And the real enemy is ...
The US will continue to fail to convince Arabs that Iran, not Israel, poses
the greatest threat to regional stability.
 Lamis Andoni Last Modified: 25 Oct 2010 16:10 GMT
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    *Ahmadinejad received a rapturous welcome on his first visit to Lebanon
since taking office in 2005 [EPA]***

No sooner had Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, left Beirut last
week, than Jeffrey Feltman, the US secretary of state for Near East affairs,
arrived in the Lebanese capital.

Washington wasted no time in seeking to counter what it views as Iran's
growing influence across the Arab world and Ahmadinejad's message of
resistance to Israel.

But it is precisely that message that has so far foiled the US' relentless
efforts to form a regional security pact to isolate and confront Tehran.
Washington has failed - and will continue to fail - to convince Arabs that
Iran, not Israel, is the real enemy.

*A sectarian formula*

This does not mean that Iran's agenda in the region has been entirely
palatable to Arab states. It has been complicit in the invasion and
occupation of Iraq, where its position remains opportunistic and deeply
sectarian.

But Washington has no issue with that aspect of Iranian foreign policy. It
was, after all, the US invasion that fed sectarian divisions within Iraq.
And Washington has been happy to champion Shia political parties within the
country in order to suppress its rich pan-Arab identity - all while being
opposed to the Lebanese Shia group, Hezbollah.

That Washington does not have a favourite sect is not evidence of its
commitment to secularism. It supports different sectarian formulas in Iraq
and Lebanon to guarantee that neither country poses a threat to Israel.

In Lebanon, sectarianism has been employed to prevent national unity. And
when that has not been sufficient Israeli wars have been used to quell
resistance - whether by a Palestinian coalition with Lebanese leftists and
pan-Arabists in 1982 or by Hezbollah in 2006.

But these wars backfired: The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon created
Hezbollah, while the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000 and the
2006 war anointed the movement as the only Arab force to defeat Israel in a
major battle.

*Marginalising Palestine*

Through Hezbollah's triumphs, Iran has consolidated its influence in Lebanon
and enhanced its image as the region's counter power to Israel. For in Iran,
just as in the Arab world, confronting Israel helps to legitimise a regime.

The Iranian regime stepped into this role almost immediately after the 1978
revolution that transformed the country from a gendarme for US interests and
an Israeli ally into a champion of the Palestinian cause.

Even the Iran-Iraq war failed to unanimously rally Arabs against Tehran, as
evidenced when a 1981 US-backed summit intended to form an axis against Iran
was boycotted by most Arab parties, including the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO). The majority of Arabs simply refused to see Iran as
posing a greater threat than Israel.

In fact, the eruption of the first intifada in 1987 came about partly as a
reaction to another US-backed summit, which sought to establish Iran as the
main enemy of the Arab world - and in so doing to marginalise the
Palestinian cause.

Yasser Arafat, the then PLO leader, was snubbed by the Jordanian hosts of
the summit and by other Arab regimes, prompting him to boycott the official
dinner and to declare that Palestine remained the core issue for the region.
This attempt to humiliate the PLO provoked visible anger in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip - a sentiment that was openly expressed during the intifada
when it erupted less than a month later.

*Fake peace process*

But the US did not learn its lesson. More than two decades later it is still
trying to create an Arab axis against Iran, while expecting Arabs to ignore
Israeli occupation and aggression. And while a US-backed so-called
'moderate' axis comprising Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait does exist
- brought together by legitimate and fictional fears of Iranian meddling in
their affairs - none see a bigger threat to regional stability than Israeli
expansionism.

These countries have often urged the US to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace
in order to enable them to effectively help in countering Iran. But
consecutive US administrations have instead pushed a fake peace process
focused more on solidifying Israeli supremacy than addressing the root
causes of the conflict. The current administration's 'enthusiasm' for a
resumption of the stalled Israeli-Palestinian talks is no different and is
motivated more by a desire to provide a cover for its drive against Iran
than achieving a suitable and just settlement to the conflict.

Israel is now openly lobbying the West to either declare war on Iran or to
support an Israeli strike against the country - or at least its nuclear
facilities. It uses the Iranian president's rhetorical threats to justify
this, but for all Ahmadinejad's words it is Israel that is engaged in the
real and systematic destruction of lands and lives.

But the US and Israel do not fear that Iran poses a real, existential
threat. It is the deterrence Iranian power represents that they seek to
eliminate, thus allowing Israel to freely pursue its aggressive expansionist
policies.

For its part, the US is opposed to the existence of a regional power that it
does not consider an ally. So when Ahmadinejad was warmly welcomed in
Beirut, Feltman made an unscheduled visit to protest against "Iran meddling
in Lebanon's affairs".

The former US ambassador to Lebanon, known for his constant meddling in
Lebanese affairs, was declaring Lebanon - and with it the Arab world - to be
within the US' sphere of influence.

*Vying for influence*

This is not to say that Iran is not also vying for regional influence -
something stressed by an Iranian parliamentarian who declared that
Ahmadinejad's visit asserted "Iran's supremacy". And there is no doubt that
Iran's agenda is not always compatible with Lebanese or, more broadly, Arab
interests. But its support for Hezbollah in its battles against Israel has
elevated its status among the Arab public in a way that no anti-Iranian Arab
axis can deny or top.

The real problem is that US meddling and support for Israel obstructs any
critical discussion of Iran's role in the region. The US has no interest in
such a discourse because it simply expects Arabs to endorse its own agenda,
including normalising ties with Israel even as it continues to suppress
Palestinian rights.

But none of the US' Arab allies would dare - or could afford - to follow the
American line completely, particularly if this includes a strike against
Iran. For Arab governments would then be pressed to explain their support
for a war against Iran, when they have so clearly failed to confront Israel.

The US-led war against Iraq shattered any illusions that the US could bring
stability or democracy to the region - a fact that even its staunchest Arab
allies are aware of. And there is a growing awareness that both Iran and the
US - and in a different way, Turkey - have been vying to fill a political
gap resulting from Arab weakness.

But Washington is truly delusional if it thinks it can defeat Iran by
convincing Arabs that its pro-Israeli agenda could bring peace and
stability, let alone justice to the region.

*Lamis Andoni is an analyst and commentator on Middle Eastern and
Palestinian affairs.*

*The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy*

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