On Sun, 20 May 2007 20:06:19 +0200 Dan Lukes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Dag-Erling Smørgrav napsal/wrote, On 05/20/07 19:10: > > "Zane C.B." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > >> Dag-Erling Smørgrav <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > >>> Your patch opens a gaping security hole. Sensitive information > >>> should never be placed in the environment. > >> Unless I am missing something, this is only dangerous if one is > >> doing something stupid with what ever is being executed by > >> pam_exec. > > > > Environment variables may be visible to other processes and users > > through e.g. /proc. > > Many sensitive informations can be accessible via /dev/kmem > but the default mode of the device doesn't allow regular user > access. > > We trust the responsible administrator he doesn't load the > mem.ko module and change the mode/ownership of /dev/kmem the way > that open a hole. > > So we shall trust the same administrator he doesn't load > the procfs.ko and mount /proc creating the security hole this way. > > Please note I agree with the conclusion - the offered patch > shall be rejected. I disagree with explanation only. It's not as > simple as presented. I agree with D.E.S. about procfs, but by your argument by what I wrote is a bad idea, would not PAM and any other form of authentication be a bad idea?
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