Thanks, Glen, for your generous and thoughtful post, but please be careful. 

 

...And Nick's idea that convergence within the universe's formal system, S, 
implies truth ....

 

 

You actually misstate my position, as I understand it.  Nick's assertion so far 
implies no truth, anymore than his discussion of Unicorns implies the existence 
of Unicorns.  In some ways, Nick’s assertion is MORE ARROGANT than you suppose. 
 It is an assertion concerning what “WE” mean by truth.  It asserts only that 
If any Truth exists, that is what it would look like.  You (or anybody else, 
for that matter) can prove me wrong by asserting another definition of Truth, 
but so far nobody has done that.  

 

Or am I completely off the rails, here. 

 

Nick  

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2017 11:21 AM
To: FriAM <friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Truth: “Hunh! What is it good for? Absolutely Nothing!”

 

Whew!  Fantastic thread!  I'm grateful to be able to witness it.

 

I'd like to point out that Peirce (and as Dave points out, many of us) are what 
I'd call "Grand Unified Modelers" (GUMmers): those who think there is, in R. 
Rosen's terms a "largest model" ... a penultimate language that if we could 
only learn and speak *that* language, what Nick's describing as Peirce's defn 
of "truth" would be accurate.

 

Solomon Feferman has worked on this problem and his (now old) initial 
submission is described here:

 

  Gödel, Nagel, minds and machines

   <https://math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers/godelnagel.pdf> 
https://math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers/godelnagel.pdf

 

It's probably important to read the whole thing.  But you could just jump to 
section "5. One way to straddle the mechanist and anti-mechanist positions."

 

It's also useful to note that Lee Rudolph submitted a relevant piece awhile 
back: "Logic in Modeling", wherein he cites Soare's definition of a 
"computation", which requires it be *definite* ... i.e. that all variables be 
bound, which would outlaw Feferman's "schematic axioms".  (... if I understand 
correctly ... I am not a logician, mathematician, or meta-mathematician... so 
your results may vary.)

 

Peirce's (and Nick's) insistence on the definiteness/fixedness of the 
universe's "formal system S", is what lies at the heart of the disagreement 
between Nick and Dave.  I think it's also important to point out that BOTH Nick 
and Dave COULD BE wrong.  Dave's idea that "mathematical logic" is impoverished 
may not be right if something like Feferman's solution could work.  And Nick's 
idea that convergence within the universe's formal system, S, implies truth may 
be wrong if something like the problem Feferman (and Dave) are trying to solve 
actually is the case.

 

--

☣ gⅼеɳ

 

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