Reko Turja wrote:

Dear all,

Today I saw a security notice:


cat distinfo
MD5 (cups-1.3.3-source.tar.bz2) = d4911e68b6979d16bc7a55f68d16cc53
SHA256 (cups-1.3.3-source.tar.bz2) = 5e9e5670777055293e309cb0cbb2758df9c1275bf648df70478b7389c2d804de
SIZE (cups-1.3.3-source.tar.bz2) = 4077262

Update your ports and INDEX file as it seems that you are installing a vulnerable version of cups-base. The VuXML report says:

cups-base <1.3.4

so the cups-1.3.3 still has the vulnerability mentioned in the report.

Actually, I think the worst security problem I've seen is one I don't personally care to fix right now, but I guess I will soon. It's the fact that postscript is actually a language, one that's more general purpose in limitations than many people realize. Isn't that true? I think this means that my postscript interpreter (which is, for me, and I think for most, is ghostscript) should have some security controls on it, to limit postscript's direct access to local machine capabilities. I think that the options in gs for security are too little. It'd be pretty easy to write a really nasty worm. I remember laughing at my Windows friends, back when that Philappines worm hit, but we could get pretty easily hit on gs, or am I all wet?

I don't much like pdf, but at least its not succeptible to such a thing, because pdf's not a general purpose language (not a language at all). Nobody's take advantage of it, but it'd be possible to write a general purpose docbook interpreter entirely in postscript. Wonder if modern gs limitations would allow such a big program? Sure would be convenient.

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