R.
I suppose that if the robot met the conditions I laid out, I would have to consider it. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott Sent: Thursday, February 25, 2016 9:40 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy I meant to follow up on this from Nick. DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: So a robot could be made that would feel pain? Well, you are cheating a bit, because you are asking me to participate in a word game I have already disavowed, the game in which pain is something inside my brain that I use my pain-feelers to palpate (contra Natsoulas, this volume). To me, pain is an emergency organization of my behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of various sorts. You show me a robot that is part of a society of robots, becomes frantic when you break some part of it, calls upon it fellow robots to assist, etc., I will be happy to admit that it is “paining”. Do you apply that standard to ethics and the law? That is, from an ethical perspective should entities that "pain" in your sense not be acted upon in such a way as to result in their performing their "paining" activities? Would you recommend that anything along those lines be enshrined in the law? What about "killing" a robot by (turning it off and) dismantling it? It will have "died" because it stops acting "alive." On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 10:06 PM Nick Thompson <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Hi, Russ, Your questions are so answered by the “Old New Realist” article. I will attach it again. In the meantime, here is an excerpt. DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: If feelings are something that one does, rather than something that one “has inside”, then the right sort of robot should be capable of feeling when it does the sorts of things that humans do when we say that humans are feeling something. Are you prepared to live with that implication? Sure. DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: So a robot could be made that would feel pain? Well, you are cheating a bit, because you are asking me to participate in a word game I have already disavowed, the game in which pain is something inside my brain that I use my pain-feelers to palpate (contra Natsoulas, this volume). To me, pain is an emergency organization of my behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of various sorts. You show me a robot that is part of a society of robots, becomes frantic when you break some part of it, calls upon it fellow robots to assist, etc., I will be happy to admit that it is “paining”. DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: On your account, non-social animals don’t feel pain? Well, not the same sort of pain. Any creature that struggles when you do something to it is “paining” in some sense. But animals that have the potential to summon help seem to pain in a different way. DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: But Nick, while “paining” sounds nice in an academic paper, it is just silly otherwise. The other day I felt quite nauseous after a meal. I am interested in what it’s like to feel nauseous, and you cannot honestly claim that you don’t know what feeling nauseous is like. Behavioral correlates aren’t at issue, stop changing the subject. What is “being nauseous” like? It’s like being on a small boat in a choppy sea, it’s like being in a world that is revolving when others see it as stable, it’s like being grey in the face and turning away from the sights and smells of food that others find attractive, it’s like having your head in the toilet when others have theirs in the refrigerator. But you have brought us to the crux of the problem. Nobody has ever been satisfied with my answers to these, “What is it like to be a _______?” questions. “What is it like to be in pain? What is it like to be a bat? What is it like to be Nick Thompson?” Notice how the grammar is contorted. If you ask the question in its natural order, you begin to see a path to an answer. “What is being Nick Thompson like?” “It’s like running around like a chicken with its head cut off.” OK. I get that. I see me doing that. You see me doing that. But most people won’t be satisfied with that sort of answer, because it’s the same as the answer to the question, “What do people like Nick Thompson do?” and therefore appears to convey no information that is inherently private. To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”, has been fully answered when you have said where X-like people can be found and what they will be doing there. However, I seem to be pretty alone in that view. DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: Now I see why you annoy people. I ask you a perfectly straightforward question about the quality of an experience and you keep trying to saddle me with a description of a behavior. You just change the subject. You clearly understand me when I ask you about the quality of feeling nauseous, yet you answer like a person who doesn’t understand. Well, here you just prove my point by refusing to believe me when I say that, for me, feeling is a kind of doing, an exploring of the world. Where does somebody who believes that mental states are private, and that each person has privileged access to their own mental states, stand to deny me my account of my own mental states? You can’t have it both ways – you have run smack-dab into the ultimate foolishness of your position. Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 10:18 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy Sorry. Guess I missed it. Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world from where you stand. I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior toward you is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" What does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say that it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time must they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if the projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions in the papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 9:05 PM Nick Thompson <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Thanks, Eric. Precisely said. