-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Sam,
There are definitely problems with using a global DHT for name resolution - that doesn't mean they're insurmountable problems. I think the first thing we may have to do is step back, and realize that in fact, the names need to be global in scope, but they don't need to be globally *unique*. Think of it as building a phonebook for freedomboxes. Some people really *do* have the same name. What we need is collision handling, not guaranteed uniqueness, in my opinion. So, you look up somebody's name in the FreedomTable (at this point, I'm just having fun with it). There are 45 Eben Moglens. There are many possible solutions at this point, so let's take a look at what we're really trying to accomplish. We need to turn the *right* Eben Moglen into a routable IP address. The likelihood is that Eben (or whoever) is assigned an address dynamically by their ISP, and the box is hidden behind NAT, to boot. So, instead of a simple (unique) name -> address pairing, you've got to have something more like name -> catchphrase -> public key -> (current) v4 + v6 addresses. When a box moves from subnet to subnet, it updates the final entry in that chain. I'm not quite sure of the details on a multi-stage hash like that, but I see no reason why it wouldn't work. Then, once you've got the identity worked out, you store the public key of the *right* Eben Moglen locally, along with their address. You use that address until it doesn't work any more, and then you do a new lookup based just on the key. It does seem that we would want to have some sort of access control - that is, changing or making an entry for a given public key should probably require one to be holding the associated private key. It obviously requires the bootstrapping of some infrastructure - the table probably should not be held by the entire fbx network. From the standpoint of the FNF, this would be a sensible role for FreedomTowers, but the nomenclature is unimportant. The point here is that the name table should be hosted by a collection of trusted nodes. Have I missed something, or does this seem doable to folks? take care, Isaac Wilder The Free Network Foundation www.thefnf.org I've copied Brandon Wiley of the Foundation for Decentralization Research on this, in the hopes that he may be able to demystify some of the finer points of DHT usage. I've never spoken with Brandon, but he's put out some really good material on DHTs. On 08/19/2011 05:34 AM, Sam Hartman wrote: > > Hi. I'd like to understand how these human readable names that > we're going to insert into a DHT are going to work from a security > standpoint. > > What stops me from taking your name? What stops me from taking > names similar to yours? > > I'm skeptical of the advisability of globally scoped > non-hierarchically registered human readable names and would like > to understand the service model and goals for this proposal. > > _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss > mailing list [email protected] > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJOTkFjAAoJEA8fUKCD77NLX3MH/1OqvmHMxTIRetg+gh9GX4aT Lu34nyn+c2RWFPiJIdDH5jO+GKYlTYCXWdUDG9y7qnOSxA5DaxPGEBdfrpdqtd7b WMnqZODyQxk358RTvkFHEid+SNRbQZRfnhIUAXDeYPueTnpD4SFCChHqO6NZ7krs YHDTd2o2qwFZp6HaVk+0ysAHHxZkKEhfFwHSejV015D5LRyUiTeWqs/DtghgYl/l 8LBbT+MBGkHqiKie1dfWRwDw+oSRVQ/wg4gD3FW72+xNb3zeyOYDdwuOqw7BbAjo uEO5aZNgRZJZzYKNY5DIJjgPrS8hD64vnH77dJmuwoWv63mDkT1RSDXVZqfarPg= =QXTR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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