Dear Stan,

> On 20 Mar 2018, at 20:22, Stanley N Salthe <> wrote:
> Bruno -- In this context I like to point out the constraints on our abilities 
> of perception.  First, we are physical.

That is a strong metaphysical assumption. See my paper for showing this is not 
compatible with the Digital Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science, 
which is my working hypothesis. 

Perception is a relative indexical relation between a (digital) machine 
(number, combinators, pattern of game of life, whatever) and other plausible, 
from its perspective, universal or not entities (infinitely many below the 
substitution level, making both matter and consciousness not Turing emulable 
(in the Mechanist perspective).

There are evidences for a physical reality, but I am not sure there are 
evidence for a primary physical reality. The use of math in physics is well 
explained if the physical appears to be a mathematical reality seen from 
internal creature represented, relatively incarnated or implemented in that 
mathematical reality.

I can prove, if you agree with very elementary arithmetic, the existence of the 
computations and the machine running them. I cannot prove the existence of a 
physical universe, but if Mechanism is true, the physical universe appearance 
can and must be explained by a statistics on all computations (seen in a first 
person way). That makes mechanism testable and indeed, thanks to Quantum 
Mechanics (without collapse) it fits very well up to now.

> Thus:
> {physical {material {biological {animal {mammal {primate {human {socialized 
> {with accumulated personal history }}}}}}}}}

Ok, but you will need “magical” (non Turing emulable, nor Recoverable) ability 
in your matter to select some computation. 

You invoke the God “Matter", but if it plays a role, I am no more sure I can 
say yes to …the doctor and survive qua computation.

Mechanism and Materialism, which are often used together, can be shown 
incompatible (it is basically my PhD thesis, and it is summed up in most of my 

So it is more like

{arithmetical{dream-like{biological{conscious{physical{{animal {mammal {primate 
{human {socialized {with accumulated personal history }}}}}}}}}

> Hence, actuality is for us non-existent.

Is not actuality existent *for us*, phenomenologically, and non-existent 
Ontologically, I guess you mean.  I am not sure I understand well.

> We live in a constructed reality.

The whole physicalness is indeed the arithmetic seen from the internal 
arithmetical beings, but the person attached to them are not arithmetical not 
even analytical (not even third person describable in any way).

I am aware that what I say contradicts 1500 years of (Aristotelian) theology, 
but then it was enforced by 1500 years of argument per authority, sometimes 



> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal < 
> <>> wrote:
> Hi Dai, Hi Carl, Hi colleagues,
> > On 19 Mar 2018, at 16:22, Dai Griffiths < 
> > <>> wrote:
> >
> > On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:
> >
> > >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between 
> > >“reality” and “data”
> >
> > That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that 
> > which we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we 
> > cannot perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.
> If not the whole of mathematics.
> To be provocative, I would me more like thinking that the data are an 
> observer tiny distorted part of reality, especially that we can never 
> distinguishes possibly genuine data with hallucinations and dreams.
> In the computationalist theory, a data is the input to some machine/number 
> program, the execution is the arithmetical semantic of some universal number 
> getting the machine and the data has its input.
> Now a data can be anything, and can be interpreted, and handled, quite 
> differently, if at all, by different universal, or not, programs. I identify 
> the person by its set of beliefs, and the first person by its subset of true 
> beliefs. Incompleteness makes this working well.
> >
> > > just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between the 
> > > note printed on the partiture,
> > > and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between the 
> > > description of the position
> > > in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his 
> > > hands.
> >
> > I do not think that these are the same case.
> I think that equating reality and data would lead to solipsism (which is 
> phenomenologically correct but ontologically incorrect).
> Also, is there a reality?
> And what could it be?
> We can’t answer, but we can do hypothesis/theory, and with mechanism the 
> physical reality becomes a phenomenological mode of self-reference of the 
> universal (in the sense of Post, Church, Kleene, Turing, …) machine/number.
> The biological evolution explains the biological origin of the humans, but to 
> avoid the behaviourist error of avoiding consciousness, eventually, we get a 
> “physical evolution”, where the physical laws somehow percolate from the 
> dreams of all universal numbers. The key is that from the universal machines' 
> first person perspectives it is “executed” by infinitely many universal 
> numbers below their computationalist substitution level. A fact that I saw a 
> long time before this is confirmed by Everett quantum mechanics (which is the 
> old one minus the collapse of the wave packet postulate).
> Data are indexicals, defined relatively to the universal machine/number which 
> interpret it, correctly, or incorrectly, relatively to its most probable 
> computations (among an infinity of them).
> With mechanism the big picture is very simple, arithmetic and its enumerable, 
> but non mechanically enumerable set of universal numbers. But the first 
> person phenomenology is “uncertain” on non enumerable computations, making 
> them “living” on the border of the uncomputable.
> Related to this is that the original doubt of the greek 
> theologians/metaphysicians was between "is reality what we see” or is reality 
> something else from which what we see is the shadow, the border, the symptom, 
> ...
> >
> > The description of the configuration of a chess game is lossless. I could 
> > note down the distribution of the pieces, take them off the board, mix them 
> > up and put them back again, and the game would not be changed for the 
> > players. The physical chess set and the physical context are also largely 
> > irrelevant. Players could leave one room, have a relaxed coffee or aquavit, 
> > go back into another room with a duplicate of the game with different 
> > pieces on another board, and continue with little disturbance.
> >
> > But sheet music is not a lossless representation of a performance. From the 
> > starting point of the sheet music, the performer has to decide on volumes, 
> > intonation and timing, and in some cases also ornament and variations. 
> > These issues arouse deep passions and ferocious debate! Nor would we be 
> > happy to buy a recording of a symphony in which different orchestras played 
> > different movements in different concert halls (although it might be 
> > interesting to hear).
> I might agree with Karl, but as expressing a first person phenomenology. With 
> mechanism that keeps enumerability, but loss “recursive enumerability. Even 
> the simple Gödel-Löbian self-observing universal system/number/machine is 
> confronted to the uncomputable main part of the (arithmetical) Truth by just 
> this introspection. The senses comes from the multi-relations in between 
> different universal machine.
> Best Regards,
> Bruno
> >
> > Dai
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