I'd agree there's a (large?) component of Trump voters motivated by that "deep story". But the people I interact [⛧] with voted for him for a different reason: their lives seem to just suck. And nothing Clinton, Biden, or Harris said convinced them that their life would improve with them as President. Yes, Trump's incompetent, a clown, thin-skinned, etc. But there's a power/money lock-in that's disaffected these people and that lock-in is waaaay more powerful than any of the rhetorical propositions of Clinton, Biden, and Harris.
Some of my friends are just downright angry, *claiming* they're ready to burn buildings and kill people. But most of them are simply lost. They'll never own a house. They don't own any stock. They probably won't have children or get married. They either skipped college or have a huge student loan to pay off. They work at least 2 part-time jobs, often bar tending and driving for Uber with a car they can't afford. They spend something like 50% of their income on rent - or live with several housemates in similar situations, can't go to the doctor unless it's an emergency, have to find the cheapest food ... and smoke as much dope as they can get their hands on to avoid worrying about this stuff all day every day. And, yes, some of these are red-pilled incels. But most of them aren't and, therefore, also tend to worry about things like access to abortion, transphobia, etc. They just don't *see* any future ... or at least they can't see 5 or 10 years down the road. The answer for Trump 1.0 was to simply not vote at all. The answer for Trump 2.0 was Biden didn't do sh¡t for us; so Fvck the System. Burn it down and let's see what replaces it. Interestingly, a few of these people I've had the chance to talk calmly with have heard of the Veil of Ignorance. And when asked directly about the moral imperative to ensure a "fair" system replaces the current one, they've mostly responded with "how?" And I don't have an answer. Luckily, our local government(s) do seem to care a bit more than the Feds do. So at least a few I've talked to voted for progressive locals and Trump as a signal for what they think of the Feds. People are complex. Don't get high on your own supply. [⛧] I'm not very social. So I'm talking about maybe 50 people, here, mostly those who pop in and out of our salon now and then. It's not a big sample. But it's enough to cast a little doubt on just-so narratives like that "deep story". On 5/4/25 9:38 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
I guess from their point of view Americans who voted for Mr. Trump have behaved in a positive way. The question is why have so many people in America voted against their economic self-interests for a guy that ruins it all. Why do working class voters want tax cuts for the super rich of the Mar-a-Lago club in the first place? UC Berkeley sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild argues in her book "Strangers in Their Own Land" that Trump supporters voted for him and against women like Hillary Clinton & Kamala Harris because they share the experience of a "deep story" which goes like this: despite years and years of hard work, patient and orderly 'waiting in line', and great personal sacrifice, the rewards of the American Dream just over the brow of the hill remain out of reach, especially for older white male blue-collar workers. For decades, they had been patiently waiting for a rise in their paychecks, better jobs and better life opportunities which did not come. They now feel that others (such as blacks, women, and immigrants) are cutting in line and receiving rewards without either the same work performance or the same patient and orderly conduct. http://blog.asjournal.org/the-deep-story-of-the-white-american-south-or-strangers-in-their-own-land-2016-by-arlie-russell-hochschild-part-i/ This deep story is similar to the one that the far-right AfD party in Germany uses to deceive people (whose members I find just as disgusting as Donald Trump). Arlie Russell Hochschild says people in the red states find the "deep story" so appealling that they vote for the one that says it is true - even if it is not really true. But as an American you know better than me if Arlie is right or not. -J. -------- Original message -------- From: Marcus Daniels <[email protected]> Date: 5/4/25 5:29 PM (GMT+01:00) To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] agent-based macroeconomic model I struggle to think of what kind of crisis might change the behavior of Americans in a positive way. The U.S. had a million deaths from COVID-19 and the result was to elect an administration that wants to cast doubt on lipid nanoparticles for delivery of mRNA and cripple what has been the engine of the innovation in biomedical innovation in the world, the NIH. Maybe a 75% fatality rate? Marcus *From: *Friam <[email protected]> on behalf of Jochen Fromm <[email protected]> *Date: *Sunday, May 4, 2025 at 3:19 AM *To: *The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]> *Subject: *Re: [FRIAM] agent-based macroeconomic model Yes, I agree that sustainability is the key and that "Technological progress should enable us to reduce our environmental footprint while increasing our capacity to meet human needs. Clean energy technologies, circular economies, and efficient material use are essential components of this future". Yes, definitely. Unfortunately we are not on this path at all. The US under Trump is on the fast track in the opposite direction. If the World3 "Limits to Growth" model is correct and there will a widespread collapse of civilization in the middle of this century, then every other economic model becomes insignificant. There have been multiple attempts to validate the World3 results in the last decades, and the results are always the same: the model is valid and relevant, we are still in the "business as usual" scenario, and society as we know it will collapse soon. One of the latest papers is https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jiec.13442 I believe the collapse has already started under Trump. Trump is to America what Dieselgate was to Volkswagen. Faced with insurmountable obstacles - creating a clean car based on fossil fuels to meet increasingly sharp environmental regulations - Volkswagen which was addicted to building Diesel cars started to cheat. Dieselgate was the result: a disaster for the company. George W. Bush said the US is addicted to oil. Faced with insurmountable obstacles after peak oil has been reached (the point where global oil production reaches its maximum rate, after which it will begin to decline irreversibly), the country has elected a person who embraces cheating as a way of life, as his niece wrote in her book "Too much and never enough". We are witnessing the disastrous results in realtime. He is a disaster for the country. -J. -------- Original message -------- From: Pieter Steenekamp <[email protected]> Date: 5/4/25 10:23 AM (GMT+01:00) To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] agent-based macroeconomic model The *World3 Limits to Growth* model, developed in the early 1970s and made famous through the Club of Rome’s report, is a well-known example of how internal conceptual frameworks are externalized and explored through computer modeling. In this case, the authors constructed a systems dynamics model to simulate long-term global trends in population, resource consumption, industrial output, and pollution. Their primary aim was to communicate a particular vision of the future: one in which exponential growth in a finite system inevitably leads to overshoot and collapse unless proactive changes are made. What is often overlooked, however, is the degree to which the conclusions of such models are shaped by the assumptions built into them—assumptions that may not always be made explicit. In the case of the *Limits to Growth* model, one of the most critical assumptions underpinning its projections is that technological development during the period from 1900 to 2100 will not proceed rapidly enough to fundamentally change the dynamics of resource availability and consumption. In other words, the model implicitly assumes that no breakthrough technologies will emerge in time to mitigate the depletion of key resources or to radically improve the efficiency and sustainability of industrial activity. This is a crucial point, because the validity of the model’s most dramatic conclusions—such as widespread societal collapse by the late 21st century—hinges heavily on that assumption. If, in contrast, technological innovation does accelerate and lead to the discovery or creation of new resources, energy sources, or modes of production, then the trajectory of global development may look very different from the model’s projections. I freely admit that I do not know whether this key assumption is ultimately correct. No one can say with certainty what the pace or direction of technological progress will be over the next 75 years. However, based on historical trends and current trajectories, I am inclined to believe that the assumption is too pessimistic. In my view, it underestimates humanity’s capacity for innovation and the accelerating feedback loop between knowledge, technology, and problem-solving. Of course, we must acknowledge that the Earth's natural resources are finite. At some point—whether decades or centuries from now—this finitude will impose constraints on economic and population growth. That said, the timing and severity of these constraints depend heavily on how we define and access resources. Technological advancements can dramatically alter both. For instance, materials once considered scarce or inaccessible can become viable through improved extraction techniques, recycling, or even synthesis. Similarly, previously unusable energy sources may become dominant through innovation, as was the case with oil in the early 20th century. To illustrate this point more concretely, consider