This is a good direction, Nick. And of course, I should wait to let you respond long-form before replying myself, and adding to the overhang.
While I understand your camping analogy as a re-assertion of the Peirce-Pragmatist position on convergence to true views, I think there is a reading of the analogy that is tempting but that doesn’t go through in any way that isn’t fatally naive. To me, the problem would be this: 1. Hiking and then camping, you are always somewhere. You are somewhere while you hike, and you are somewhere when you camp, and the former converges within smaller and smaller circles on the latter. (Has Philosophy ever formalized a “precept of no helicopters”? You could get famous, maybe, like Searle.) Those “somewhere”s are of a single kind, and thus it is sensible to speak of how values of them can converge to a fixed point. 2. The notion of a “whole and complete true position” isn’t like that. In my construction of the matter, and of Peirce-Pragmatism as I think we would have to understand it across the sciences today —meaning, to include the physical sciences, not exclusively, but as a subclass that provide particularly bothersome instances — “the truth” is something you never stand in possession of. Not merely as a matter of degree, but as a matter of kind. 2a. What you do have is that, there are assertion-sentences you make today, and tomorrow, and there will be assertion sentences you make at some time in a projected future. And experimental machinery you build and read, and predictions for what it will yield, etc. Some of those are about classifying happenings in the world, and some are about “theory” that enables you to reason mechanically to connect the setup actions you perform, and the predictions you make about outcomes. 2b. Examples we have from the physical sciences show that the prediction-assertions can undergo a seemingly fairly smooth progression of accuracy around a stable center, while the “theory” layer that enables reasoning undergoes wholesale replacement. To whatever extent we want ideas like “a true understanding” to somehow stand for the whole edifice: what you do and predict, and how your reasoning gets you to those, the things we used as placeholders for “the truth” weren’t stable before, and if we are reasonable, we should expect that they will not be stable going forward, in dimensions that we won’t generally be good at anticipating. When we apply this recursively to the whole of discourse in which it is all transacted, we get the full-on fallibilist position, that I would argue Quine responded to by abandoning the field. Speaking as if he were a complete relativist (the “Quine-Dehem” theorem, or whatever it was), but then taking scientific empiricism as somehow “just fine”, and letting the matter go. 3. To me this means that, if we are to take Pragmatism seriously, and try to formalize it, we have to make the notion of the limiting “concept of truth” different in kind from the collection of other things: the collection of assertions that are considered empirically admissible within a given language and a given community at a given time, and the capabilities we have for things to do (deliberately, as opposed to by accidental flailing). 3a. The problem that any such formalism would have to find good ways to handle is that a good system for describing and reasoning has _structure_, and the structure can allow finite (and generally, few) dimensions of assertive content or capability to converge in Peirce’s sense, while allowing potentially-infinitely much of what “would be true if we knew about it and had expressions for it” to be outside our command at all times in the past, present, and future. It is easy for me to adduce examples of what this looks like in cases, but I am not formalist enough to have a taste for what it would mean to make this into a system. Now I have to commit a break. Everything above was the standard language of “truth” and “meaningfulness” as Peirce-Pragmatism tried to construct them. I specifically didn’t use the word “objectivity”, because the language above doesn’t tell me where a notion of “objectivity” would enter, or what work it would be doing. I was just talking about convergence properties in systems of assertion and activity, given to us as realized histories of instances that we want to characterize. How does any of that bring in talk about “objectivity”? Well…. 4. It is ultimately the problem of finiteness, and of carrying out inductive behavior, that leads me from the above claims, to the “as if” characterization of the role of an “objective posture” in our discourse and our behavior. I acknowledge that Glen didn’t want to sign off on a notion of the “real world”. But speaking just for myself, I obviously go through the day acting as if there “is” a “real world” “out there” all the time. And I assume that the reason our common language gave me a discourse to refer to such things is that most-everybody else goes through life feeling much like I do about it, and acting much like I do. Indeed, I would argue that we cannot do otherwise, because for practical purposes we are induction-committers: finite beings in an infinite world, who cannot help but coarse-grain endlessly variable circumstances into limited categories, and then use the limited categories as indices for our responses. I settle on that act of performing an inductive continuation as the central feature of us that, if we want to refer to it, will lead to language about the real world, more or less like the language we find ourselves having inherited, and using. 4a. On the (still inductive) belief that the moments of my life actually flow in a sequence roughly like I think they do, and that the wakeful moments of my life aren't all a grand hallucination, which only those on LSD recognize in its true nature, and the rest of us are blind to — mea culpa here for my stance on the matter — I take a certain Darwinian (or reinforcement-learning) view that there is only some stability to any of these inductions, enough that we ever have a reason to need to refer to them, because the structure in the events that happen likewise has elements of stability that we can sync onto, metaphorically like a phase-locked loop (from electrical engineering) uses its tendency to synchronize to find the periodicity in a signal that it can lock onto. My reasoning here is clearly circular: in refusing to reject the premise of a “real world”, I am using patterns of structure I form within my discourse about that world, to refer to myself within it, and assign commonalities to me and to the rest of it that warrant my referring to the rest of it. This is what the mystics regard as error on my part: that we have all been infinite forever, and that we therefore never needed to settle for induction. Oh well; I don’t know what to do with them. 4b. But at last I at least have a language in which to say how objectivity attached to the earlier discourse about the stability of assertion and activity. This “source of stabilization” for my inductive