Acceleration can be a changing, non-constant function of time. The change is necessarily continuous. Want to go for a ride?
On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 3:06 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Glen, and all, > > > > This is very good, so good that I am in danger of getting lost in thought > and never giving it any reply. > > > > So let me attempt a short reply. > > > > Following Holt, I am going to take the metaphor (if you will) of point of > view. Let's say we are all blindfolded philosophers palpating an extremely > patient elephant. Even without introducing the qualia problem, there is > an odd sense in which we all feel the same thing and an equally odd sense > in which we each feel a different thing. And to know what you are feeling, > I have to question you (and ask you to use metaphors) to convey what you > are feeling to me. Here there is no question of qualia. If I were > standing where you are and feeling the same part of the elephant that you > feel, then I would feel the same thing (ex hypothesi). > > > > One of the challenges here, of course, is how we come to the conclusion > that we are all palpating the SAME thing. We could all behave as some of > my "qualitative" colleagues at Clark wanted to behave, and simply "share > our experiences"--. "I am having a scaley experience; I am having a fuzzy > experience." "I am having a mucussy experience" "Ugh! Something just > wacked me over the head." -- and then walk away. There has to be the > possibility of classes of objects for us to appeal to before we can begin > to integrate the various information that each of us is gathering. And > there is philosophical difficulty enough here to concern us without > introducing the problem of whether each of us experiences fuzziness, say, > in the same way that each of the others do. > > > > Now if we were determined to study THAT problem, we could take a group of > extremely standardized objects ... a perfect steel sphere, a perfect > cylinder, etc., say, and ask each of us to report on what we feel as we > feel them. We might notice, from this research, that one of us focusses on > weight, another on surface texture, another on warmth and coldness, etc. > And across objects we might find individual differences in how each of us > describes the objects. That might get at our individual uniqueness in how > we approach the touching of objects. And just as we could agree, after a > time that we were surrounding an elephant, we could agree, after a time and > a discussion, that you approach objects in one way and I approach them in > an other. We could, with the diligent application of metaphors, come to > see the world approximately from one another's point of view > > > > To me, the mystery of consciousness is no greater than the fact that we > never stand in exactly the same place when we look at something. But as > steve Guerin has pointed out, just as we can work out where the fire is by > all of us pointing our differently located cameras at it, we can as easily > work out the location of each of the cameras from the same information. > This is no accident because Steve is a student of Gibson and Gibson was a > student of Holt, and Holt's metaphor of consciousness is a point of view > metaphor. > > > > I note with particular interest this paragraph in Glen's letter: > > > > The hard problem of consciousness is that any given > creature/object/thing/situation has a qualitative experience, a > *comprehension* of the situation/state/condition that creature finds itself > it at any given time, any given place, or any given trajectory through time > and space. The hard problem is one of uniqueness. The uniqueness of that > experience. > > > > I just don’t think “experience” is that sort of thing. Experience is > always a step from one thing to another. A “unique experience” is like > acceleration an instant. A fiction that is useful for some purposes. We > know how to study the elephant; and we know how to study the uniqueness of > the observers of the elephant. But those are distinct objects of study. > > > > Not short. Ugh. Glen, you are allowed to say I begged your question. > > > > Nick > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nicholas Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > > Clark University > > [email protected] > > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of u?l? ? > Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 9:44 AM > To: FriAM <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve > > > > OK. Here's the setup: > > > > Nick says 1: Metaphorical thinker maps their experience onto another's > experience, modeling that other's experience with their own. > > > > Nick says 2: I don't understand the hard problem of consciousness. > > > > Glen says: Expressions 1 and 2 are contradictory. > > > > I suppose it's on me to show that they're contradictory. The idea that > abduction is an inference from the unique to a class might be helpful. But > I think it's a jargonal distraction. So, here goes. > > > > Let's propose that there exist unique situations/objects ... things or > points in time or whatever that are not, cannot be, exactly the same > anywhere else or at any other time. They are absolutely, completely unique > in the entire universe. Because they are unique, there's absolutely no way > any *other* thing/situation can perfectly model them. E.g. no 2 electrons > are in exactly the same state at exactly the same time in exactly the same > place. There will always be something different about any 2 unique things. > So analogies/metaphors/maps from 1 unique thing to another unique thing > will always be slightly off. > > > > Now, a metaphor/model/analogy/mapping thinker will accept an imperfect > mapping and go ahead and model a unique thing with another unique thing. > That's what a metaphorical thinker does, inaccurately models one thing with > another thing. > > > > The hard problem of consciousness is that any given > creature/object/thing/situation has a qualitative experience, a > *comprehension* of the situation/state/condition that creature finds itself > it at any given time, any given place, or any given trajectory through time > and space. The hard problem is one of uniqueness. The uniqueness of that > experience. > > > > The AI/ALife component of the hard problem asks how can we build a machine > that will have these experiences. But that's not important to this > conversation. The modeling/mapping/metaphorical component is how can any > one thing (machine, rock, golfball, human) *understand* the experience of > any other thing (car, elephant, galaxy, bacterium). > > > > The answer is that one thing *models* the other thing imperfectly. The > only reason anyone would be a "metaphorical thinker" is because they > recognize the hard problem. If they don't recognize the hard problem, then > there's no need to use metaphor. Sure, it might be convenient to use > metaphor, but there's no NEED because there is no hard problem. > > > > Therefore, Nick *does* understand the hard problem, even if only tacitly, > and even if he doesn't *believe* in it. He states it and restates it every > time he insists that thinking is metaphorical. > > > > > > On 4/29/20 8:19 PM, [email protected] wrote: > > > I think the first was Glen, and I agree, I don’t see how a belief in > > > the centrality of metaphor to thought commits one to a belief in the > hardness of, or even the existence of, the hard problem. > > > > > > > > > > > > It was me that floated the thought that “all thinking is > > > metaphorical”. (I was trying to draw Dave West in on my side of the > argument, at the time.) I meant only to say that the application of any > word (save perhaps grammatical operators or proper names) involves > abduction, which I think we both believe, is a very close relative of > metaphor. You and I have struggled over this for years, decades, almost, > but I think we believe that abduction is an inference from the properties > of an object to the class to which it belongs whereas a metaphor carries > the process further in some way I have trouble defining. For instance, > when Darwin said that evolution was caused by selection, it definitely was > an abduction of sort. But as selection was understood at the time, it > involved the intentional intervention of a breeder. So the metaphor not > only abduces selection, it seems also rupture the original concept in some > say. > > > > > > -- > > ☣ uǝlƃ > > > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > -- Frank Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918
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