On Sun, Jan 20, 2002 at 23:14:13 +0000, Mark Murray wrote: > > The PAM OPIE may only do OPIE authentication. It is entirely up to the > PAM stack to decide what the login policy is. > > (Well, the PAM stack as specified by the pam configs in /etc/pam*)
Yes. And to allow PAM stack to make right decision, pam_opie pass special information to PAM stack. Look at the patch, pam_opie not breaks from the stack by yourself, it is /etc/pam* do that using information from pam_opie. > However - the module may pass on the authentication token (the password) > and any following modules are allowed to use this if they find it. > (look at the try_first_pass and use_fist_pass options). I was thinking about that way but not find a good solution. That way workatround is: 1) In the failure case when Unix (plaintext) passwords are disabled pam_opie can pass specially-generated incorrect password down to pam_unix. 2) pam_unix option must be changed from "try_first_pass" to "use_first_pass", because it asks again for password if "try_first_pass" active, i.e. allows user to enter Unix (plaintext) password again. So we have the same bug, but shifted to one prompt step. I have doubts about 1): what specially-generated incorrect password can be? It seems that any combination is legal and MAY be equal to real password. -- Andrey A. Chernov http://ache.pp.ru/ To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
