David, >And BTW, I think the Pascal analogy is excellent, with due attention to Marcus' caveat about measurability. >db
I guess I'd seen Marcus' point as demonstrating why Pascal's wager wasn't at all applicable. As I understand it, the wager is entirely dependent on the payoff to believing in God's existence (and God existing) being infinite. It's the only way it totally dominates all other actions (vs non belief whether God does or does not exist, that is). Otherwise it's just a cost-benefit calculation. And while we can certainly talk about the benefits of acting in regards to climate change now even if the change isn't primarily anthropogenic vs non-action when it is, the only way to make the analogy, I would think, is to suggest that action now has an infinite payoff. The trouble with that, though, is that it means we should accept ANY further wager that might result in the outcome with the infinite payoff being realized. One should, it seems, be willing to take my wager on whether or not I can personally reverse climate change in exchange for all your wealth. Whether or not I could do it, there just might be a non-zero subjective probability that I COULD, which means you should take the bet -- since the expected payoff is still infinite -- and hand over everything. In terms of Pascal's wager, that is the argument for doubters: if you are even willing to entertain a tiny belief that there is some non-zero probability that God exists, you should still pray/become a "believer". No matter the personal effort and cost of belief, there is no way it will surpass the expected value of the bet. This doesn't work if the payoff isn't infinite, since some countervailing return to tip things back towards the non-believer side. On 8/14/07, David Breecker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Sorry Nick, I inadvertantly omitted your key question to which I was > replying, which was: > >>I do worry about complexity thinking leading to fatalism. If a > goddamnedbutterfly can cause a climate crash, why take responsibility for > ANYTHING > we do. We should all be dionysians. > > I think Kant offers a solid explanation for why one should (must) act > "responsibly." At the very least, he's the only reason I vote in > Presidential elections. More tomorrow if folks are still interested, when > I'm less Dionysian and more sober-- I mean, Apollonian ;-) > > And BTW, I think the Pascal analogy is excellent, with due attention to > Marcus' caveat about measurability. > db > > > On Aug 13, 2007, at 10:05 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > David, > > Can you explain this relation a bit further. Sorry if I am being dim, but > I did not quite understand your comment. Let's say we are on the QE2 > which, for some reason is inclined to be a bit tippy. We notice that the > passengers are gathering on the right side of the ship, which is OK so long > as the water is calm, but would be disastrous if a storm came. We have no > particular reason to believe that a storm is coming, except that half the > meteorologists in the Captain's meteorological committee think that there > is. You and I get together and decide that it would be a good idea for > some of us to move over to the other side of the boat. Now, certainly this > is not a CATEGORICAL imperative. I certainly cannot will that EVERYBODY go > over to the other side of the boat. So what kind of an imperative is it. > How is it possible for everybody to act so that the boat is in balance. > This would have everybody constantly moving from one side of the boat to the > other, like one of those models of neighborhood integration where either the > neighborhood is unintegrated or everybody is unhappy. > > How DOES one square Kant with ABM's??? > > And what did it have to do with Pascal's Wager in the first place? > > Nick > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* David Breecker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > *To: [EMAIL PROTECTED];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > Coffee Group <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 8/13/2007 4:31:20 PM > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Pascal's Wager and Global Warming > > Kant's Categorical Imperative is the answer: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative > He defined an imperative as any proposition that declares a certain action > (or inaction) to be > necessary<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_possibility>. > A hypothetical > imperative<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_imperative>would compel > action in a given circumstance: > *If I wish to satisfy my thirst, then I must drink something*. A > categorical imperative would denote an absolute, unconditional requirement > that exerts its authority in all circumstances, both required and justified > as an end in itself. It is best known in its first formulation: "Act only > according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should > become a universal law." > [1]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative#_note-Ellington> > > db > > > On Aug 13, 2007, at 3:53 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > All, > > The best argument for worrying about global warming presented so far in > this interesting correspondence is the one that says it costs us > relatively > little to worry about it and and costs us LOT if we dont. > > Sort of like Pascal's argument for prayer, right? > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Research Associate, Redfish Group, Santa Fe, NM ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) > Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ( > [EMAIL PROTECTED]) > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > dba | David Breecker Associates, Inc. > Santa Fe: 505-690-2335 > Abiquiu: 505-685-4891 > www.BreeckerAssociates.com > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >
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