There is no need to distinguish between behavior and non-behavior movement. It's a distraction. That's part of my position in this discussion. To play fair, though, I'll take your example of the live vs. dead duck. I don't care whether the duck is alive or dead. I don't distinguish between dead duck behavior and live duck behavior. There is no such thing as "trying to escape the fox" behavior. There is only "darting this way", "sprinting that way", etc.
*You*, the observer impute the "trying to escape the fox" intention onto the behavior much the same way a mystic might impute a "returning to mother earth" intention onto a dead duck falling from the sky. There is no behavioral difference between celery changing color and a paper towel changing color. There *is* behavioral difference between the *mechanisms* inside the paper towel and the mechanisms inside the celery. Rocks don't have intention when they fall from a cliff and humans don't have intention when they wink sarcastically. Intention is an illusory imputation. All I care about is the action and the boundary between the measuring device and the thing measured (which Nick targets nicely in the next post, to which I'll reply). But please remember that I'm trying to steelman what I infer is *your* (and you claim is Nick's) position. It's a testament to my incompetence that I've failed so spectacularly to repeat what I inferred to be your own position back to you. On 5/12/20 7:55 PM, Eric Charles wrote: > Ok.... so how do we distinguish behavior from non-behavior movements within > the system you are proposing? In what way do we distinguish the dead duck > from the living duck? Or, to stick with the example you prefer, the changing > color of the celery from the changing color of a paper towel placed part-way > into the same solution? > > I'm also not sure what you mean to refer to with "holographic principle." My > assertion is that psychologists are not, in their basic activity, trying to > infer about internal processes. That claim is similar to the claim that > chemists are not, in their basic activity, trying to infer about the inside > of atoms. Or that Newton, in formulating his physics, was not trying to infer > about the inside of planets. The phenomenon in question can be taken apart if > you want, but that is a fundamentally different path of inquiry. A rabbit > trying to escape a fox is made up of cells, but the cracking open its skulls > and looking inside won't tell you that it is /trying to escape the fox/. The > /trying-to-escape/ is not inside it's head, it is in the rabbit's behavior > relative to the fox, and can be observed. When someone says "Hey, come quick! > Look, that rabbit is trying to get away from that fox!", they are not making > some mysterious inference about a hidden state within the rabbit, they are > describing what they are observing. -- ☣ uǝlƃ .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
