Hi John,

> On 26 Feb 2018, at 04:37, John Collier <ag...@ncf.ca> wrote:
> Inclined to agree with Joseph.

OK. Nice.

> I would like to point out that there are different meanings for "real', and 
> one has to be clear about ones metaphysics to make the idea (somewhat) clear.

Yes. That is a key point. Then if we want to adopt the scientific attitude in 
metaphysics/theology, we better be neutral at the start.

The god/non-god debate has hidden the original question raised (more or less 
explicitly) by Plato about what is ultimately real, and the doubt was about the 
primariness of the physical. The choice, for xeusippes was between physicalism 
(the ultimate reality is the physical or material universe) and mathematicalism 
or theologicalism, where the dispute is somehow between the numbers (the finite 
things) and the ideas (usually infinite).

Now, it can be shown that with the digital mechanist hypothesis (the invariance 
of consciousness for a digital functional substitution made at *some* level) is 
logically or at least epistemologically incompatible with materialism (in the 
weak sense of the ontological commitment in primary material substance, or 
dubbed as such (technically we can introduce more nuances here. Tegmark suggest 
a Mathematicalism which is still largely physicalist).

With digital mechanism, consciousness get contagiated to all computations 
supporting us so that we are first person indeterminate on an infinity of 
computations below our substitution level. (Like in Feynman-Everett formulation 
of QM). Physics get redefined by the observable by the universal machine, which 
in this case can be translated in arithmetical terms. 

> Peirce, for example, would call Plato's shadows (which aren't really shadows 
> at all, real, but not existent.

Here, the universal machines, when we listen to them (which today requires 
mainly studying Gödel’s proof and Kleene’s technic, or searching for the 
relevant papers as the literature is very rich, too much rich somehow) suggests 
a very simple Pythagorean ontology (only the natural numbers exists), and the 
only laws are the laws of succession, addition and multiplication. That already 
entails the 3p existence of all prime numbers, but also of all computations. So 
the existence becomes the existence is the semantic of the first order theory 
of arithmetic (ExP(x)).

Then, the incompleteness makes Gödel’s arithmetical provability predicate into 
a (strange) believability predicate. The self-referentially correct universal 
machine quickly becomes modest and does not prove for all proposition that 
provable(p) -> p. []p->p is not a law in the provability logic.

But there is much more. This makes possible to “meta”define knowledge in the 
manner of Theaetetus (true belief), by []p & p. By a theorem of Traski, we 
cannot define the arithmetical truth in the arithmetical language, but for each 
proposition we can mimic its truth by its assertability (as we talk about 
simple machine which we can trust). But this associates the machine (played in 
arithmetic)  by the beweisbar predicate of Gödel to a semantic, and it obeys a 
very different logic from the logic of “[]” (provability/believability).It 
provides a notion of first person and a logic of evolving states of knowledge, 
close to intuitionist logic, and having topological semantics. Then 
incompleteness push further the nuances, by making the weaker nuance []p & <>t, 
where we attach only the consistency of the machine, instead of the truth. This 
is what we need to have a notion of certainty when doing an experience, and 
this, on the semi-computable p, provides the quantisation justifying a nest of 
quantum logics lurking there. 

I don’t claim any truth. If mechanism is correct, the physical reality is in 
the head of the universal Turing machine. That makes the theory easily 
refutable empirically, by comparing the physics in the head of the universal 
digital machine, with the physics we observe.

Up to now it fits, as we recover a quantisation at the place needed.

Consciousness of a person p supported by a machine m can be defined quasi 
axiomatically by what the machine m can assert as true, unprovable, 
undefinable, but also undoubtable. And invariant in the relative digital 
substitution for some level.

I think that the universal (Turing) machine might be maximally intelligent and 
conscious.  We can only make it more stupid (albeit more competent in some 
tasks). It will still take some time before they become as stupid as the 
humans, though.

> The sort of shadows that we normal experience are both real and existent on 
> Peirce's account.


With Mechanism, we get the “ontological” existence, or the basic objects that 
we assume, and I took the numbers 0, 1, 2, … because everyone is familiar, but 
any terms of a Turing universal machinery would do. Theology and Physics are 
machine independent, as it depends on *all* computations, and that is mimicked 
by all universal machine/word/number/finite-entity. Then we get all the 
phenomenological nuances by the modal variants: physical existence if of the 
type []<>p, on the logic of []p & <>t, with p a semi-computable/provable 

Peirce’s account is not fundamental at this stage, but it should plausibly 
introduced itself in the perception modes, around the []p & <>t & p nuances 
implied by incompleteness. It is very interesting, but to see how the 
“persistent and partially sharable illusion” emerges, the semantic of Tarski is 
enough (and easier for a mathematician of course).

I don’t want you to bother too much, as mathematical logic and computer science 
are not well known, and when used in philosophy it is often invalid ((cf 
Penrose and Lucas). Yet very interesting as such works points on the response 
of the universal machine, which makes such reasoning into a confusion between 
[]p & p with []p. 

Sometimes I agree with many people here, but then some can either dismiss the 
digital world, or favour a material basic reality, and well, some choice 
(Aristotle or Plato) does not have to been made, but we must be aware that not 
everybody take physicalism or materialism for granted. My works make Quantum 
Mechanics testing retrospectively Aristotle V Plato in Metaphysic/Theology, and 
that confirms mechanism, and not materialism, unless we introduce some wave 
packet reduction, which indeed is an alternative taken by some.


PS Second, and thus last, post of the week! 

