Psi is vastly more extensive (types) and complicated than Daryl seems to recognize. Based on the abstract, his experimental method precludes the possibility of obtaining any but negative results. I would attempt to explain why, but I doubt anyone on the list is interested.
davew On Sun, May 10, 2020, at 4:18 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote: > Here is an abstract by Daryl Bem (I thought there was only one 'r'): > > > > > > > > > > Abstract > The term psi denotes anomalous processes of information or energy transfer > that are currently unexplained in terms of known physical or biological > mechanisms. Two variants of psi are* precognition* (conscious cognitive > awareness) and premonition (affective apprehension) of a future event that > could not otherwise be anticipated through any known inferential process. > Precognition and *premonition* are themselves special cases of a more general > phenomenon: the anomalous retroactive influence of some future event on an > individual's current responses, whether those responses are conscious or > nonconscious, cognitive or affective. This article reports 9 experiments, > involving more than 1,000 participants, that test for retroactive influence > by “time-reversing” well-established psychological effects so that the > individual's responses are obtained before the putatively causal stimulus > events occur. Data are presented for 4 time-reversed effects: precognitive > approach to erotic stimuli and precognitive avoidance of negative stimuli; > retroactive priming; retroactive habituation; and retroactive facilitation of > recall. The mean effect size (d) in psi performance across all 9 experiments > was 0.22, and all but one of the experiments yielded statistically > significant results. The individual-difference variable of stimulus seeking, > a component of extraversion, was significantly correlated with psi > performance in 5 of the experiments, with participants who scored above the > midpoint on a scale of stimulus seeking achieving a mean effect size of 0.43. > Skepticism about psi, issues of replication, and theories of psi are also > discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) > > > On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 3:50 PM Frank Wimberly <[email protected]> wrote: >> Eric Charles, >> >> As you read this recall that I have an MS in psychology so you can think of >> me as a disenchanted former psychologist. >> >> You hint at something I have wondered about. Psychologists seem to have >> physics envy. They want to make wonderful counter-intuitive discoveries like >> the photon slit experiment, etc that seem incredible. But some (not I) claim >> that their findings are either obvious or incapable of replication. I took >> classes from Darryl Bem who could fascinate undergraduates with his >> self-perception ideas. He was also an amateur magician who was in his >> element when he was performing before an auditorium full of amazed people. >> Admittedly he explained how he did his illusions. He must have been expelled >> from the magicians union. >> >> Frank >> >> --- >> Frank C. Wimberly >> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, >> Santa Fe, NM 87505 >> >> 505 670-9918 >> Santa Fe, NM >> >> On Sun, May 10, 2020, 2:35 PM Eric Charles <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>> Frank, >>> So far as I can tell, no one is denying thought. I'm certainly not. There >>> are phenomenon at play, and one of the things that happens when you science >>> a phenomenon is that you end up with descriptions of the phenomenon (and >>> explanations for the phenomenon) that don't match mundane intuitions about >>> things,. We should expect that the science of psychology defines its >>> subject matter different from mundane intuitions in the same way that the >>> science of physics and the science of biology did for their respective >>> subject matters: Sometimes those definitions end up pretty close to the >>> mundane intuitions of a given era, other times you end up with definitions >>> that are radically different. >>> >>> In these contexts, I like to remind people how mindbogglingly unintuitive >>> Newtonian momentum is. When was the last time you moved an object and it >>> didn't come to rest? Aristotle's system is much more intuitive. >>> >>> ----------- >>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >>> Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist >>> American University - Adjunct Instructor >>> <mailto:[email protected]> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 10:46 AM Frank Wimberly <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> As I said to Nick approximately a dozen years ago, people who deny thought >>>> must not have it. I don't mean that as an insult. It's that for me thought >>>> is the one thing I can't deny because it's the first *experience* >>>> At that point Nick dismisses me as a Cartesian. >>>> >>>> --- >>>> Frank C. Wimberly >>>> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, >>>> Santa Fe, NM 87505 >>>> >>>> 505 670-9918 >>>> Santa Fe, NM >>>> >>>> On Sun, May 10, 2020, 8:34 AM uǝlƃ ☣ <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> Ha! Well, by ignoring the poignant example, you've ignored my entire >>>>> point. And it's that point by which I can't agree with the unmoored >>>>> distinction you're making. The celery example isn't about being alive. >>>>> Sorry for injecting that into it. The celery example is about *scale*. >>>>> Celery's movement *is* movement. An antenna's behavior *is* its movement. >>>>> I introduced antennas' behavior in order to help demonstrate that >>>>> behavior is orthogonal to life. >>>>> >>>>> Now, the distinction you're making by saying that behavior is a proper >>>>> subset of movement, would be fine *if* you identify some movement that is >>>>> *not* behavior. I didn't see that in the Old Dead Guy text you quoted ... >>>>> maybe I missed it? Anyway, that's the important category and celery and >>>>> antennas fit right in. >>>>> >>>>> But the behavior/movement discussion (including observer-ascribed >>>>> intention) is a bit of a distraction. What we're actually talking about >>>>> is *hidden* states (a.k.a. "thinking", maybe extrapolated to >>>>> "consciousness"). So, the examples of light-following or higher order >>>>> objective targeting is like trying to run before you can walk. Why do >>>>> that? Why not talk about, say, the hidden states of an antenna? If we >>>>> could characterize purely *passive* behavior/movement, we might be able >>>>> to characterize *reactive* movement. And if we do that, then we can talk >>>>> about the complicatedness (or complexity) of more general >>>>> *transformations* from input to output. And then we might be able to talk >>>>> about I⇔O maps whose internal state can (or can't) be estimated solely >>>>> from their I&O. >>>>> >>>>> We don't need all this philosophical rigmarole to talk about the >>>>> complexity of I⇔O maps. >>>>> >>>>> On 5/9/20 6:17 PM, Eric Charles wrote: >>>>> > Ok, so it sounds like we agree there is a distinction can be made >>>>> between behavior and "mere movement". So what is that difference? I would >>>>> argue, following E. B. Holt, that it is the presence of intentionality. >>>>> Note crucially that the directedness of the behavior described below is >>>>> descriptive, /not /explanatory. The intention is not a force behind the >>>>> behavior, it is a property of the behavior-to-circumstance mapping that >>>>> can be demonstrated by varying conditions appropriately. >>>>> > [...] >>>>> > P.S. I'm going to try to ignore the celery challenge, because while we >>>>> recognize plants as living, we do not typically talk about them as >>>>> behaving. And I think the broad issue of living vs. not-living is a >>>>> different issue. We probably should talk about plants behaving a bit more >>>>> than we normally do, but I think it is worth getting a handle on what we >>>>> mean in the more normal seeming cases before we try to look for >>>>> implications like those. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> ☣ uǝlƃ >>>>> >>>>> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- >>>>> ... .... . ... >>>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>>> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >>>>> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>>> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>>>> FRIAM-COMIC <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> >>>>> http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>>> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... >>>> .... . ... >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >>>> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... >>> .... . ... >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >>> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > -- > Frank Wimberly > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > 505 670-9918 > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >
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