Nick, Nick,
> One little scrap I can grasp at here, and perhaps make a contribution. > There is a subtle point, perhaps a weakness in Peirce, to which the term > "believable" points. Note the mode. "believable--that which is readily > believed." But Peirce is pointing not to that but to "that which SHALL be > believed" or "that which is fated to be believed" in the very long run. > Not "credibles" but "credibilenda" . Note that the term 'believable' for me is in reference to the idea of a universal grammar of belief (UGB) and corresponds to what giving enough time one *will* believe. This idea is a riff on Chomsky's notion of language competence, where the universal grammar is *there* and through *performance* one becomes *competent* wrt their universal grammar[Æ]. That said, I assert that there is a kind of identification between my model and the Peircean model. I assert that for an individual given enough time to discover their beliefs, that which is *believable* is that which is fated to be believed. Now here is where Carter's paper comes in. In the paper, the author defines the notion of apt-belief as a belief that is discovered to be accurate because competent. I posit that scientific beliefs could be in a class of this type. Further, we note that the collection of one's possible apt-beliefs is a sub-collection of their total possible beliefs, UGB. In this way, the UGB can be thought of as a classifying object for belief. The version of Peirce's assertion I am working with here is the one that you sometimes claim, namely, *that which in the long-run we will _all_ come to agree upon*. This stronger Peircean assertion gives rise to a sub-collection as well, the collection of those apt-beliefs that we collectively find to be necessary. That is, granted a Kripke-like semantics, a belief is Peircean-true iff every person will come to believe it in the long-run. Dually[⇆], we can consider all of those apt-beliefs that each of us comes to discover but is not part of the belief-commons. That at least one of us finds the belief apt means, again via Kripke, that these beliefs are to be considered possible apt-beliefs wrt the whole of us. These beliefs are interesting to me exactly because we can profit from them as knowledge while they _can never_ be Peircean-true. Again, the reason they cannot, like the grounding for universal grammar, would follow from a historical accident of biology. I hope to have not muddied my own waters too much here, and I hope that what I am writing now is still mostly consistent with what I wrote before. [Æ] I am speaking loosely here. For one thing, language competence in Chomsky's model refers to one's *knowledge* of their universal grammar and not just to what one performs. For the sake of simplicity, I am blending these ideas. [⇆] The alethic operators come in monad-comonad adjoint pairs and so are linked by a duality. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
