👍 ---- Frank Wimberly https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 Phone (505) 670-9918
On Dec 19, 2017 5:45 PM, "Prof David West" <[email protected]> wrote: > In my opinion, Glen is right to be worried, and more than a little worried > about the idea that "narrative" is fundamental to cognition. > > Simultaneously, I am a huge fan of "story" and do believe that "story" is > fundamental to cognition. > > My antipathy towards narrative theory, and the resolution of the partial > contradiction above, is that I see narrative theorists as a group of > academics that are trying to "formalize" something that is fundamentally > aformal. > > That vast majority of what we know, individually and collectively was > acquired via story (70-75%); while 20-25% was acquired via direct > experience (but shared with others via story); and only 2-5% of what we > know was acquired formally as 'book learning'. > > Ever since we started talking to each other, and telling stories around > the fire pit, we have had no difficulty telling intelligible, meaningful, > and useful stories about complex systems - after all we have lived in one > and interacted with one, pretty successfully, for tens of thousands of > years. > > If narrative theory, as presently formalized, cannot deal with complexity, > then the issue is with the formalism - it is fatally flawed. > > In my opinion, this is the same issue with AI, both classical and the > current resurgence of "AI in everything" fad - intelligence is defined as > what the machine can do, what the formalisms that drive the machine can > handle, and not what goes on in the embodied minds of human beings. When > the singularity occurs and the machines take over, it is not because they > are 'are cognitively superior and think better than us" it is because we > allowed them to define away, as "not cognition," that which is unique to > human minds. > > Narrative theorists, again only in my opinion, do the same thing with > story: anything not congruent with the theory is excluded as not cognition. > > davew > > > > On Mon, Dec 18, 2017, at 3:51 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote: > > > > This was helpful: > > > > https://www.academia.edu/4163381/ > > Narrating_Complexity_The_Antipathy_of_Stories_and_Systems > > > > Ultimately, I'm a little worried about the idea that narrative is > > somehow fundamental to thought/understanding. I'm completely ignorant of > > any official domain called "Narrative". But I tend to associate it with > > stories, most importantly *including* stories that include concrete > > detail. And concreteness is antithetic to the type of "conceptual > > model" I'm inferring from both Stepney's and Walsh's (from the above > > presentation) sense/use of the term. This is my core concern. > > > > But first, I'd like to broach a more peripheral concern. Walsh's defn: > > "The semiotic articulation of linear temporal sequence" very clearly > > lays out the sequentiality. But, at least with computation, isn't it > > relatively accepted that any parallel process can be simulated by a > > sequential process? And if so, couldn't we claim that this > > sequentiality isn't that much of a limiting factor? I mean, sure, it > > may be merely approximate, or inaccurate, or whatever. But, basically, > > this would mean their research program would become showing which, in > > particular, types of complex adaptive systems cannot be approximated by > > narrative and the naive claim that *no* CAS can ever be adequately > > approximated would be unjustified or too extreme. > > > > The more important concern goes back to the accusation of idealism I > > often lob. I don't believe narrative is core to *my* cognition. Yes, > > when interacting mostly in symbols (like books, email, etc.), narrative > > seems dominant. But I would claim that's an artifact, a side effect, of > > the underlying process(es). A quick way to my point is the accusation of > > "book learning" vs. doing. It's notoriously difficult to *tell* someone > > how to, ride a bike or hit a baseball with a bat. Such telling does > > tend to be narrative, a kind of recipe, I suppose. But is the narrative > > necessary for *understanding* how to hit a baseball? Or for > > understanding what it *means* to ride a bicycle? I would say "no." > > > > Understanding is a concrete thing, done with the *body*, not with some > > abstraction in the *mind*. To go a step further, the objects pointed to > > by the signs in a narrative, are fully complex processes. The narratives > > really are just lossy models of the complex experiences. So, one person > > compresses her experience(s) into a word salad. Another person reads > > that word salad and the signs are interpreted to map to concretely > > *different* complex processes in the receiver. I like the quote from > > Herman below. But even that doesn't go far enough. Rather than say it > > the way Herman does, I'd prefer to say narrative is a justificationist > > technique for formulating hypotheses (whether testable or not). Then > > the concrete experiences of executed *tests* of those hypotheses are > > understanding (like when a child actually slides a block down an incline > > as opposed to hearing descriptions of blocks sliding down inclines). The > > experiment is the understanding. The narratives are only related to > > reality to the extent they cause repeatable experiences (through both > > inter- and intra-agent repetition). > > > > Anyway, none of what I say is probably new to Walsh or Stepney and they > > probably have answers. But it's curious. I'm intrigued by one of the > > text boxes in the "Cognition" box of slide 60: "Narrative cognition > > (relation to other modes of cognition)". It'll be interesting to see if > > the upcoming book talks about that. > > > > > > On 12/17/2017 09:03 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: > > > > > > Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences > > > > > > [...] > > > David Herman, ed. > > > /Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences/. > > > CSLI. 2003 > > > [...] > > > Herman > > > > > > /Narrative can have many cognitive functions. It is a system for > structuring patterns of events progressing through time: for structuring > processes. It can be used to “chunk” experiences into “frames” of > stereotypical experiences, then used to compare this typical against the > actual. This helps us to understand the world more, and therefore have to > memorise less. It allows us to generate and evaluate what-if scenarios. It > allows us to draw coherent system boundaries: to extract and bound a > relevant collection of participants, events, and structures from the > overall stream of events we experience. / > > > > > > -- > > ☣ uǝlƃ > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
