Because there is no physical card. Although if I were handed a deck I could find the instance of the card I have in mind.
Frank Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 On Aug 15, 2014 9:53 PM, "Nick Thompson" <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Frank, > > Thanks for putting your oar in. > > How is your question different from the following question? > > I am looking at a Cup with an inscription. When you [finally] come to > visit > me in Massachusetts, I will show you the inscription on the cup. It will > be > the same cup. > > Nick > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly > Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 9:50 PM > To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > Nick, > > Re: Your cup. > > I am thinking of a card. Can you tell me what it is? I will ask you again > when you are present in Santa Fe. It will be the same card. This is just > to explain the problem I have with your claims about whether one has > private > access to one's mind. > > Frank > > > Frank C. Wimberly > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > > [email protected] [email protected] > Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson > Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 7:08 PM > To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > John, > > Ok. I am in. But we have to go slowly, because, as somebody > famously said, "In philosophy, if you are not moving slowly, you aren't > moving." Not clear where to start. I don't want to try to defend my > "insight" that our vernacular understanding of consciousness arises not > because it is accurate but because it makes society possible. I will say > in > its defense only that the McNauton Rule which forms the basis for our > notion of legal responsibility, states that I can only be considered > criminally responsible If I know the nature and quality of my own acts. > This phrase, "knowing nature and quality of one's acts" sounds a heckuva > lot > like a definition of [self] consciousness to me. > > I thought we perhaps could start with unpacking "interior", since > it > appears in both of your messages ("access"). What does it mean to say that > my thoughts are "inside" me. It ought to mean, if we play the language > game of "inside" by the rules, that there is some sort of container that my > thoughts are enclosed within. The use of the word, "access", would seem > to > suggest that I have ways of getting at the insides of the "box" to "see" my > thoughts that you do not have. Perhaps the box is a 5-sided box, and it's > open side faces me, so I can see inside and you cannot? If that is how > the > metaphor works, then you should be able to come around to my side of the > box and look in examine its contents with me. Or, if my access is provided > by a key, you should be able to use that key to get inside my box. In > other > words, there should be some set of conditions under which you can see > exactly what I see. Since this entailment of the box metaphor undermines > the essential privacy of mind, I assume that you would rule it out by, say, > asserting that only I have the key to my box, and I cannot loan it to you. > > > But now we encounter another problem. I think you would agree that you do > have some access to the inside of my box, beyond the access that I might > provide you by telling you what is inside it. Certainly, if I wrote you > now the words, "I really have no interest in issues in the philosophy of > mind," you would have every reason to assert that I had misrepresented the > contents of my box to you. So, to make the metaphor work, we would have to > imagine that, perhaps it's sides are not entirely opaque, or not opaque all > the time. Perhaps they are sometimes translucent? > > How about a different metaphor altogether? How about the metaphor of > "point > of view"? My consciousness is just that what is seen from the point of > view on the world from where I stand. It is mine only in the sense that it > is indexed to me, not in the sense that I own it or that it is in me. For > example, there is a cup on my desk whose inscription is turned toward me so > that if you were sitting across my desk from me right now, you would not > "have access to it". The inscription is, "ONLY MUGS PAY POLL TAX." I am > conscious of it in the sense that my behavior points to it. From your > point > of view, my consciousness is just all that my behavior designates. When > your behavior designates the relations between me and some of the objects > in > your environment, you become conscious of what I am conscious. When my > behavior designates those same relations, I become self-conscious. I > think > "self-consciousness is what we are principally arguing about, here. > > I hope this answer is somewhat satisfying. Thanks for running me around > the > track. I am trying to write some on this subject this summer. I really > need the exercise. > > Best, > > Nick > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Kennison > Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 12:52 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > Hi Nick, > > I certainly don't think of what you said as "rude" --in fact I asked you > to > tell what errors you might see in what I said. > And in any case, I am very glad to agree that we are old friends and can, > if > necessary, forgive what might appear as rudeness. > > I am willing to accept your conclusion that the words "inner subjective > life" are not really very useful and do no contribute much to my idea of > what consciousness is. I don't think I claimed that they are either of > these > things. > > I am having difficulty seeing the connection between these words and a > quasi-legal understanding that I and only I get to speak for myself. > I guess I would say that my sense of what my consciousness is all about > will > be different from yours because I have access to my thoughts and vague > feelings etc. that differs from the kind of access you have. It's okay with > me if you speak for myself (so to speak) --and