What is odd about this whole interchange is that I can't quite find the
point of view (all experience is 3rd person) Nick is promoting, but it
feels that it could very well be my own habit of experience and
language.
This is not to say that I "believe" the 3rd person thing is real or
literally true, but I do find it interesting and am surprised how hard
it is for me to think about it.
I can see how Russ might feel that Nick's (lack of?) response to the
discussion is disingenuous (I'm not quite as sure about dishonest) but
my knowledge of Nick does not support that as a likely mode of
relationship for him. My own use of "dishonest" includes an intention
to mislead which I do not believe Nick is engaging in.
I don't think Nick's description of 1st person experience as 3rd person
experience from a unique perspective denies the existence of the "self"
which is what I think Russ is getting at. It just changes how the
"self" is experienced by the "self" (if I understand this correctly).
- Steve
As I wrote to Nick directly, I think Nick is gracious and kind and a
man of great integrity.
But this doesn't make sense to me: "We don't have to believe in inner
minds to say that a person accused of dishonesty behaves as if deeply
hurt." What could it possibly mean to say that a person is deeply hurt
if there is no such thing as first person experience? And if there is
no such thing as being deeply hurt in a first person way, what could
it possibly mean to say that someone is behaving as if deeply hurt?
This suggests that it is very dangerous to claim that there is no
first person experience and that observable behavior is all there is.
It would encourage "treating people as objects" because that's exactly
the position it takes. An attitude of this sort would seem to discard
millennia of progress in our understanding and acceptance of what
ethical human-to-human interaction consists of.
-- Russ
On Fri, Jun 19, 2009 at 7:40 AM, John Kennison <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Nick and I are on opposite sides of the consciousness debate. I
think there is an inner mind and that I experience it. Nick
rejects statements not made from the third person perspective.
Perhaps the debate suffers from a feeling that if we take Nick's
third person view, we are not allowed to use metaphorical
statements that suggest an inner mind. But clearly we can say "The
computer had an illusion" or a "breakdown" etc. to describe
behavior. (e.g. The behavior was as we imagined it would be if the
computer had a inner mind which suffered a breakdown.) Moreover,
not only can these metaphorical statements about behavior be
defined rigorously, but we can formulate and test rules about how
they are related. We don't have to believe in inner minds to say
that a person accused of dishonesty behaves as if deeply hurt.
That is why we should not casually make such accusations nor
assume they will be without negative consequences even if there is
no inner mind.
________________________________________
From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
[[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>] On
Behalf Of Russ Abbott [[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>]
Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2009 11:07 PM
To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Nick and dishonest behavior
Nick wrote:
To call a man "dishonest" (my word, I admit, but you have embraced
it) is very harsh in my world, and seems (to me) to require a
level of certainty about another person's motives that I just
don't know how you could come by from your limited experience with
me. ...
You are insisting on the correctness of your view of my mind based
on inferences from my behavior.
Yes, I'm doing exactly that, judging you on the basis of your
behavior -- in this conversation. (The past 40 years aren't
relevant to that.) Your position in this discussion seems to be
that your behavior is all there is. So why are you objecting that
I'm doing it?
Furthermore, your objection seems to be that I don't know what
your "motives" are. I'm not sure what you mean by motives in this
case. I'm not assuming any particular motive. In fact I'm confused
about what your motives might be and why you are acting so
dishonestly. Yet you are acting dishonestly.
To review: a good example of your dishonest behavior was your
answer to my question about nausea. Your provided a very nice
first person description of what it means to feel nauseous.
If you say that you are "feeling nauseous" i will understand that
your world seems like it is churning around but that your visual
cues do not confirm (i.e., you are dizzy) and that your stomach
feels the way it does when on previous occasions you have thrown up.
Note your use of the first person words seems and feels. But then
you refused to answer whether that description would ever apply to
a robot. Instead you offered a 3rd person description of what it
looks like to feel nauseous and said that of course a robot could
fit that description. I call that dishonest. You know what a
first person description means because you used it yourself. But
then you refused to answer the question whether such a first
person description could apply to a robot. Furthermore, you
refused to acknowledge that this is what you were doing. I see
that as dishonest. But I don't know what your motives for acting
this way might be.
Besides, why are you so concerned about my characterizing your
behavior as dishonest? Why is that a very harsh term? It's simply
a description of your behavior.
Are you upset because you are taking my use of the term dishonest
to apply more broadly than to your behavior? In the second passage
of yours quoted above, you talked about my view of your mind. Are
you unhappy that I seem to be implying that your mind is
dishonest? I thought your position was that there is no mind for
me to have a view of. I thought your position was that behavior
was all that mattered. It should not matter to you what "my view
of your mind" is if it doesn't mean anything to talk about minds.
-- Russ
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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