Well, your abstract seems to assume something akin to coherence, the idea that whatever's doing the introspection is a whole/atomic thing perceiving that whole/atomic thing. I think we know that established types of self-perception (proprio-, entero-) consist of one sub-component monitoring another sub-component. It's not clear to me whether you intend to address that part-whole aspect of self-perception or not. But if you don't address it, *I* won't be satisfied with whatever you write. 8^)
On 1/24/20 7:20 AM, [email protected] wrote: > Anybody else? > > *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Pieter Steenekamp > *Sent:* Thursday, January 23, 2020 11:05 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Your worst nightmare > > > > To put a Popper inspired philosophy of science-hat on this topic. The key is > in the falsification and good explanations process. Conjectures form in a > human's mind without consciously knowing where it comes from. To try to use > introspection to understand the roots of the conjecture is fruitless. A > process of cognitive falsification then takes this conjecture further. The > first stages might be a very informal process. Without expressing it like > that, the mind asks - I have this idea, why could it be false. If it passes > the first stages then a good explanation for the conjecture is developed and > it could be put out there in the world. This idea which originally started as > a conjecture now develops into knowledge whilst continuously open to be > falsified and better explanations are developed. There is no knowledge that > is immune against falsification and attempts to hamper the falsification > process limits the growth of knowledge. > I think this is a different paradigm in support of Nick's point that too > strong emphasis on introspection shuts down rather than inspiring inquiry. > > > On 1/23/20 2:38 PM, [email protected] wrote: > New Abstract: > > > > As psychologists in the behaviorist tradition, we have long had misgivings > about the concept of introspection. The metaphor behind the concept is > misleading, and despite the wide use of the concept in both vernacular and > professional settings, we doubt that anybody has ever resorted to > introspection in the sense that the concept is usually understood. > Additional misgivings arise from the study of the philosophy of C S Peirce. > Peirce’s Pragmaticism, one of the foundations of modern behaviorism, rejects > the Cartesian notion that all knowledge first arises from direct knowledge of > one’s own mind – i.e., from introspection. Peirce declares that all > knowledge arises from inference. He even reverses the flow, declaring that > self-knowledge is largely inference from what we do and what happens to us. > The logical operation by which we infer our selves is that called > “Abduction” by Peirce. When we engage in abduction, we use one or more > properties of an individual event or object to infer its membership in a > class of events or objects that share this properties with our initial event > or object. Abductions have potential heuristic power because when we infer > what class an individual event belongs to we may infer by deduction other > properties that this individual may have. However abductions vary > tremendously in their heuristic power ranging from the from highly useful and > testable expectations to implications that are mere vacuous or misleading. > We argue that the manner in which “introspection” is understood in psychology > abuses the logic of abduction, prematurely shutting down, rather than > inspiring inquiry. -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
