I did not get the file.


From: Fis <> On Behalf Of Joseph Brenner
Sent: 11. maj 2018 19:08
To: 'Krassimir Markov' <>;; 'Arturo 
Tozzi' <>
Cc: 'fis' <>
Subject: Re: [Fis] INFORMATION IS PROCESSING. Information as process

Perhaps you will also be interested in my brief comments on 
information-as-process in my 2011 paper in Information 2(3), 560-578. It seems 
a bit too simple to say that a computer, machine, whatever can process all 
reflections if these include high-level complex exchanges of energy in and 
between human brains Does not something get lost in that process?



From: Fis [] On Behalf Of Krassimir Markov
Sent: vendredi, 11 mai 2018 16:13
To:<>; Arturo Tozzi
Cc: fis
Subject: [Fis] INFORMATION IS PROCESSING the reflections

Dear Colleagues,

During activity of Infos' consciousness, reflections are combined and as a 
result the new ones may be created and stored in the Infos memory.
Processing of some reflections may cause some activity, too.

In other words, it doesn't matter what kind of Infos is active - the result is 
the same!

INFORMATION IS PROCESSING the reflections that has as final result an activity 
or new reflections.

Usually, the results of such processing are called "Information".

Of course, to be active means to be real (material, physical) and to have 
energy for processing.
To store reflections, material objects are needed, i.e. "carriers".

This is the main interconnection between mater, energy, and information.

No Information exist anywhere - only reflections - REAL, PHYSICAL REFLECTIONS!
Reflections in real, physical objects, including living creatures.
Including Brain!

Main difference between living and not living mater is possibility for 
processing of reflections.

Of course, many levels of such processing exist.
Maybe, the most complex is the social one.
Maybe, the simplest one is in the cells...

Could the Machine process reflections? Still no answer ...
But the Computer can!

"That's All Folks!"

Friendly greetings

From: Karl Javorszky<>
Sent: Friday, May 11, 2018 1:20 PM
To: Arturo Tozzi<>
Cc: fis<>
Subject: Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?

Dear Arturo,

There were some reports in clinical psychology, about 30 years ago, that relate 
to the question whether a machine can pretend to be a therapist. That was the 
time as computers could newly be used in an interactive fashion, and the Rogers 
techniques were a current discovery.
(Rogers developed a dialogue method where one does not address the contents of 
what the patient says, but rather the emotional aspects of the message, assumed 
to be at work in the patient.)

They then said, that in some cases it was indistinguishable, whether a human or 
a machine provides the answer to a patient's elucidations.

Progress since then has surely made possible to create machines that are 
indistinguishable in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called "expert 
systems ", are widely used in many fields. If the interaction is rational,  
that is: formally equivalent to a logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, the 
difference in: "who arrived at this answer, machinery or a human", becomes 

Artistry, intuition, creativity are presently seen as not possible to translate 
into Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are not yet well 
understood. But!: there are some who are busily undermining the current 
fundamentals of rational thinking. So there is hope that we shall live to 
experience the ultimate disillusionment,  namely that humans are a 
combinatorial tautology.

Accordingly, may I respectfully express opposing views to what you state: that 
machines and humans are of incompatible builds. There are hints that as far as 
rational capabilities go, the same principles apply. There is a rest, you say, 
which is not of this kind. The counter argument says that irrational processes 
do not take place in organisms, therefore what you refer to belongs to the main 
process, maybe like waste belongs to the organism's principle. This view draws 
a picture of a functional biotope, in which the waste of one kind of organism 
is raw material for a different kind.


<<>> schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 
2018 15:24:

Dear Bruno,
You state:
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
THEN "physical" has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
"physical" becomes a mathematical notion.
...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or "not feel any 
change" if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
brain/body at that level of description".

The problem of your account is the following:
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested and 
it is not empirically testable.  You are starting with a sort of postulate: I, 
and other people, do not agree with it.  The current neuroscience does not 
state that our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) a digital machine.
In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not exist in 
our real world.  Here your entire building falls down.

Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal<>:

(This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend it, with 
minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my first comment to 
Mark Burgin new thread "Is information physical?".

Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,

Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my new 
computer classifies them in some mysterious way!
This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at the end 
of the week.

On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark 
<<>> wrote:

Dear Colleagues,

I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion

                                      Is information physical?

That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on.

My result here is that

IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,

THEN  "physical" has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
"physical" becomes a mathematical notion.

The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from 
Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use "reality" instead of "model" 
(logician's term, because physicists use "model" for "theory").

Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or "not feel any 
change" if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
brain/body at that level of description.

Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all physical 
objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology. Physics is reduced 
to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any Turing-complete machinery. Amazingly 
Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of arithmetic) is Turing 
complete (Turing Universal).

The basic idea is that:

1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an arithmetical 
reality or by a physical reality. And,

2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are necessarily 
undetermined on the set of of all its continuations emulated in arithmetic.

That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to my actual 
state, and see from some first person points of view (something I can describe 
more precisely in some future post perhaps).

Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, we 
cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel's incompleteness can be used to 
recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, like Peano 
arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction between first and 
third person views (and six others!).

I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this (including 
the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago.  I was about sure this 
would refute Mechanism, until I learned about quantum mechanics, which verifies 
all the most startling predictions of Indexical Mechanism, unless we add the 
controversial wave collapse reduction principle.

The curious "many-worlds" becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many computations 
(up to some equivalence quotient). The weird indeterminacy becomes the simpler 
amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter becomes obvious: as any 
piece of matter is the result of the first person indeterminacy (the first 
person view of the amoeba undergoing a duplication, ...) on infinitely many 
computations. This entails also that neither matter appearance nor 
consciousness are Turing emulable per se, as the whole arithmetical 
reality-which is a highly non computable notion as we know since Gödel-plays a 
key role. Note this makes Digital Physics leaning to inconsistency, as it 
implies indexical computationalism which implies the negation of Digital 
Physics (unless my "body" is the entire physical universe, which I rather 

My opinion is presented below:

   Why some people erroneously think that information is physical

   The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong belief 
of many people, especially, scientists that there is only physical reality, 
which is studied by science. At the same time, people encounter something that 
they call information.
   When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information because 
with the letter they receive information. The letter is physical, i.e., a 
physical object. As a result, people start thinking that information is 
physical. When people receive an e-mail, they comprehend that it is information 
because with the e-mail they receive information. The e-mail comes to the 
computer in the form of electromagnetic waves, which are physical. As a result, 
people start thinking even more that information is physical.
   However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical objects 
are only carriers or containers of information.
   To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to say 
that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that the textbook 
contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way, the textbook 
contains information but is not information itself. The same is true for 
letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical objects because all 
of them only contain information but are not information. For instance, as we 
know, different letters can contain the same information. Even if we make an 
identical copy of a letter or any other text, then the letter and its copy will 
be different physical objects (physical things) but they will contain the same 
   Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge, data 
and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on physical objects 
(physical bodies) and this action also misleads people who think that 
information is physical.

OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how immaterial or non physical 
objects can alter the physical realm. It is the usual problem faced by dualist 
ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we recover many dualities, but they 
belong to the phenomenologies.

   One more misleading property of information is that people can measure it. 
This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure only 
physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous conclusion 
that information is physical. However, measuring information is essentially 
different than measuring physical quantities, i.e., weight. There are no 
"scales" that measure information. Only human intellect can do this.

OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he human one.

Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is always a form of the 
"knocking table" argument. They knocks on the table and say "you will not tell 
me that this table is unreal".

I have got so many people giving me that argument, that I have made dreams in 
which I made that argument, or even where I was convinced by that argument ... 
until I wake up.

When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this "dream argument" 
illustrates that seeing, measuring, ... cannot prove anything ontological. A 
subjective experience proves only the phenomenological existence of 
consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that although there are plenty of 
strong evidences for a material reality, there are no evidences (yet) for a 
primitive or primary matter (and that is why, I think, Aristotle assumes it 
quasi explicitly, against Plato, and plausibly against Pythagorus).

Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the worlds of ideas is the world 
of programs, or information, or even just numbers, since very elementary 
arithmetic (PA without induction, + the predecessor axiom) is already Turing 
complete (it contains what I have named a Universal Dovetailer: a program which 
generates *and* executes all programs).

So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim that if we assume 
Mechanism (Indexical computationalism) matter itself is also not *primarily* 
physical: it is all in the "head of the universal machine/number" (so to speak).

And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough to find if there is a 
discrepancy between the physics that we infer from the observation, and the 
physics that we extract from "the head" of the machine. This took me more than 
30 years of work, but the results obtained up to now is that there is no 
discrepancies. I have compared the quantum logic imposed by incompleteness 
(formally) on the semi-computable (partial recursive, sigma_1) propositions, 
with most quantum logics given by physicists, and it fits rather well.

Best regards,

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