I imagine you will, perhaps > over the previous sentence. I invite and will (I think) welcome your > analysis. > > --John > > ________________________________________ > From: Friam [[email protected]] on behalf of Nick Thompson > [[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 11:38 AM > To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' > Cc: James Laird > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > Hi, John, > > Nothing like a sober, quiet, good question to knock an old warrior off his > high horse. > > Ok. Now that I am standing on the ground ... > > First, let us stipulate, we are talking about self-consciousness, here, ... > something beyond sentience, right? If so, then I think your question is a > wonderful example of a "mystery", like we talked about yesterday. A > mystery > is a state of pleasurable confusion generated by using words outside their > realm of usefulness. So, I would predict that if we sat down and unpacked > "inner", "subjective", and "life" we would discover that these words have > really nothing to contribute beyond the assertion that "I, and only I, get > to speak for me." In other words, under your use of "consciousness", it > is > really a quasi-legal understanding central to human interaction that, in > the > absence of a legal certification of incompetence, our assertions about our > own needs, wants, thoughts, etc., are to be taken as definitive. So, for > instance, what I just said -- that your view of consciousness is not quite > what you think it is -- would be (may be) seen as RUDE, in polite society, > because, on your own understanding of consciousness, you and only you get > to > say what you think it is. Because we have been friends for more than 40 > years, I hoping you will let that rudeness pass. > > On my account, an entity is conscious of something when it acts with > respect > to it, and SELF-conscious, when it acts with reference to itself. On that > account, a simple thermostat is clearly conscious, but not self-conscious. > A more complicated thermostat, which calibrates its own sensitivity (which > most modern thermostats do), would probably have to be admitted as > self-conscious. > > Nick > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Kennison > Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 11:00 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > Nick, > > I guess my criterion for consciousness would be something like "has an > inner > subjective life". It's not something that I can measure and it has the > problem of circularity --if you ask me what I mean by an "inner subjective > life" I will soon be making a circular definition. I am willing to concede > that I don't have a suitable definition for a scientific study of > consciousness. Still the question of whether a thermostat has consciousness > seems meaningful to me. (I don't have an answer --other than "I doubt it". > ) > Perhaps, I am making some kind of error. If so, could you explain what my > mistake is. > > --John > ________________________________________ > From: Friam [[email protected]] on behalf of Nick Thompson > [[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 10:20 AM > To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > So, I looked up David Chalmers . Yeh, I know: I shouldn't have HAD to > look up David Chalmers. Here from Philosophy Index > > A potential problem with this speculation, which Chalmers acknowledges, is > that it may imply the consciousness of things that we would not normally > consider to have consciousness at all. For instance, Chalmers wonders if > this means that a thermostat may have some experiential properties, even if > they are especially dull. He does not commit to the notion that they do, > but > the possibility remains in the more speculative area of his thought. > > This is one of those "TED" insights, to which the only rational response > is, > "Duh!" Why exactly is that a problem? What exactly would it have meant to > say that "humans are conscious" if it were not possible to discover that > (1) > things other than humans are conscious and/or that humans are not, in fact, > conscious. Either we have a criterion for consciousness or we don't; once > we have a criterion, we either apply it rigorously or . we are dishonest. > It's really quite simple, actually. > > > N > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Eric Smith > Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 9:45 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > Quick, somebody call David Chalmers! > > > On Aug 15, 2014, at 9:25 AM, Eric Charles wrote: > > > Weird that they want to call it "personality" instead of more simply saying > that ant colonies seem to adapt to their local environment. Of course, the > flashiness of the claim is the only reason it is being covered on the BBC, > so I guess it isn't that weird after all. > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall > Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > > On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Gillian Densmore > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > A few swarm inteligence from the 90s described that. Scott Kelly's "Fast > Cheap and Out of Controll" touched on that. In his case they knew ants > (and > often uncles) could pass around experience- and displayed something > simillar > to hummans sense of experience they didn't have a explination. Then again > his forray into science was from the 90s. > > On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 9:01 AM, Tom Johnson > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > So who is going to integrate this into the sugar model? > > http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28658268 > > =================================== > Tom Johnson - Inst. for Analytic Journalism Santa Fe, NM > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>. > 505-473-9646<tel:505-473-9646> > =================================== > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >
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