Yes; I will now call you "Glen the pedant." ;-) On Mon, Nov 2, 2009 at 8:07 PM, glen e. p. ropella < [email protected]> wrote:
> > First, I pick a few nits just to be sure we're communicating. Please > note that I almost didn't send this because too much of what I say is > just distracting nit-picking. But then I decided that's OK because the > people who don't want to read it can just hit the delete key. ;-) > > Thus spake Ted Carmichael circa 09-11-01 05:53 PM: > > I'm actually fine with re-defining 'scale' to mean something along the > lines > > of the amount of error in the mapping. That is mostly, I think, what I > was > > trying to say. > > Well, I couldn't redefine 'scale' that way. For me, the word "scale" is > really a synonym for the word "measure" (noun). It sets the granularity > at which one can distinguish parts. That means it's an aspect or > perspective taken when looking at some phenomena. > > Now, it's true that indistinguishability or "wiggle room" is the dual of > scale. So, if I choose scale X, that implies a granularity below which > I can't distinguish things. Well ... no. If you *choose *a particular scale, that implies that you are unconcerned with using a finer or coarser grain to distinguish things ... that you choose to differentiate at one level and not another. It says nothing of ability. I suppose now you'll say, "Well, once you have chosen scale X, then you *are *limited in your ability ... limited by scale X," and then I'll say, "I thought you meant 'measure X' even though 'measure' is a verb," and then you'll say, "Measure can also be a noun," and then the pies will come out and hilarity will ensue and someone will have to clean up the mess. > Translating methods from one person to another involves scale to the > extent that the scale chosen for observing is capable of precisely > mapping measurements of the other guy's actions to controls for your > own. As such, it's not arbitrary, at all. In some contexts, scale must > be carefully chosen and in others scale is irrelevant. We can often > translate methods from human to human because regardless of what scale > is chosen, we are similar all the way up and down all the scales. ?? I don't get this part. I'm 6'5", which means there is a ~99% chance I am taller than you. As such, my jump shot will differ from yours in many subtle ways. We need a coarser scale in order to equate them. Assume a scale that doesn't distinguish between your jump shot and mine, but one that is still fine enough to distinguish between a jump shot and a hook shot. If I use this scale, then a hook shot is something new, i.e. something different than a jump shot. If, however, I use an even coarser scale - say, your two-state solution (ha!) - then these two methods of shooting a ball are no longer distinguishable. > And > this is also what allows us to trust the false concept of translating > ideas from human to human, which was what my original criticism was > about: Ideas should not be a part of this conversation of novelty. > You have to prove that, I think. Occam's razor and all. The null-hypothesis would be that similar ideas spring from similar mental processes. > But what is an illusion is the generic method. No such thing exists. > If, for example, you try to generalize a method from, say, 20 > chimpanzees and 20 humans accomplishing the same objective... let's say > eating something, then the generalization is an illusion. And, I agree > that it's a useful illusion. > > Yay! We agree! Now let me tell you what I *really *meant... > OK. I don't think methods can be tacitly distinguished by choice of > scale. To be clear, measurements (state) can be distinguished by choice > of scale; but actions (functions, methods) can't. So, if we choose the > coarsest scale for the basketball example, we have two states: 1) ball > at point A and 2) ball in hoop. At that scale, you're right that you > can't distinguish the measurements from the jump, hook, or granny shots. > Then add more states, let's say: 1) ball at point A, 2) ball at point > B, and 3) ball in hoop. Between the 3 methods, state (2) will be > different. So, again, you're right that you can distinguish the TRACE > of the methods. > > And you can then argue (by the duality of congruence and bisimilarity) > that a distinction between the measurements implies a distinction > between the methods. But you can't distinguish between methods directly. > I'm not sure what you are getting at here. If you can watch someone playing basketball, and you know when to say "That was a jump shot" and when to say "That was a hook shot," then you are able to distinguish between the methods. If you aren't able to see the difference, then you are probably using the wrong scale for your analysis. > What I was arguing with, however, was your statement that the > distinction between thought and action was a somewhat arbitrary choice > of scale. The scale is not at all arbitrary. > Perhaps "artificial" is a better word. The scale and the type of the analysis is a choice that we make. We determine what the threshold is for saying one thing is different than another. We try to make these thresholds useful, but they are artificially imposed by our desire to categorize. That's all I meant. > > All of which goes back to what I tried to say before. The > transferability of methods isn't really about scale but about the > mismatch between the measurements and the actions you have to take to > execute your particular method. I.e. the distinction between thoughts > and actions is NOT a matter of (even a somewhat) arbitrary choice of > scale. It's about whether the twitching we do as part of all our > methods is commensurate with the twitching others do as part of all > their methods. When tracing the method of someone very similar to us, > our methods of interpolating between states are similar enough to allow > us to execute a different method that has the same trace. > I don't see how comparing two methods of shooting a ball is any different than comparing two methods of mental calculation. I've already conceded that each of these require a different scale of analysis. Yet some scale that can equate two methods of mental calculation does exist. But I think you got that last bit backwards. When you say two different methods are capable of producing the same trace, then your scale is very coarse and limited ... you're only using 2 or 3 states of where the ball is. Which is fine, if that's how you chose to analyze the action. But given that scale, the *similarity *between the two people that produce the trace doesn't matter. You're not even looking at the people. (Inferred by the fact that you don't care to differentiate between the methods.) > > > What is innovative about these new methods is not that they ignore the > > common operations of adding, multiplying, and subtracting. It's that > these > > basic operations are combined in an innovative way. If Crutchfield asks: > is > > this really something new? I would say "yes." If he points out that all > > three methods use the same old operations, I would say that doesn't > matter > > ... those operations are used in an innovative way; in a new combination. > > I don't think Crutchfield's framework would classify the hook shot or > Java as novel because they aren't examples of movement to a more > expressive class of models. Is that how he defined innovation? That the new model class is necessarily more expressive? If so, I missed it. I thought he just said innovation is jump to a *different *model class. But if he says the new model class must be more expressive, then I disagree. If he says the hook shot is nothing new - that it is functionally the same as the jump shot, and hence in the same model class - then his granularity of analysis is too coarse. His "model class" is too broad. The hook shot was new, and it was innovative, as these things are commonly understood. > By analogy, imagine a 2 dimensional real (pun intended) plane. We > already know of all the functions like x^2, x^3, x+y, etc. Then when I > take my pencil and draw some squiggly line across the plane, is my new > "function" really new? > Yes! That's the beauty of it. The elements are already defined, and the number and type of squiggly lines are limited by these elements. But your line is (presumably) a new combination of these elements never seen before. Just like Windows 7 is a new OS, combining 1's and 0's, and using logical NAND gates, in a new way. > Well, it would be hard to construct a counter example because "emergent > feature" is ambiguous, as is "produced", "interaction", and "element". > [grin] So, it's no surprise that it's difficult to construct such a > counter example. No matter what you come up with, all you need to do is > subtly redefine any of those words to fit the context. > > I'm not being snarky, here, either. I truly believe the language you're > using to talk about this is hopelessly self-fulfilling ... and perhaps > even degenerate. Of course emergent features emerge up one level from > the level just below them! That sounds tautological to me. You can't > construct a counter example because it's like saying ( x == y ) implies > (x == y). > Two balls are floating in space. You say ball A is above ball B, and this implies that ball B is below ball A. This is tautological, I agree. But that doesn't mean you haven't said something useful about the two balls. And note: you have also said something useful about the two balls' relationship to other things in the environment, by defining "above" and "below." Well, I've stayed up WAY too late writing this. Cheers, Ted
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