OK.  This is better.  But you seem to have defined "unit" or "coherence", 
rather than "self" ... I'm reminded of Simon's "near decomposability" in The 
Sciences of the Artificial.  To promote a unit to a self, you're going to have 
to include some sort of loop, like propri- or inter-oception.  And that raises 
the idea that some (exteroception) variables are unbound.  If the "unit" has 
more unbound variables than bound ones and/or the loops see less weight/traffic 
than the unbound ones, then the "unit" isn't coherent ... not a unit.  By that 
reasoning, we should be able to parse the unit into parts whose excision does 
not (appreciatively) affect the unit versus parts whose excision fundamentally 
changes it, including destroying it.

I'd posit that a passable definition of "self" is the collection of parts that 
can't be excised without causing fundamental changes.  So, the loss of things 
like hair, fingernails, skin cells, maybe teeth, maybe 1 kidney, 1/2 a liver, 
etc. preserve the unit.

But even *that* definition is hopelessly flawed because it passes the buck to 
"fundamental changes".  Is myself invariant across the loss of a tooth?  What 
were we talking about?

On 08/07/2017 05:52 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> I claim a message send is analogous to an axon firing, where there is at 
> least one target neuron for each receivable message.   The whole graph and 
> instantaneous charge state of the neurons and the musculature/skeleton/etc. 
> attached to them is the `self'.  The edges and effective edges in the graph 
> (apparently) come and go depending on experience.   In terms of comparing 
> selves, I think one needs to look at the graphs in terms of the behaviors 
> they exhibit and not their internal wiring.   My wiring of yellow can be 
> different from yours.    Your perception of throwing a baseball will change 
> with and without a broken arm, not just because the arm might not work, but 
> also because the broken arm will lead to the motor system changing due to the 
> lack of practice with throwing.
> 
> Probably there are subgraphs that are more stable configurations than others.

-- 
☣ glen

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