On 18 March 2018 at 13:54, Jan Demter <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Andrea! > > Am 16.03.18 um 17:11 schrieb Andrea Venturoli via freebsd-security: >> >> On 03/14/18 05:29, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote: >>> >>> # sysctl vm.pmap.pti >>> vm.pmap.pti: 1 >> >> Of course I find this enabled on the Intel box and not on the AMD one, >> but... is PTI in any way affected by a microcode update from Intel? > > From what I have read so far, I'm pretty certain it isn't planned or even > possible to patch this via a microcode update.
That is correct. Meltdown won't ever be fixed with a microcode update as far as we know, and no microcode update is required for the PTI mitigation. There's one small wrinkle: there are some recent lower-end processors (at least some recent Celerons) which it seems are not susceptible to Meltdown, and after a microcode update will set a bit to indicate this. In that case a microcode update will cause FreeBSD to switch from enabling PTI to disabling it by default -- but that CPU is not affected by Meltdown, with or without the update. > IBRS does not seem to be enabled by default: > https://reviews.freebsd.org/rS328625 > "For existing processors, you need a microcode update which adds IBRS > CPU features, and to manually enable it by setting the tunable/sysctl > hw.ibrs_disable to 0." That is true. Further, we expect the compiler-based retpoline to be the usual mitigation used for Spectre V2, for CPUs before Skylake. Development work for this is still ongoing in -CURRENT. _______________________________________________ [email protected] mailing list https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[email protected]"