> John
> On 2018/02/26 4:58 AM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> 
> wrote:
>> Dear FISers,
>> With all due respect to Krassimir, Sung, and his son, it is becoming a 
>> matter of scientific interest that statements by them and others to the 
>> effect that "systematic research of what the 'shadows' are a part" has not 
>> been done are made routinely. First of all, the logic in reality  of Lupasco 
>> about which I have been talking here for 10 years, includes a new mereology 
>> in which the dynamic relations between part and whole are set out for 
>> discussion. Second, while the 'diagram' of Merleau-Ponty may be considered 
>> interesting as philosophy and as a foundation of religious belief, I see no 
>> reason to include it, without heavy qualification, in a discussion of the 
>> foundations of information science.
>> Thank you,
>> Joseph
>> ----Message d'origine----
>> De : s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu <mailto:s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu>
>> Date : 25/02/2018 - 15:04 (PST)
>> À : ag...@ncf.ca <mailto:ag...@ncf.ca>, fis@listas.unizar.es 
>> <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
>> Objet : Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!
>> Hi Krassimir,
>> I agree with you that  "The shadows are real but only a part of the whole. 
>> What is needed is a systematic research from what they are part."
>> In my previous post,  I was suggesting that Shadows are a part of the 
>> irreudicible triad consisting of Form (A), Shadow (B) and Thought (C).  The 
>> essential notion of the ITR (Irreducible Triadic realrtion) is that A, B, 
>> and C cannot be reduced to any one or a pair of the triad.  This 
>> automatically means that 'Shadow' is a part of the whole triad (which is, to 
>> me, another name for the Ultimate Reality), as Form and Thought are.  In 
>> other words, the Ultimate Reality is not Form nor Shadow nor Thought 
>> individually but all of them together, since they constitute an irreducible 
>> triad.    This idea is expressed in 1995  in another way: The Ultimate 
>> Reality is the complementary union of the Visble and the Invisible World 
>> (see Table 1 attached).  Apparently a similar idea underlies the philosophy 
>> of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), according to my son, Douglas Sayer Ji 
>> (see his semior research thesis submitted in 1996 to the Department of 
>> Philosophy at Rutgers University under the guidance of B. Wilshire, 
>> attached). 
>> All the best.
>> Sung
>> From: Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> 
>> <mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> on behalf of John Collier 
>> <ag...@ncf.ca> <mailto:ag...@ncf.ca>
>> Sent: Sunday, February 25, 2018 2:51 PM
>> To: fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!
>> Daer Krassimir, List
>> I basically support what you are saying. I understand the mathematics you 
>> presented, I am good at mathematics and studied logic with some of the best. 
>> However, and this is a big however, giving a mathematical or logical proof 
>> by itself, in its formalism, does not show anything at all. One has to be 
>> able to connect teh mathematics to experience in a comprehensible way. This 
>> was partly the topic of my dissertation, and I take a basically Peircean 
>> approach, though there are others that are pretty strong as well.
>> I fgenerally skip over the mathematics and look for the empirical 
>> connections. If I find them, then generally all becomes clear. Without this, 
>> the formalism is nothing more than formalism. It does not help to give 
>> formal names to things and assume that this identifies things, Often trying 
>> to follow up approaches kine this is a profound waste of time. I try to, and 
>> often am able to, express my ideas in a nonformal way. Some mathematically 
>> oriented colleagues see this as automatically defective, since they think 
>> that formal representation is all that really rigorously explains things. 
>> This sort of thinking (in Logical Positivism) eventually led to its own 
>> destruction as people started to ask the meaning of theoretical terms and 
>> their relation to observations. It is a defunct and self destructive 
>> metaphysics. Irt leads nowhere -- my PhD thesis was about this problem. It 
>> hurts me to see people making the same mistake, especially when it leads 
>> them to bizarre conclusions that are compatible with the formalism 
>> (actually, it is provable that almost anything is compatible with a specific 
>> formalism, up to numerosity).
>> I don't like to waste my time with such emptiness,
>> John
>> On 2018/02/25 6:22 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:
>>> Dear Sung,
>>> I like your approach but I think it is only a part of the whole.
>>> 1. The shadows are real but only a part of the whole. What is needed is a 
>>> systematic research from what they are part.
>>> 2. About the whole now I will use the category theory I have seen you like:
>>> CATA => F => CATB => G => CATC
>>> CATA => H => CATC
>>> F ○ G = H
>>> where
>>> F, G, and H are functors;
>>> CATII Î CAT is the category of information interaction categories;
>>> CATA Î CATII and CATC Î CATII  are the categories of mental models’ 
>>> categories;
>>> CATB Î CATII  is the category of models’ categories.
>>> Of course, I will explain this in natural language (English) in further 
>>> posts.
>>> ;
>>> Dear  Karl,
>>> Thank you for your post – it is very useful and I will discus it in further 
>>> posts.
>>> ;
>>> Dear Pedro,
>>> Thank you for your nice words.
>>> Mathematics is very good to be used when all know the mathematical 
>>> languages.
>>> Unfortunately, only a few scientists are involved in the mathematical 
>>> reasoning, in one hand, and, as the Bourbaki experiment had shown, not 
>>> everything is ready to be formalized.
>>> How much of FIS members understood what I had written above?
>>> The way starts from philosophical reasoning  and only some times ends in 
>>> mathematical formal explanations.
>>> Friendly greetings
>>> Krassimir
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Fis mailing list
>>> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es>
>>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis 
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>> -- 
>> John Collier
>> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
>> Collier web page  
>> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fweb.ncf.ca%2Fcollier&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7C4be3d21049464c94484008d57c89414b%7Cb92d2b234d35447093ff69aca6632ffe%7C1%7C1%7C636551851333258845&sdata=rIcx4KChby6VazUEEwX4fp1Umhr4qIMxgQg6adIA5lo%3D&reserved=0>
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>> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> -- 
> John Collier
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
> Collier web page  <http://web.ncf.ca/collier>
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