the domain of energy. Energy is foundational to almost every aspect of economic growth and societal development. If we are able to develop clean, scalable, and abundant sources of energy, many other constraints—such as water scarcity, food production, and even material shortages—can potentially be addressed. Sam Altman and others have argued persuasively that the combination of abundant energy and advanced intelligence systems (even if narrow and artificial) could usher in an era of material abundance. It is important to clarify what is and isn’t meant by this. I am not referring to fantastical technologies that violate the known laws of physics. I am speaking of plausible, science-based advances that are already in development or on the horizon. Nor am I invoking some vague notion of sentient or “real” artificial intelligence. The kind of AI I have in mind is the narrow, task-specific form we see today—tools that, while limited, are increasingly capable of solving complex problems, optimizing systems, and accelerating scientific discovery when combined with human ingenuity. Nor should this vision be interpreted as a license for ecological destruction. On the contrary, I argue that the path to abundance must be rooted in sustainability. Technological progress should enable us to reduce our environmental footprint while increasing our capacity to meet human needs. Clean energy technologies, circular economies, and efficient material use are essential components of this future. One promising example is the development of thorium-based nuclear reactors, such as the one currently being built in China. These reactors offer the potential for abundant, safe, and low-waste energy—possibly serving as a bridge until nuclear fusion becomes a practical reality. In sum, the *Limits to Growth* model is a valuable intellectual exercise and a cautionary tale. It highlights the risks of unchecked growth in a finite system. However, its conclusions are not inevitable. They are based on a set of assumptions, the most consequential of which concerns the pace of technological development. If one believes that innovation will stagnate, then the model presents a sobering and perhaps accurate warning. But if one believes—as I do—that human creativity and technological capacity will continue to grow, then a more optimistic future is plausible. Ultimately, the debate over such models is less about data than it is about belief—about how we weigh uncertainty and how we envision the future. I do not claim certainty in my outlook. Rather, I argue that we should be cautious in drawing fatalistic conclusions from models that may underestimate the transformative power of innovation. No one can guarantee that a future of abundance awaits us. But likewise, no one can confidently assert that it does not. In that uncertainty lies both the risk and the opportunity of our time. On Sat, 3 May 2025 at 07:46, Jochen Fromm <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Nice model! Not bad. One aspect we could try to model is the distribution of supply chains in a globalized world. In 2021 the average gross income in the US was about 70,430, in Taiwan 21,689, in China 11,890, in India 2170, and in Myanmar 1,140. Supply chains of companies in a world where income differs so much will obviously end sooner or later in low income countries. Typical supply chain lines for Apple are for instance Apple (California) > TSMC (Taiwan) > Factory (Guangdong Province, China) or Apple (California) > Foxconn (Taiwan) > Factory (Henan Province, China). How are supply chains affected if transportation costs rise or tariffs are imposed? What would cause a world-wide economic crisis in such a model and how would it look like? One of the most famous models on a global scale is the world3 model from the Club of Rome. Brian Hayes decided to rewrite the world3 model in Javascript http://bit-player.org/limits <http://bit-player.org/limits> The article is here https://www.americanscientist.org/article/computation-and-the-human-predicament <https://www.americanscientist.org/article/computation-and-the-human-predicament> -J. -------- Original message -------- From: Pieter Steenekamp <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> Date: 5/1/25 7:48 PM (GMT+01:00) To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: [FRIAM] agent-based macroeconomic model I made a very "quick and dirty" start on developing an agent-based macroeconomic model. Posted about it on X: https://x.com/pietersteenekam/status/1917995128678986170 <https://x.com/pietersteenekam/status/1917995128678986170> , the post reads as follows: Me: “Let’s understand global macroeconomic policy better.” Also me: Builds a crude ABM with AI because economists can’t agree on tariffs. Is it useful? Not yet. Is it cool? Heck yes. 🔗https://github.com/pieterSteenekamp/bottom-up-macroeconomics <https://github.com/pieterSteenekamp/bottom-up-macroeconomics>"
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