On Mar 9, 2017, at 1:44 PM, Andy Bradford 
<[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Thus said Warren Young on Thu, 09 Mar 2017 13:37:35 -0700:
> 
>> That can be gotten around with  a MITM attack
> 
> How? If  the server to which  the attacker tries to  synchronize content
> already  has Y,  there is  no way  for the  attacker to  push Y'  to the
> repository.

Who said “push”?

The attack is as follows: the remote peer has Y, the MITM attacker has Y’; the 
MITM waits for a sync to happen, and when it sees Y come through, it 
substitutes Y’.

The MITM can substitute any content it wishes when the checksums and hashes 
match, which was part of the major premise.
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