Owen, I think a loose set theoretic approach would actually be helpful - especially as it is compatible with a "level of analysis" approach. Also, as this is a new approach to the subject matter, rather than a rehash, even the negative "voters" might grant some leeway.
As a rough draft of that: One of (the New Realist guy) Holt's fundamental assertions is that "reflex arcs", which we today might call "simple neuronal chains", can be combined together into sets that are "behavior". Not all such sets will be behaviors, only those that result in goal directed action. For example, some primitive swimmers have a simple neuronal chain that connects an eye spot to the muscle that contracts the opposite side of the tail, so that when light strikes the right eyespot the left side of the tail contracts and turns the fish right. Holt would say that this is not yet behavior, but merely a reflex (i.e. a lower level set). If you have two of these reflexes, however, one on each side, something new emerges. The animal still twitches based on which spot receives the most light, but the net result is that the animal swims towards the light source! Thus the combination of reflexes can be objectively DESCRIBED as "moving towards the light source", and that extero-reference is the sin qua non of behavior. Because the behavior has an "objective referent", it is "about" something outside the organism. Moving up another level, different sets of behaviors combine to form the things we refer to as "mental traits".* That is, mental traits are just a higher level of analysis of physical happenings. For example, to observe that the animal "intends to swim" towards the light source is merely to observe that the behavior can be accurately DESCRIBED as directed towards that end, i.e. that when the organism's progress towards its objective referent is perturbed, it acts in a way that right itself. That is, the critical feature of "intending to swim to the light" is whether or not you do things that continue your movement towards the light if an obstacle appears. Hence, for example, if Steve was lying on his back with people holding him down, and we saw that Steve was doing actions directed at standing up without success -- THEN we might believe Steve when he says that he was intending to get up but could not. That is, even though Steve never got up, we could accept Steve's intentional claim as an objective description of his behavior relative to the unfourtunate circumstances. Without no such barrier existed. Thus, this position asserts that Steve's claim was in error. That is, we submit that an objective description of Steve's behavior does not include "intending to stand up". Now, we might at a later time have a long back and forth about what exactly it means to "think one intends something", but I assure everyone that is just a distraction at this point. Did that satisfy the set-theoretic request at all? Eric *We might need to have an intermediate step in which "circumstances" enter our sets. Mental traits are not just macro-patterns of behavior, but macro-patterns of behaviors relative to circumstance. The requirement that sets constituting behaviors contain "goal directedness" might already cover that requirement, but I'm not positive. On Thu, Jul 2, 2009 11:46 AM, Owen Densmore <[email protected]> wrote: > Thank you Nick, good explanation. And Steve -- we actually started >down this road on the thermodynamic formulation of ABM .. Guerin- >Speak .. with some success. > >Much more generally: There is a rift between the formal and >philosophic that I have a partial solution for. Both are VSI (Very >Short Introduction) books. > http://www.amazon.com/dp/0192853619/ > http://www.amazon.com/dp/0192854119/ > >The first is the Mathematics VSI. It is written by Timothy Gowers and >really does get the reader into the mind of mathematics folks. Gowers >is a Fields Medalist -- the Nobel for math. And he is driven by a >Wittgenstein understanding of abstraction. Gowers' discussion of a >5th dimensional cube is a wonderful example. He constantly comes back >to the type of abstraction he prefers: very clean and focused on the >properties under discussion. > >The second is the Wittgenstein VSI, to bind Gowers' math with his >inspiration, Wittgenstein. I've not finished this one (I've got a >digital version and have just sent for the paper one) but there is >hope we might actually find a connection between the more >philosophical discussions and a formalism for them. > >I'd be very interested in this endeavor. > > -- Owen > > >On Jul 2, 2009, at 9:14 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > >> Owen, >> >> (1)Yes, I do assume that most people delete these messages and >> press on, >> as I delete most (but not all) messages about ... say ... the >the >> latest >> 4.0.17a.alpha version of Groovy on Rails. >> >> Different stroke for different folks. >> >> (2)Lord we tried on the summaries. Unfortunately we couldnt >agree >> sufficiently to produce a synopsis. >> >> (3) I am aware that you believe the following: >> >> Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic >> deadly embrace. They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great cost >> of word length. The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low: >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity >> in that much compression could be attained. >> >> And, accordingly, our inabiliity to produce such a summary >> distressed me >> deeply. This I take to be not as a failiure of philosphy but a >> failure on >> my (our) part to do it right, but I fear you will draw another >> conclusion. >> . >> >> all the best, >> >> nick > >On Jul 2, 2009, at 9:27 AM, Steve Smith wrote: > >> Owen - >> Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic >> deadly embrace. They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great >> cost of word length. >> I agree with the sentiment, but if we were to caste this into a set- >> theoretic (or algebraic) framework, I think we would find some >> interesting features. I'm not sure, however, that such discussions >> can truly be placed into a formalism. I would find it interesting >> (entertaining, instructive) if you could elaborate how you think > >> such a mapping would be done. I believe these discussions to >> (naturally, inherently) transcend formal logic. >> The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low: >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity >> in that much compression could be attained. >> I think someone did try to formulate an algorithmic description of >> the discussion: >> >> • Read everything written in the Western Philosophical Tradition >> • Focus on Kant >> • Focus on the New Realists >> • Think real hard about all of the above >> • Lay in the grass and intend to get up without doing so (my >> contribution) >> • Discuss your interpretation of 3, 2, 1 >> • Go to 4 >> But methinks this is tantamount to getting several large carpets to >> cover up the many small ones already hiding large piles of dust and >> litter swept under them. >> >> Apologies to Nick, Russ, Eric, et al. for (perhaps) being too >flip >> here. I respect the earnestness and the information content that >> is in the discussion, despite the difficulty in finding any >> convergence. >> >> Carry On! >> >> - Steve > >============================================================ >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > Eric Charles Professional Student and Assistant Professor of Psychology Penn State University Altoona, PA 16601 On Thu, Jul 2, 2009 10:45 AM, Owen Densmore <[email protected]> wrote: Please understand that the majority of FRIAM folks simply delete these and press on. Please understand that one or more FRIAMers politely asked for summaries and did not receive them. Please understand that "Please God no" is a form of netiquette. It is a vote, not a censure. I for one would expect more formalism in this discussion. I believe most of your discussion could be placed in a set-theoretic framework and I would prefer that. Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic deadly embrace. They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great cost of word length. The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity in that much compression could be attained. That said, you must understand that "Please God no" is a very high information content string that should be considered, not as censure, but as information. Do with it what you will. -- Owen On Jul 2, 2009, at 7:07 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > Dear List, > > Does one grumpy comment a consensus make? > > I can see how the philosophy of mind, a qualia, etc., might not be > everybody's cup of tea, but certainly it's well within FRIAM's > domain and the discussion has drawn out some new and interesting > folks. Eh? (As we Canadians say?). > > Back in a week. > > N > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([email protected]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Robert Holmes > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Sent: 7/1/2009 5:42:59 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person > > > On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 at 5:35 PM, Russ Abbott <[email protected]> > wrote: > <snip> > > P.S. Since this is heating up again, I've added the list back to the > addressees. > > > Please God no. > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org Eric Charles Professional Student and Assistant Professor of Psychology Penn State University Altoona, PA 16601
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
