Doug -
> what benefits does a Philosopher *of Science* provide.
My simple answer would be "context" ?
Fish don't need to have a formal understanding of water, nor birds a
formal understanding of air, and one might say that scientific
practitioners needn't have a formal understanding of theories of
(scientific) knowledge to navigate and exist effectively in the very
milieu that they are entirely dependent upon.
Using your definition, a philosopher of "one who thinks deeply about
Science". One can seek answers to scientific questions without any
resort to the philosophy of science I suppose, but I am not sure one can
form scientific questions without at least an implicit understanding of
the nature and limits of scientific inquiry and knowledge. It is fair
to ask whether the two are separated *in practice* , I would say that in
*good science*, both are practiced in tandem.
I suppose *some* scientists do not think deeply *about* the context of
their work, the limits of their practice, knowledge or even it's
applicability. That is to say, they do not practice the philosophy of
science, although they do depend heavily on the fact that others *have*
done so quite elaborately. This is what a factory model of "education"
all the way through Doctoral programs can give you.
I suspect George Smoot does "think deeply about scientific knowledge
and processes", or at least cosmology. I met him when I was at LBL and
he actually reminded me a bit of you (in appearance). As a
cosmologist, the very fundamental questions he is pursuing are defined
*by* physical cosmology which is part of the philosophy of science.
The Copernican Principle that the earth does not represent a special or
unique place in the cosmos is an example of scientific philosophy...
(un)surprisingly, it was generally assumed by all (many, most?) that
celestial objects were qualitatively different from earthly ones.
Copernicus *used* scientific methods to demonstrate the principle, but
to even contrive the question in the first place was *outside* of
science. Many points of scientific philosophy seem "obvious in
hindsight" but I contend are anything *but* until they have been
discovered, recognized, mulled over, argued, considered, debated, etc.
A lot of our discussion here about evidence is an epistimological
question (the nature of knowledge), not a scientific one. It has
incredible, direct application in the practice of science, but "thinking
deeply about important things like 'what constitutes evidence'" is not
science itself.
As for Computer Science? A huge amount of what we *call* Computer
Science is at best Computer Engineering, or Computer Technology or often
applications of Logic and Mathematics. There are professors of Computer
Science here who can answer that question better than I, I am sure.
I measure you as a "Logical Positivist" or "Logical Empiricist" in
practice and you probably hold no difference between your practice and
your principles (one of the six contradictory if not impossible things
*I* believe each morning religiously before during and *after* breakfast).
*Logical positivism* or *logical empiricism* are variants of
*neopositivism* that embraced *verificationism
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verificationism>*, a theory of
knowledge <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology> combining
strong empiricism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empiricism>---basing
all knowledge on sensory experience---with mathematical logic
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_logic> and linguistics
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics> so that scientific
statements could be conclusively proved false or true.
Many members of the Vienna Circle, (whence logical positivism arose)
were more well known for the mathematics (Bergman, von Mises, etc.)
and/or scientific (Mach (posthumeously), Schlick) contributions than
their philosophical ones, but it was at it's heart a philosophical
society, studying (developing) primarily the philosophy of science. The
Berlin circle, less well known but peers with the Vienna folks, included
the likes of David Hilbert.
My experience is that most (contemporary, casual?) neopositivists
(toward which I lean strongly myself) tend to believe that their way of
viewing the world is self-evident, unequivocal, and not really in need
of further discussion. I, of course, am willing to discuss anything at
any length (aka Dog With Bone and Beat the Dead Horse Slowly patterns).
I haven't quite sorted Glen out, but I think he only plays neopositivist
while riding his motorcycle on loose or otherwise slick surfaces, and
the rest of the time has a somewhat less physicalist-centric view of
life, the universe and everything?
I suspect that Rich, for example, is far from being a neopositivist. I
*think* neopositivists are materialists (or more generally physicalists)
and I am pretty sure that Rich admits to phenomena that we can
experience which are NOT rooted in material or physical sources (e.g.
psi, morphic fields, etc.). In fact, I think this is the core of the
TED uproar... Sheldrake, et al.
As a philosopher (using your definition) I am pretty weak... I tend to
think broadly (rather than deeply) about random, sometimes remunerable
or entertaining, but rarely fundamenatally important stuff. My
engagement in science is equally weak... I tend much more toward
engineer or more to the point, semi-skilled hacker. My hypothesis
generation and testing ends up looking more like "cut and try" and I am
of the "measure thrice, cut twice" school of carpentry. I keep a 2x4
stretcher handy and use it often. I don't think much about lambda
calculus or closures when I program. I do understand algorithmic
complexity and often do even analyze my algorithms for it but usually
only after I realize I have a problem.
oh yeah... P&L and 2012 tax liabilities.. April 15, bah!
- Steve
Relying to Steve & Roger:
No, for once I was not being argumentative, it was the "of science"
part I was questioning. As compared, say, to a philosopher of
religion, or morality, or human psychology. Continuing to use our
favorite reference source, Wikipedia gives this definition for
"Philosopher" (which, as it turns out, does not really differ
substantively from mine):
A *philosopher* is a person
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person> with an extensive knowledge
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge> of philosophy
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy> who uses this knowledge
in their work, typically to solve philosophical problems
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_philosophy>.
Philosophy is concerned with studying the subject matter of fields
such as aesthetics <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aesthetics>,
ethics <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics>, epistemology
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology>, logic
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic>, metaphysics
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics>, as well as social
philosophy <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social> and political
philosophy <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_philosophy>.
My definition of /philosopher/, btw, is "One who thinks deeply about
important stuff."
Back to the original question, what benefits does a Philosopher *of
Science* provide. Does he aid people like, say, George Smoot (Noble
Prize in Physics, 2006) do cosmology better? Or, does he help a
computer scientist develop better code or systems designs?
--Doug
On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 2:39 PM, Roger Critchlow <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 1:30 PM, Douglas Roberts
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> So not only do phenomena worth studying emerge at different
levels of organization,
>> but the emerging phenomena at a level of organization are
amenable to different disciplines of study
>> which may all be judged "scientific" by a philosopher of science.
This phrase struck me, and this will sound like a dumb
question, but humor me: What is a philosopher of science? And
what value do they provide? Serious question.
The author of the book is a faculty member at Stanford University
who identifies as a philosopher of science. She wrote a book.
She presumably teaches classes, writes scholarly articles, and
reviews the writings of other scholars.
She identifies the different ways of studying human behavior as
equally "scientific", while the popular science literature, the
grant competition process, and the disciplines themselves tend to
treat the alternatives as mutually exclusive possible truths, in a
conflict from which one shall emerge triumphant.
So which question is the serious one? Taken together, you are
expressing skepticism of philosophy by asking a question about
values. That is as close to the origins of western philosophy as
you can get without directly quoting Socrates.
-- rec --
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