Marcus G. Daniels wrote at 09/23/2013 07:26 PM:
This wasn't an "open everything" situation. The `collective' here was not a flat organization and the information wasn't posted on a bulletin board. In this story the IT people had privileged access to the organization's communication devices. I don't see why you jump to this conclusion. (It may be the correct one, I just don't see that it has anything to do with the story you referenced.)
Sorry. I tried to draw lines between this data point and others. While it's true that this isn't an open everything situation, it sits on a spectrum between complete isolation (everything closed) and complete integration (everything open). My original assertion about categories was an attempt to preemptively fend off arguments that this story is of a different _kind_ than the NSA or Manning stories. I see it as a difference in _degree_. The phones were public property, being copied by employees (presumably) paid through tax money. There is (usually) an implication of greater openness to public employees than private (along the spectrum through publicly traded companies to purely private to individuals, etc.). Even more openness/transparency is implied by the willingness of the board to cover up the incident. I can't imagine treating everything as a special case. The story I referenced is related, at least by the 3 breaches I mentioned, to every other asymmetric snooping (privileged access) story. Understanding how these special cases fit into the general societal architecture was, I thought, right in line with the purpose of this e-mail list. Anyway, clearly I've failed to make my point. Sorry for the distraction. -- ⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella Is what the prophets have to say
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