On Sun, Jan 20, 2002 at 23:14:13 +0000, Mark Murray wrote:
> The PAM OPIE may only do OPIE authentication. It is entirely up to the
> PAM stack to decide what the login policy is.
> (Well, the PAM stack as specified by the pam configs in /etc/pam*)
Yes. And to allow PAM stack to make right decision, pam_opie pass special
information to PAM stack. Look at the patch, pam_opie not breaks from the
stack by yourself, it is /etc/pam* do that using information from
> However - the module may pass on the authentication token (the password)
> and any following modules are allowed to use this if they find it.
> (look at the try_first_pass and use_fist_pass options).
I was thinking about that way but not find a good solution. That way
1) In the failure case when Unix (plaintext) passwords are disabled
pam_opie can pass specially-generated incorrect password down to pam_unix.
2) pam_unix option must be changed from "try_first_pass" to
"use_first_pass", because it asks again for password if "try_first_pass"
active, i.e. allows user to enter Unix (plaintext) password again. So we
have the same bug, but shifted to one prompt step.
I have doubts about 1): what specially-generated incorrect password
can be? It seems that any combination is legal and MAY be equal to real
Andrey A. Chernov
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