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of Eric Charles Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 9:16 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy "But what is it to know the subjective experience of another ? You ask me about my experience, and I tell you? Do you have to trust my account?" Well.... the whole crux of psychology ("small p" psychology?) is that your account is suspect, and I would be a fool to accept it naively. Your ability to know yourself is suspect (what Henriques calls your "Freud Filter") and your ability to acknowledge what you know in an authentic fashion is suspect (what Henriques calls your "Rogerian Filter") and of course whatever you say encounters the same hurdles in "the mind" of the listener. We all recognize "sharing subjective experience" and "intimacy" as more than this. There are people who claim to tell us about their experience, but with whom we feel no sense of connection. "It just struck me that intimacy as I understand that term depends on an assumption of subjective experience" Well.... The question is, as Nick has said, what you mean by "subjective", right? If you mean that the world looks differently to different people, in the literal sense, of a physical body/mind experiencing certain things, then it is fine to talk about subjective experience and about coming to understand the subjective experience of another person. To be intimate with someone, as you present it, would be to understand, a person's quirky way of experiencing the world to such an extent that you could share in their view, i.e., you could come, at least from time to time, to find yourself with "their" quirks rather than "your own." If, on the other hand, when you talk about "subjective", you mean that there is a ghost-soul somewhere, experiencing a Cartesian theater in its own unique way, then you have a problem. (The problem isn't the one you might think, however! It matters not, for this discussion, whether such a thing exists.) The problem is that such a view rules out the intimacy you are thinking of in a much, much more dogmatic way than what you might worry about from Nick. If that is what you mean by "subjective experience" then it is by definition unsharable. You cannot possibly get yourself into another person's Cartesian theater, and you will never know if anything you experience bares even the slightest resemblance to what they experience. It is a deep rabbit hole. Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 3:15 PM, Nick Thompson <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Yep! I didn’t feel I should name names. How did the wedding go? There was a point around 4pm when I was kicking myself about bailing; and then another point, around 8 pm, when I was wolfing hydrocodone and thanking God that I had. Debby must be exhausted. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 12:25 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy Nick, I hope I am the "other FRIAMMER" to which you referring. Frank Frank Wimberly Phone (505) 670-9918 <tel:%28505%29%20670-9918> On Feb 20, 2016 9:11 PM, "Nick Thompson" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Hi, Russ, You wrote: Intimacy is … not about just about knowing something about someone that isn't generally known, e.g., where the person went to elementary school or her mother's maiden. Intimacy has to do with the kinds of things that are known, in particular with knowing about the subjective experience of another person. At least that's how I would describe it -- and that's why I raised the question. Oh, I don’t have a lot of trouble agreeing with the first part of this statement. Some unknowns are inherently more intimate than others. But what is it to know the subjective experience of another ? You ask me about my experience, and I tell you? Do you have to trust my account? Well, if you ask me, I assert that I, for one, DON’T. One answer to this quandary is to simply assert that Russ Abbot has subjective experience and Nick Thompson does not! Perhaps ,N.T. is the victim of a form of autism that deprives him of that self-conscious that for you defines the human condition. And there’s an end to it, eh? At this point, one of my most dedicated opponents in this discussion, a former graduate student, always say, “So it’s OK to kill you eat you, right?” I am going to invoke the academic Scoundrel’s Defense here, and attach a link to another paper <http://www.clarku.edu/faculty/nthompson/1-websitestuff/Texts/1990-1994/The_many_perils_of_ejective_anthropomorphism.pdf> . “Ejective anthropomorphism” is the idea that we come to know animal mental states by seeing an isomorphism between some feature of an animals behavior and some behavior of our own and then, since we know infallibly the internal causes of our behavior, inferring the internal causes of the animal’s. The whole argument hangs, of course, on the notion that we know why we do things by some special direct knowledge… “privileged access”. The article is a bit of a slog, but if skim judiciously until you get to the section on “privileged access”, 67, then you might have enough energy to read the argument against that notion and be convinced. Russ, I think in our correspondence before you have perhaps taken the position that it simply is the case that each of us has a private consciousness. That is a position taken by another FRIAMMER and I find it, oddly, the most winning argument. “I choose to start here!” Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 10:33 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy Intimacy is not necessarily about sex, but it is also not about just about knowing something about someone that isn't generally known, e.g., where the person went to elementary school or her mother's maiden name. It's more than just being able to answer the sorts of questions web sites ask as a way to establish one's identity. Intimacy has to do with the kinds of things that are known, in particular with knowing about the subjective experience of another person. At least that's how I would describe it -- and that's why I raised the question. On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 3:39 PM Nick Thompson <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Dear John and Russ, Well, you question is an example of itself. Who is best qualified to explain the basis of Nick's denial of subjectivity? Is this a question about etiology: I.e., the causal history of Nick's coming to deny subjectivity? Or is it a question of what rational arguments Nick might make for his denial of subjectivity. Note that there is nothing particularly private about either of those forms of the question. FRIAM could get to work on answering them and Nick could stand aside and wonder at the quality and perspicacity of your answers. My own most recent and condensed and approachable attempt to answer both versions of the question can be found in the manuscript that is attached. I can’t find cc of the published vsn at the moment. I will think about the intimacy issue. I think it’s about having some others who know things about you that are not generally known. I would argue that when you get into bed with somebody naked, it’s a metaphor. But then, I am old. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 2:30 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy One thing I wonder about (or perhaps have forgotten) in this discussion and Nick's denial is what the denial is based on. Is the absence of subjectivity supposed to be a scientific fact? If so, we should be discussing the experimental foundations of this fact. I have read of some experiments which seem to indicate that subjectiviity is not exactly what we (or what I) used to think it is --but which do not seem to disprove subjectivity. --John ________________________________________ From: Friam [[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] on behalf of Russ Abbott [[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 3:27 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy We've had discussions on and off about subjectivity -- with me getting frustrated at Nick's denial thereof (if I understood him correctly). It occurred to me recently that intimacy is defined -- as I understand it -- in terms of subjectivity, i.e., the sharing of one's (most private) subjective experiences with another. I'm wondering what Nick thinks about this and whether anyone else has something to say about it. In particular, if there is no such thing as subjective experience, does that imply in your view that the same goes for intimacy? ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 10:33 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy Intimacy is not necessarily about sex, but it is also not about just about knowing something about someone that isn't generally known, e.g., where the person went to elementary school or her mother's maiden name. It's more than just being able to answer the sorts of questions web sites ask as a way to establish one's identity. Intimacy has to do with the kinds of things that are known, in particular with knowing about the subjective experience of another person. At least that's how I would describe it -- and that's why I raised the question. On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 3:39 PM Nick Thompson <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Dear John and Russ, Well, you question is an example of it self. Who is best qualified to explain the basis of Nick's denial of subjectivity? Is this a question about aetiology: I.e., the causal history of Nick's coming to deny subjectivity? Or is it a question of what rational arguments Nick might make for his denial of subjectivity. Note that there is nothing particularly private about either of those forms of the question. FRIAM could get to work on answering them and Nick could stand aside and wonder at the quality and perspicacity of your answers. My own most recent and condensed and approachable attempt to answer both versions of the question can be found in the manuscript that is attached. I can’t find cc of the published vsn at the moment. I will think about the intimacy issue. I think it’s about having some others who know things about you that are not generally known. I would argue that when you get into bed with somebody naked, it’s a metaphor. But then, I am old. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 2:30 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy One thing I wonder about (or perhaps have forgotten) in this discussion and Nick's denial is what the denial is based on. Is the absence of subjectivity supposed to be a scientific fact? If so, we should be discussing the experimental foundations of this fact. I have read of some experiments which seem to indicate that subjectiviity is not exactly what we (or what I) used to think it is --but which do not seem to disprove subjectivity. --John ________________________________________ From: Friam [[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] on behalf of Russ Abbott [[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 3:27 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy We've had discussions on and off about subjectivity -- with me getting frustrated at Nick's denial thereof (if I understood him correctly). It occurred to me recently that intimacy is defined -- as I understand it -- in terms of subjectivity, i.e., the sharing of one's (most private) subjective experiences with another. I'm wondering what Nick thinks about this and whether anyone else has something to say about it. In particular, if there is no such thing as subjective experience, does that imply in your view that the same goes for intimacy? ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
