If I try to reword what I think you've said, I end up with something like: the mesh of designators can remain constant while the universe's goo it separates can be different. Similarly, the universe goo can remain constant while the mesh of designators varies. The image is that of playdo smashed through a plastic mold. In an ideal deposition, the goo would not be fluid. It would have structure. And, hence, some meshes would fit and other meshes demonstrably inconsistent. (Or vice versa, obviously.) In an extreme act of poetic license, both the mesh and the goo are so fluid when you press them together, you just get more goo.
Making the huge leap that this is somehow similar to what you have in mind, I'm left wondering how to map that onto the believability of my steel man. Feferman's schematic axiomatic systems come to mind (but probably only because I'm so ignorant of so much math). In such schema, some of the system (sentences) are bound and some are free. The hosts in your Red Scare podcast would, then, agree to some extent on some number of bound parts, some number of free parts, and then argue about some parts ... arguing about whether those parts are free or bound, and if bound, what values they take on. And if I make that leap, then I can see how it's directly relevant to privacy and empathetic listening. Even the most plastic thinker will have some few things they just cannot believe or suspend disbelief in/of, even for a little while. So, e.g. in the novel "Dies the Fire", Renee' loves it and totally buys into the idea that some types of "fire" don't work but other types still do. But a good friend of mine thinks the whole thing just stupid and couldn't even finish the 1st novel, thereby depriving himself of whatever *other* interesting little wiggly things the author might have to say. (I assume, anyway. I haven't read the books.) I don't have a comment, yet, on the trustafarian. But you did teach me "spanging". Ha! Cool word. On 5/26/20 10:42 AM, Jon Zingale wrote: > What seems interesting here is not the project of identifying > encoders with their decoders, but rather the possibility of > modeling conceptual play. Here I am thinking of concept in > the sense of Carnap > <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-intensional/#ParIntLog> (again from > the SEP article on intensional logic). > Concepts there are functorial, they are seen as structural mappings > that take states-of-affairs to objects of designation. Varying > states-of-affairs over their objects of designation provides > room for conceptual play, though at the expense of consistency. > I have been trying to think about how to make this idea more > precise over the last couple of days. I will continue too, but > I wanted to be sure to add a log to our conversational fire. > > Another possibly interesting case study could be that of the > trustafarian. In the trustafarian case we can identify gaming > with dissimulation [1] (in the Baudrillard sense). Here, the obscurity > is access to money and familial support. When we see a trustafarian > on the street spanging or at a music festival rubbing petroli into > dreaded hair locks, we are not seeing their rich LA power-lawyer > fathers (anonymity). I leave the obvious cases of deniability > and ambiguity as an exercise for the reader. Lastly, there is > a gaming/dissimulation layer. This individual will continue to > act as if they have nothing: spanging, sleeping on a dirty blanket, > dumpster diving for food, etc... -- ☣ uǝlƃ -- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
