> On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 04:24:54PM -0500, Steve Dainard wrote:
> > Would it not be possible for root to disable selinux enforcement?

It should also be possible to copy private keys out of ~user/.ssh and login to 
other machines as "user", assuming no password on the ssh key pair.

It's probably best to assume that all your client machines are under the 
control of knowledgeable, malicious admins, and to put your important 
information somewhere other than your client machines. The only real way to 
"take back the night" is to force your users to connect to a service you 
control using an authentication mechanism you control. (e.g., Kerberos service 
tickets: accept no substitute. :) ) Prohibiting them from making any changes 
makes you responsible for every last customization. Delegating frees you up, 
but requires trust. Probably a good rule of thumb is to be generous doling out 
permissions when only one person will ever use the machine. Giving someone 
control over someone else's workspace should require consent of the controlled.

One thing that is nagging at me: I read that sssd caches your credentials in a 
form such that they can be retrieved and provided to your "organizational 
system". [1] This seems like a vector for a knowledgeable, malicious admin to 
break out of the client machine and impersonate someone else to any domain 
service. Is there a safeguard against this?



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