Glen, I am honestly confused at this point about what you are looking for in your main question. To be "experiencing something" or "reacting to something" requires two entities with a relationship between them. How do you separate "that table" from "the experience of that table"? Well, one is the table, the other is a particular type of relationship between an organism and the table. Your question strikes me as roughly akin to asking how we distinguish between "that table" and "me standing on the table." In both cases there is a table, but in the latter we are interested in a relationship between me and the table. I don't think Zombies are any particular help in understand the "standing on" relationship, and I also don't think they are of any particular help in understanding the "reacting to" relationship.
On other notes: 1) Your friend clearly wants to tailgate. We know she does because, she does so when given the opportunity, and she expends effort to continue doing so (i.e., she regulates her speed with the person she is closely following, etc.). Now, I fully agree with you - it is fascinating that her behavior changes when it is pointed out. We could have a great time analyzing that. However, whatever our analysis revealed wouldn't undo the original observation that (until someone points out the behavior) she clearly wants to tailgate. 2) This way of thinking leads to suspicion of the often-assumed-to-be-clear distinction between mental processes labeled with different terms. For example, we might see a person raising a full cup to their mouths and ask them why they were doing it. The person says "because I was thirsty". If we further asked them, perhaps posing as a person with poor English skills, what "thirsty" meant, then they might elaborate to "I wanted liquid." But, of course, that answer alone is incoherent. The raising-cup-to-mouth behavior is not just the "want" of liquid, it is also the "belief" that raising-cup-to-mouth will result in having-liquid. That is, if we are looking at behavior, there might not be as clear a distinction between "want" and "belief" as we have been lead to believe/desire. Does that clarify anything? Eric P.S. In the second note above, we could have gone straight to the "belief" that drinking would relieve "thirst", but given our current example, it seemed better to get the word "want" involved. On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 11:53 AM, glen <[email protected]> wrote: > ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/18/2012 07:46 AM: >> Trying to be a "sophisticated" Nick: >> >> Faith doesn't underlies reality, but it underlies all experience. And by >> "experience", I mean it underlies all "the way you act and >react towards >> reality". This doesn't give you a "theory of everything", >but it might give >> you a "theory of everything psychological". > >I could tolerate that position. But I'm not going to. The whole >question of ascribing the potentiality for sane actions to crazy people >(be they Muslim or Atheist) hinges on the Cartesian partition. Nick >(sophisticated or not) argues against the partition: mind is matter, >no >more no less. Hence, if faith underlies experience and experience is >matter, then either we can separate experience from non-experience or >all matter is experience. By accusing Nick of claiming that faith >underlies all reality, I am pressing for _his_ technique for separating >experience from everything else. Zombies are one rhetorical tool for >doing that. > >> ------ >> >> To return to the zombies... the usual riddle of the Cartesian zombie goes >> something like this: >> 1. Imagine a Person who is trying to catch you, perhaps to eat you. You run >> through the woods, twisting and turning, but your adversary always changes >to >> stay on your trail. Let us all agree from the beginning that said Person >stays >> on your trail BECAUSE he intends to catch and eat you. >> >> 2. Now imagine a Zombie who is trying to catch you and eat you. The Zombie >> makes all the same alterations of course to stay on your trail that the >Person >> would have made in the same situation. But now, let us all agree that the >> Zombie has no intention. >> >> 3. <Insert mystery music here.> Aha! How would you ever know the >difference? If >> we can imagine a Zombie doing everything it can to stay on your trail, but >> without wanting to catch you, then we can never know anything about the >mind of >> another. Because I thought of this mystery, I am really smart! But you'll >have >> to take my word on it, because a Zombie could have said all the same things >> without any smarts. Ooooh, see, I made it a meta-mystery - super clever >points >> achieved! >> >> ---------- >> >> Nick's assertion is to declare point 2 a blatant falsity. To be >"trying to >> catch you" or to "want to catch you", is nothing other than >to be varying >> behavior so as to stay on your trail. That is, you can imagine a >"try-less and >> want-less" thing coming towards you, for as long as you run in a >straight line. >> As soon as you start turning, and the thing chasing you turns as a >function of >> the changes in your trajectory, such that it is always moving to intersect >you, >> then you are imagining that the thing is trying to catch you. > >I'm with you up to here. However, I do know someone who tailgates other >drivers just out of habit ... as soon as you point out that she's >following a person, she immediately changes lanes. Of course, I have no >idea what that means. > >> The creature >> believes that these alterations of its course will bring it closer to you >(than >> if it didn't alter its course). > >You lost me here. The creature is tracking you. If belief is a >collection of actions, then the creature does not YET _believe_ it's >trying to catch you. It can't believe that until it actually does it >... wait for it ... because belief is action. > >Now, had you said that belief is a _memory_ of past action, then I might >tolerate a claim that the creature believes it's tracking you. But that >would mean that belief isn't a collection of actions. It's something >else ... perhaps a type of action distinguishable from other types of >action ... perhaps something called "state", which is distinguishable >from process? > >-- >-- >glen > >============================================================ >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > ------------ Eric Charles Assistant Professor of Psychology Penn State University Altoona, PA 16601
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