Eric, Thats an interesting way of looking at it. As complex game of information hiding.
I was thinking along the line of of having a schema for rule creation. The schema here is like a constitution, and players can generate new rules based on that schema to promote their self interest. For rules to become "laws" they have to be the choice on the majority (or subject to some other social choice mechanism), this system allows for group formation and coalition building to get the new rules passed into laws. The interesting bit is how the drive for self interest amongst some of those groups and their coalitions can give rise to rules renders the original schema and/or the social choice mechanism ineffective. By "ineffective", I mean that they yield results and behavior that run counter to the purpose for which they were originally designed. What do you think? Cheers, Mohammed On Sun, May 8, 2011 at 2:44 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES <e...@psu.edu> wrote: > I can't see that this posted, sorry if it is a duplicate -------- > > > Mohammed, > Being totally unqualified to help you with this problem... it seems > interesting to me because most models I know of this sort (social systems > models) are about information acquisition and deployment. That is, the > modeled critters try to find out stuff, and then they do actions dependent > upon what they find. If we are modeling active obfuscation, then we would be > doing the opposite - we would be modeling an information-hiding game. Of > course, there is lots of game theory work on information hiding in two > critter encounters (I'm thinking > evolutionary-game-theory-looking-at-deception). I haven't seen anything, > though, looking at distributed information hiding. > > The idea that you could create a system full of autonomous agents in which > information ends up hidden, but no particular individuals have done the > hiding, is kind of cool. Seems like the type of thing encryption guys could > get into (or already are into, or have already moved past). > > Eric > > On Fri, May 6, 2011 10:05 PM, *Mohammed El-Beltagy <moham...@computer.org> > * wrote: > > I have a question I would like to pose to the group in that regard: > > Can we model/simulate how in a democracy that is inherently open (as > stated in the constitution: for the people, by the people etc..) there > emerges "decision masking structures" emerge that actively obfuscate > the participatory nature of the democratic decision making for their > ends? > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > -- http://perfectionatic.blogspot.com/ http://twitter.com/#!/perfectionatic
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
