or a BIC? Hopefully, without bending an otherwise interesting thread, I will hint at what IMO might be a serious response to your troll. I was thinking about the rhizomatic nature of both category theory and semiotics. In both the first case, a la the Lawverian approach to foundations, and in the second case, following Peirce, the basic assumption is that "We must start in the middle". But, why exactly is this so? Why is it taken almost as an axiom for rhizomatic theories? To some extent, I would argue that both categories and (historically) systems of signs begin with the assumption of crisp objects. The game afterward is then to understand, (co-)extensionally, the objects relative to one another through morphisms in the former or signifiers in the latter. Transformations of objects, then, are understood as transitions between objects in an apriori given (though perhaps implied) algebra of parts. Of course, and to some extent I would like to think that this is what a term like rupture exists to imply, it is possible to not assume crisp objects but rather a proto-objective substrate (plane of immanence or some other cosmic source of randomness) whence come objects. Neither position, to my mind, ought to be any more privileged (up to productive inquiry) and certainly should not be taken as the only possibilities for a framework.
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