Just as an aside, I think it's worth noting (as bert just pointed out) that there are serious and perhaps intractable limits to the degree of protection an OS distro like Freedombox can provide if it simply causes the police to resort to, well, traditional police tactics in removing and investigating the system. The only defense Freedombox has against that is its deployment model, which would force police to enter a large number of private homes, activist meeting-places, etc., to confiscate what they currently confiscate by just raiding a few hosting providers. And again, the more nodes, the stronger this effect. Sheer numbers can help compensate for the physical access vulnerability, especially when the issue is something like government efforts to "remove" WikiLeaks from the Internet. But no user of any computer system should expect complete anonymity--Freedombox can at best help get the risks of searches and seizures disrupting online activism to be proportional to the risks of "traditional" activist distribution methods being disrupted in the same way.
And, of course, raiding party offices and such is nothing new, and can at least be resisted with physical and generally speaking nonviolent means such as building occupations. _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list [email protected] http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss
