I dare not really speak for Nick, but I think the essence of his position is that there is no "out there" nor is there any "in here." There is only a flow of "experience" that is sometimes "evaluated" (interpreted?) to a false distinction of in or out — both equally illusory.
davew On Fri, Dec 6, 2019, at 3:27 PM, John Kennison wrote: > Hi Nick, and Eric, > > I am grappling with Nick's ideas that mental states must be physical things > and even are "out there" rather than "in here". What about delusions? If I > think I see bear in the woods but I am mistaken, is this false perception > "out there" even when the bear is not? > > --John > > > *From:* Friam <[email protected]> on behalf of Eric Charles > <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, December 5, 2019 8:41 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]> > *Subject:* [EXT] Re: [FRIAM] A pluralistic model of the mind? > > Nick, > Your need to complicate things is fascinating. You are a monist. You are a > monist is the sense of not thinking that "mental" things and "physical" > things are made of different stuffs. At that point, you can throw a new word > in the mix (e.g., 'experience', 'neutral stuff'), or you can throw your hat > in with one or the other side of the original division, e.g., "I am a > materialist" or "I am an idealist". To that, you add the insight that that > later discussion is all a bit weird, because once you have decided to be a > monist it weirdly doesn't matter much what you call the stuff.That insight is > in need of support, because the old dichotomy is so built in to our language > and culture that the claim it doesn't matter which side you choose is very > unintuitive. That is solid, and you should develop it further. > > Instead, you bring up some sort of discussion about serial vs. parallel > processing that has nothing to do with that topic at all, then you muddle the > issues up. Whether you think of "consciousness" as "serial" or "parallel" has > no bearing on the prior issue. Given that you are talking with a bunch of > computationally minded people, and that you brought up Turing Machines, the > first problem is that a serial system can simulate a parallel system, so > while parallel buys you time savings (sometimes a little, sometimes a lot), > it doesn't change what the system is capable of in any more fundamental way > (assuming you are still limited to writing zeros and ones). But you don't > even need that, because it just doesn't matter. Being a "monist" has nothing > to do with the serial vs. parallel issue at all. There is no reason a body > can't be doing many things at once. Or, you can change your level of analysis > and somehow set up your definition so that there is only one thing the body > is doing, but that one thing has parts. It is just a word game at that point. > If I have a 5-berry pie, is it 5 different types of pie at once, or is it its > own 1 flavor of pie? We can talk about the pros and cons of labeling it > different ways, but it is the same thing whichever way we label it.... and... > it has nothing to do with monism vs. dualism.... > > Admonishment over. > > So... Say more about the monism part... That is a solid issue and you are > getting somewhere with it... > > It SEEMS so important a difference if one person claims that all we can never > know is ideas ("You don't know 'the chair', just your idea of the chair!") > and another person claims that knowing isn't ever a thing and that there is > just material ("There is no 'idea' of the chair, there is only your physical > body in relation to the physical world!"). It seems that they are making > vastly different claims, and that they should disagree about almost > everything. How is it that THAT doesn't matter? > > Eric > > > ----------- > > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist > American University - Adjunct Instructor > <mailto:[email protected]> > > > On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 1:20 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >> Hi, everybody, ____ >> __ __ >> I have gotten all the communications off of nabble and concentrated them >> below. If you read this message in plain text, a lot of useful formatting >> will go away, so I encourage you to enable HTML. Or perhaps, I can fit it >> all up as a Word file, tomorrow.____ >> __ __ >> . I have not had time to dig into the contents much. I am pleased that >> everybody took the issue straight on, and I look forward to grappling with >> your comments.____ >> __ __ >> **A recapitulation of the thread:____** >> __ __ >> First, some text from the review which Roger sent: ____ >> __ __ >> **This is exactly as radical as it sounds. Bishop Berkeley and other >> idealists argued that objects are dependent on mind; Manzotti argues the >> reverse of this: Mind exists in objects. In The Spread Mind, Manzotti >> contends that we are mistaken to believe that objects “do not depend on our >> presence. . . . Our bodies enable processes that change the ontology of the >> world. Our bodies bring into existence the physical objects with which our >> experience is identical. We are our experience. We are not our bodies.” And >> later: “We are the world and the world is us—everything is physical.” This >> includes dreams, hallucinations, memories—all are the imagined physical >> objects themselves, not neural firings or mental representations (we must at >> one time have perceived an object to hallucinate or dream it, although it >> can be an unreal combination of other objects, as in the case of flying pink >> elephants). Manzotti impishly dubs this doctrine no-psychism. It’s idealism >> turned on its head, a reductio ad absurdum of scientific materialism. (If >> you’re confused, well, I’m not sure I understand it myself, and I read the >> book.)____** >> **Manzotti first drew Parks’s attention during a conference at IULM >> University in Milan, where Parks is a professor, by bellowing “There are no >> images!” in response to a neuroscientist’s discussion about how the brain >> transforms visual stimuli into images. On Manzotti’s view, the brain does >> nothing of the kind. There are no pictures, only objects. “He really >> couldn’t believe how stupid we were all being, he said, buying into this >> dumb story of images in our heads.” Parks was besotted.____** >> **He could as easily have said “There are no objects, only pictures!” ** ____ >> __ __ >> *MY COMMENT ON THE REVIEW: ____* >> __ __ >> I think this review may be a wonderful example of what happens when a >> (Romantic) dualist tries to explain monism to dualists. ____ >> __ __ >> What nobody in this discussion seems to understand is that one can have >> objects OR images BUT NOT BOTH. The lunacy begins when people imagine that >> there are things outside of experience. Or experience outside of things… >> really it doesn’t matter: they are both equally crazy. The fact is, >> everything we know comes in over one channel – I call it experience – and >> from that channel every form of experience is derived. So, images and >> objects are not different sorts of stuff, they are arrangements of the same >> stuff. And once you have agreed that there is only one kind of stuff, it >> doesn’t make a damn bit of difference what you call it, “images” or >> “objects”. ____ >> __ __ >> Take phantom limb, for instance. I feel like I have a leg but when I put my >> weight on it I fall down. Now the dualist will artificially divide >> experience into the feeling that I have a leg (i.e., I start to put my >> weight on it) and the experience of falling down, and call one the ineffable >> experience the other the brute reality. But this is an artificial division. >> Not falling down when you put your weight on your leg is as much part of the >> experience of having a leg as expecting that you wont fall down. ____ >> __ __ >> This is where I always imagine that glen and I must ultimately find >> agreement. He has to concede that he is a monist in that everything we >> experience is, well, experience. I have to concede that I am a pluralist, in >> that experience can be be organized in a zillion different forms depending >> on how, and the degree to which, it proves out Hypothesis testing is as much >> a part of experience as hypothesis formation. ____ >> __ __ >> Now, there is a a hidden assumption in my monism which I would think you >> computer folks would be all over me about. I am thinking of consciousness as >> serial, rather than parallel. Where do I stand to assert that what ever else >> can be said about experience, it comes down to a series of single, >> instantaneous points from which all the varieties and forms of experience – >> objects and fantasies, etc. – are constructed. This is where ProfDave has >> me, because there is no more reason to believe on the basis of looking at >> the brain that it has a single point of convergence, a choke point in its >> processing, than to believe the same of the kidneys. Kidneys can make urine >> and clean the blood at the same time. This is why I wish I understood the >> Turing Model better, because I intuit that the computers we use are based on >> just this seriel fallacy. Now, I suppose behavior provides something like a >> choke point. We either walk to the supermarket or we drive. But we may do a >> dozen different things on our way to the supermarket, whether or not we walk >> and drive. We can listen to a pod cast, we can plan our summer vacation, we >> can muse about which tuxedo we will wear for our Nobel Address. And if we >> don’t, as I suspect Frank and Bruce will want us to, artificially separate >> these musements from the circumstances that occasion them and the actions >> they ultimately occasion, we will see that the myth of the choke point (the >> fallacy of the turing machine model?) is contradicted by the fact that we >> can do and do do many things at once all the time. ____ >> __ __ >> __ __ >> *RESPONSES TO MY COMMENTS*: ____ >> __ __ >> **Glen’s First____** >> ____ >> But why is serialization different from any other monist tendency? >> Serialization is a reduction to the uni-dimensional *sequence*, whereas >> parallel implies pluralism, anything > 1 dimension. It would be inconsistent >> of you to allow for parallelism and retain your monism. So, to me, you're >> better off sticking with a sequential conception. ____ >> __ __ >> And don't forget, as we've discussed before, any output a parallel machine >> can produce can be "simulated" by a sequential machine. So, again, monism is >> moot. Yes, it may well be True in some metaphysical sense. But if it walks >> like a pluralist and quacks like a pluralist ... well, then it's a >> pluralist. ____ >> __ __ >> Unification is only useful in so far as it *facilitates* multiplication, >> i.e. demonstrates constructively how we get many things from few things. If >> you can't show your work, then you don't understand the problem (or you >> haven't read the instructions 8^). ____ >> __ __ >> **Dave West’s Comment:**____ >> __ __ >> Nick, I read your Old New Realist paper, but to get a grip on it I must read >> some Tolman and Holt - or at least it appears so. However, I have come to >> one conclusion so far: that in your academic persona you are a committed >> experience monist, but in your public/political persona you are an >> irredemptive dualist, believing that humans have a soul/spirit/essence apart >> from mere experience. (I know, how dare I cast such an aspersion?)____ >> __ __ >> Other things. I will not attempt to explain the Turing Model, others have >> the technical expertise to do so, but I will speak a bit about the Turing >> Metaphor.____ >> __ __ >> Metaphorically, a Turing machine is a device with three elements: a >> read/write head, a set of instructions "in memory," and an infinite tape >> divided into cells with each cell containing a 1 or 0.____ >> __ __ >> A cell of the tape is available to the read/write head and, depending on the >> instructions in memory, will read or write (or both in sequence) and advance >> or retire the tape for 1 to n positions.____ >> __ __ >> The Turing machine "computes" the tape and, simultaneously, the tape >> "instructs" (programs) the computer (read/write head plus tape >> advance-retire mechanism).____ >> __ __ >> The "instructions in memory" are just sequences of the same "stuff" — ones >> and zeros — as the "stuff" on the tape.____ >> __ __ >> Subsequent to some "bootstrap" set of instructions (you have no interest in >> "end cases" so I will not pursue), the "instructions in memory" can >> originate on the tape, i.e. the tape contains both "program" and "data." As >> the "instructions on tape" "move" to "instructions in memory," the >> "instructions in memory" can become arbitrarily complicated.____ >> __ __ >> So far, nothing that contradicts your "experience monism."____ >> __ __ >> A favorite science fiction meme: once enough ones and zeros have moved from >> the tape into "memory" the Turing Machine "wakes up" becomes conscious. >> Instant dualism, but without much reason as mere "location" changes nothing >> about the "stuff" which is still ones and zeros. (one "stuff," two >> values)____ >> __ __ >> Because the tape is infinite in length, it matters not that it is "serial" >> because any parallel computational experience can be replicated serially >> just takes longer.____ >> __ __ >> Still nothing to interfere with your experience monism. The interesting >> questions might be:____ >> __ __ >> 1- Is each individual human being a separate (but equal) instantiation of a >> Turing Machine consuming a separate (but equal) infinite tape. If yes, then >> the door seems to be opened for "private" experience/consciousness.