Dag-Erling Smørgrav napsal/wrote, On 05/20/07 19:10:
"Zane C.B." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Dag-Erling Smørgrav <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Your patch opens a gaping security hole. Sensitive information
should never be placed in the environment.
Unless I am missing something, this is only dangerous if one is doing
something stupid with what ever is being executed by pam_exec.
Environment variables may be visible to other processes and users
through e.g. /proc.
Many sensitive informations can be accessible via /dev/kmem but the
default mode of the device doesn't allow regular user access.
We trust the responsible administrator he doesn't load the mem.ko
module and change the mode/ownership of /dev/kmem the way that open a hole.
So we shall trust the same administrator he doesn't load the procfs.ko
and mount /proc creating the security hole this way.
Please note I agree with the conclusion - the offered patch shall be
rejected. I disagree with explanation only. It's not as simple as
presented.
Dan
--
Dan Lukes SISAL MFF UK
AKA: dan at obluda.cz, dan at freebsd.cz, dan at (kolej.)mff.cuni.cz
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