< Anyway, the metaphysical commitments seep in at Church-Turing, I think. It's easy to lob accusations at, say, Roger Penrose for making a speculative argument that humans may be able to do things computers can't do. But I see both sides as making *useful* metaphysical commitments. One side has faith that our current formal systems will eventually reason over biological structures like the brain as *well* as they can reason over artifacts like the Transformer. The other side has faith that biological structures lie outside the formal systems we currently have available.>
These seem to me to physical issues not metaphysical issues. He's not proposing that humans *cannot* be understood, but that they may be insufficiently understood. In any case, quantum chemistry can be simulated on classical computers. So it is a question of degree not category. Marcus - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
