, >> at the core of ellipses, electrons, gravity, waves, particles, and so on, >> and further, at the core of time, the concept, measurement, and meaning of >> time. >> >> I enumerate below specifics with respect to what is essentially the >> foundational dynamic reality. The summary concerns are followed by >> references that document each concern. If further specifics are wanted or >> if specific articles are wanted, kindly contact m...@uoregon.edu >> <mailto:m...@uoregon.edu> >> >> (1). Instincts and/or feelings motivate animate organisms to move. >> Without such instincts or feelings there would be no disposition >> to move. An ‘animate organism’ would in truth be akin to a statue, >> a statue Condillac described two and a half centuries ago as having >> first this sense given to it, then that sense given to it, but that, >> lacking movement, is powerless to gain knowledge of the world. Such >> a movement deficient creature would furthermore lack the biological >> capacity of responsivity, a near universal characteristic of life. >> The startle reflex is a premier example. Can what is evolutionarily >> given be “illogical”? Clearly, feelings are not “illogical,” but move >> through animate bodies, moving them to move. Without feelings of >> curiosity, for example, or awe, or wonder, there would be no exploration >> of the natural world, no investigations, hence no “information.” >> Furthermore, without feelings of movement—initially, from an evolutionary >> perspective, no proprioception, and later, no kinesthesia--there would be >> no near and far, no weak and strong, no straight and curved, and so on, >> hence, no determinations of Nature. In short, there would be no information >> and no meaning. (See Note #1: The Primacy of Movement) >> >> (2). An excellent lead-in to scientific understandings of movement and >> its inherent dynamics lies in the extensive research and writings of >> J. A. Scott Kelso, Pierre de Fermat Laureate in 2007. Kelso was founder >> of the Center for Brain and Behavioral Studies and its Director for twenty >> years. His rigorous multi-dimensional experimental studies are anchored in >> coordination dynamics, an anchorage that is unconstrained by dogma. The >> breadth of his knowledge and his sense of open inquiry is apparent in the >> literature he cites in conjunction with his articles and books. His recent >> article in Biological Cybernetics that focuses on “Agency” is strikingly >> relevant to the present FIS discussion. It takes experience into account, >> specifically in the form of “positive feedback,” which obviously involves >> kinesthesia in a central way. Moreover his upcoming Opinion piece in Trends >> in Cognitive Science should be essential reading. (See Note #2: “The >> Coordination >> Dynamics of Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement” and The Complementary Nature) >> >> (3). As pointed out elsewhere, “Certainly words carry no patented meanings, >> but the term ‘phenomenology’ does seem stretched beyond its limits when it >> is used to denote either mere reportorial renderings of perceptible behaviors >> or actions, or any descriptive rendering at all of perceptible behaviors or >> actions. At the least, ‘phenomenology’ should be recognized as a very >> specific >> mode of epistemological inquiry invariably associated with the name Edmund >> Husserl. . . . ” >> Phenomenological inquiries are tethered to a very specific methodology, one >> as >> rigorous as that of science. Phenomenological findings are furthermore open >> to >> verification by others, precisely as in science. Moreover two forms of >> phenomenological analysis warrant recognition: static and genetic, the former >> being a determination of the essential character of the object of inquiry, >> the >> second being a determination of how the meaning of that object of inquiry >> came >> to be constituted, hence an inquiry into sedimentations of meaning, into >> protentions and retentions, into horizons of meaning, and so on. Thus too, >> what warrants recognition is the fact that bracketing is not the beginning >> and >> end of phenomenological methodology. On the contrary, bracketing is only the >> beginning. >> Phenomenological reduction follows bracketing and allows the essential >> character >> of the object of inquiry or the constitution of its meaning to come to light. >> (See Note #3: Animation: Analyses, Elaborations, and Implications”) >> >> (4). References made to Gödel’s theorem to uphold certain theses can be >> definitively >> questioned. The claim that Gödel makes on behalf of his theorem is >> inaccurate. >> Three articles that demonstrate the inaccuracy, one from a phenomenological >> perspective, two others from a logical-analytical perspective, warrant >> clear-headed >> study. In brief, self-referential statements are vacuous, hence neither true >> nor false. >> Moreover the sentences expressing the statements may be used to make two >> quite >> different statements, a fact ignored by Gödel.(See Note #4: “Self-Reference >> and >> Gödel’s Theorem,” “The Liar Syndrome,” and “Doctor’s Diagnosis Sustained") >> >> (5): Information is commonly understood as factual knowledge, thus >> empirically >> sustained and sustainable knowledge. It is thus a matter of the condition or >> nature or workings, etc., of something out there in the world, including even >> your liver if that is the source of information. Mathematics has its origin >> in >> arithmetic, the latter having its origins in counting things in the world, >> including if not beginning with one’s fingers, and in shape, including if not >> beginning with differentiating contours and size, thus with linear and >> amplitudinal >> dimensions of things in the world. As I wrote in my last posting, I hope that >> someone will take up the challenge of doing a phenomenological analysis of >> information. >> An inquiry into the relationship of meaning to information and of >> information to >> meaning might then be undertaken. That step, to my mind, would provide solid >> ground >> for linking informational sciences and phenomenology, linking by way of >> showing—- >> demonstrating—complementarities, precisely complementarities in the sense >> that >> Bohr and Kelso specify. >> >> Note #1: Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2011. The Primacy of Movement, expanded >> 2nd ed. >> Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing >> >> Note #2: Kelso, J. A. Scott and Armin Fuchs. 2016. “The Coordination >> Dynamics of >> Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement,” Biological Cybernetics: DOI >> 10.1007/s00422-015-0676-0. >> Kelso, J. A. Scott and David A. Engström. 2006. The Complementary Nature. >> Cambridge, >> MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. >> >> Note #3: Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2015. “Animation: Analyses, Elaborations, >> and Implications,” >> Husserl Studies, 30/3: 247-268. DOI 10.1007/s10743-014-9156-y >> >> Note #4: Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “Self-Reference and Gödel’s Theorem: A >> Husserlian Analysis." >> Husserl Studies, 19: 131-151. >> Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “The Liar Syndrome,” SATS/Nordic Journal of >> Philosophy, 3/1: 37-55. >> Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “Doctor’s Diagnosis Sustained,” SATS/Nordic >> Journal of Philosophy, >> 3/2: 142-153. >> >> Maxine >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis> >> >> >>  <x-msg://11/#_ftnref1> Peirce distinguished between formal logic as a >> mathematical branch of the science of discovery and pure theoretical >> mathematics as the most abstract of all sciences (CP 4.244, 4.263, c.1902) >> and he argued that the reasoning of pure mathematics had no need of any >> separate theory of logic to reinforce them. “… mathematics is the only >> science which can be said to stand in no need of philosophy, excepting, of >> course, some branches of philosophy itself.” (CP 1.249) From his father, >> Peirce had the view that mathematics is the discipline that draw necessary >> conclusions and is its own logic. He did not see logic as a foundational >> science, but as one of the normative sciences like aesthetics and ethics >> where logic is the science of correct reasoning, as mentioned above. >
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