____ >> __ __ >> 2- each human is a separate Turing Machine, but all consume the "same" >> infinite tape. "Same" meaning mostly identical, but with some allowance for >> perspective (slight variation in which portions of the tape are consumed >> when??). I believe that this would be your preferred interpretation as it >> might allow some kind of dialog among Turing machines as each one "wrote" to >> the infinite tape that all were consuming and, perhaps, somehow, thereby >> lead to some kind of "consensus computation."____ >> __ __ >> 3- there is but One Turing Machine, co-extensive with the Universe and One >> infinite tape, also co-extensive with the Universe and therefore the >> Universe is constantly "computing" itself. (Writing to the tape equals >> popping quantum quiffs, i.e. collapsing wave functions by observing.)____ >> __ __ >> I am pretty certain that option three is the only one possible for one >> committed to both ontological and epistemological monism. Ouroboros >> Rules!!____ >> __ __ >> **Glen’s Second: ____** >> __ __ >> Well, I did reply, as did Dave. If you're ever wondering whether someone >> replied, you might check the archive at:____ >> http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386669699&sdata=I3i4o%2FUwNgskuqC9FZm%2FJ7ih8ktHpk7XmBUVU2wsO8M%3D&reserved=0>____ >> __ __ >> Dave's was rather interesting w.r.t. Turing machines. Mine was more >> flippant. But to continue mine, your discussion of serial attention or >> behavior hearkens back to our prior discussions of quantum computing. >> Parallelism vs. serial(ism? ... sequentialism?) can be monified/unified by >> considering a 2 dimentional space of "space" vs time. In the ideal, even >> things at, say, space = 1 billion can operate that the same *time* as things >> at space = 1. Similarly, space at time = 1 billion can be at the same >> position as time = 1. But reality doesn't work that way. And quantum >> computing demonstrates this kinda-sorta painfully. But traditional >> distributed computing demonstrates it, too. Parallel computations across >> large spaces run into inter-process communication bottlenecks. I.e. sure, we >> can have 10 computers compute the same thing with different inputs and fuse >> the outputs. But we can't do the same thing with 1k computers without having >> "bus" or "backbone" bandwidth problems.____ >> __ __ >> This sort of thing seems pragmatically clear when you talk about your issues >> handling "serial consciousness". And, at risk of conflating 2 unrelated >> weird things (quantum with consciousness) for no good reason, there's a >> *coherence* to the parallel processing that goes on in quantum computing >> that kinda-sorta feels like your reduction to a serial attention/behavior in >> parsing consciousness. A loss of that coherence results in separate things, >> whereas a retention of the coherence maintains your "monism". But, in the >> end, it's all about the orthogonality between space and time and the >> *scales* of space and time wherein such orthogonality breaks down.____ >> __ __ >> I hope that's clear. I'm a bit occupied with debugging an uncooperative >> simulation at the moment.____ >> __ __ >> ============================================================____ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv____ >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fredfish.com%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffriam_redfish.com&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386669699&sdata=RDHisw3JFGEmSjT77Fl%2BA0v8pG8%2Bcp%2FBoh99Hbc9wv0%3D&reserved=0>____ >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386679692&sdata=H2NpyLgc3eaJwlES6o90%2BvU0jUvVNWWGjpGfg%2FR8d34%3D&reserved=0>____ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386679692&sdata=VnHPywdwh3fIha%2BF8j6HC3vpssUpGTxZUUXCIMsAZZk%3D&reserved=0> >> by Dr. Strangelove____ >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fredfish.com%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffriam_redfish.com&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386689685&sdata=Cy3zmueXnztFYde4YZESTlQrgSaePwNMk2XdjVndhTM%3D&reserved=0> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386689685&sdata=QrCPHEda7eV5SFAREpst%2BPvOQQ3oH3WQHlSD9NGE7UY%3D&reserved=0> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386699686&sdata=EJd2lqtzwaN16sf7wf5nAkcQqnk0iZr0PljsBpsKSuY%3D&reserved=0> >> by Dr. Strangelove > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
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