Well, to be clear, I think the idea of your sensor-web-effector individuals
squirming in a machine is perfectly consistent with Peirce's conception of
reality. The disconnect lies in the extent to which that machine (in which the
sensor-web-effector individuals squirm) is "fixed once and for all", as
Feferman puts it. Peirce's conception of reality seems to rely on that
fixation, that definiteness, the one, fixed, master structure in which we all
swim. Feferman's observation that working mathematicians are at once Platonic,
yet don't limit themselves to any single formalism, seems to argue from your
perspective: that reality is not fixed, definite, and if a sensor-web-effector
individual becomes fixated AS IF the reality in which it swims were fixed, then
that limited delusion is what it calls "truth" (a truth, the truth, etc.).
Rosen would agree with you as well, by claiming that our mathematics, logic,
and "inferential entailment" methods are impoverished when compared to reality
("causal entailment").
But it's important to look at Peirce's synoptic understanding of logic and
math. A good example is his existential graphs, which encompassed more than
first order logic, including higher-order and modal logic. My guess is Peirce
would readily entertain ideas like Feferman's schematic axiomatic systems as a
way to enrich our logics so as to handle the dynamism of working
mathematicians, and perhaps that pointed out by you or Rosen.
On 10/17/2017 01:18 PM, Prof David West wrote:
> Nothing about language or thought, but a hint of the truth-preserving
> machine in which people squirm that Glen described.
--
☣ gⅼеɳ
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