behaviors is effectively what I tag with the name of “the objectively real”. Then, my own nature as an induction-committer is the thing I tag with this notion of an “objective frame” that I take on w.r.t. all the dimensions of variation I effectively regard as ignorable while I am doing my finite-state induction-committing thing. I suppose that the two different tags have something to do with each other, to the extent that my inductions are stable and present to me as having some structure to refer to, and not just being a structureless random walk. Anyway, sorry to pile more onto the last. Whenever your current project lets go of you, if you aren’t sick of (my version of) all this, it can be added to the silage. Eric > On Dec 2, 2025, at 18:22, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> wrote: > > Thanks Eric for your anecdote. I think I will pause before I respond at > length, because it deserves careful thought and I just cant manage that now. > I think of scientifiic objectivity as an aspirational concept. Think of a > bunch of backpackers out in the woods discussing where they are going to camp > tonight. Absent helicopters (always a possibility) and assuming accurate > information concerning where they are at any moment, where they are converges > on where they will be. Like a backwards random walk perhaps? Where we sleep > tonight not only plays an important role in their dialogue but will in the > end become a fact of some matter. > > The metaphor of "breathing under water" is a stunner and led me to wonder > what might have happened if you had been raised on a regulator. > > I should stop. I need to push on on weather book/ pamphlet, or whatever it > is. > > N > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2025 at 4:52 AM Santafe <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> I wanted to reply at this branch point a couple of weeks ago, but could not >> at the time. >> >> This reply is meant also to Nick’s thread “migraine auras, reprise”, which I >> got on 29 November, and the reverberations on that one. >> >> > On Nov 25, 2025, at 12:58, glen <[email protected] >> > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> > >> > Changing gears a bit, I ran across the "as if" personality >> > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_disturbance>. I can't help but >> > wonder about a room full of agents "concealing their inner emptiness, >> > living *as if* they had genuine feelings and desires." >8^D I'm at risk of >> > Get-Off-My-Lawn, here. But 90% of the time, when I'm in a room with more >> > than, say, 5 people, it *feels* to me like they're all philosophical >> > zombies, maybe me included. >> > >> > Are we all *actually* "as if" personalities? And those who think they're >> > not are delusional? >> >> I understand that Glen’s direction here goes somewhat meta from what I was >> after, and that it becomes its own line of inquiry, at a considerably higher >> level of structural organization than the one I was after. But, in the >> assurance of becoming tedious, I wanted to re-harp a little on the level of >> description I was after. >> >> From the other thread: >> >> > On Nov 29, 2025, at 23:07, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected] >> > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> > >> > As often happens, my original post on mental imagery worked itself away >> > from my original purpose, which was to explore the concept of objectivity. >> >> > Nick >> >> That was my original purpose, too, because in any conversation that takes >> the conflation of objectivity with intersubjectivity to even be conceivable, >> I have come to think that the conversation doesn’t have its category >> distinctions straight. My own belief’s being that objective, subjective, >> and intersubjective, are terms that do such different work that there is no >> way they can be either “similes” or “alternatives”, because they are in >> wildly different categories. >> >> I am sure that, after saying it was my purpose to explore the concept of >> objectivity, Nick will reiterate that the thread has veered away from his >> purpose of exploring the concept of objectivity. So interesting how >> different styles of mind can be…. >> >> >> The reason I will be tedious is that I gave part of the argument below in a >> rant some months ago, when the mystics with their relentless obscurantism >> were driving me crazy (in other lines of conversation), and I was trying to >> decide what categories I thought I could think and speak in, that wouldn’t >> just devolve into this term-circus inherited from loose common speech. >> >> The thing I thought was “new” to my point was the claim that we want a term >> like “objective” to refer to the states (or postures) of mind that we take >> on in relation to assertions in certain circumstances. If I knew what >> Phenomenology was, I would believe that the argument I want to make is in >> the vein of Phenomenology, meaning about just-what one is doing in engaging >> experientially with some activity or assertion. But I haven’t read any >> Phenomenology, so I am probably just making up what those guys are about, >> and poaching their name. >> >> >> The point, though, being that, for me, all this should start in the body. I >> can’t argue in general terms, so I will argue anecdotally from the only case >> that made me think I have some concrete and crisp contrast to illustrate a >> distinction. >> >> The anecdote is from the good luck that my first experience of scuba diving >> came fairly late into adulthood. Here’s what I would argue the observation >> and its content are: >> >> 1. I have swum throughout childhood, and also breathed for my entire life. >> I never did both at the same time (meaning, didn’t breathe while >> underwater). I also had the good fortune to never be waterboarded. >> >> 2. Hence there were two conditions that were familiar to me. One was >> breathing. The other was having my head underwater and not breathing. >> >> 2a. I would argue that, for me, there were two “bundles” of activities and >> states of mind that were internally linked, but externally disjoint. There >> “is” “however you breathe”, and there “is” “holding your breath when your >> head is under water”. I would have had no way to disaggregate either of >> these bundles, or even to triangulate on the possibility that there was >> anything to disaggregate. >> >> 3. Then came the first time of putting my head underwater with a scuba >> regulator, and initiating breathing through it. The first inhale was choppy >> with a very fast pace, hesitant and interrupted, and over an interval of >> perhaps a second or two, gave way to the “normal” (or, more-normal, still >> not the same as thoughtless breathing above-water) mode. That early stage >> was entirely unanticipated, and I think, under any normal use of the term, >> “involuntary”. >> >> 3a. So, for the first time, I had more than one “state of mind”, or “mental >> posture” I could be in while breathing. That made it possible to see that >> breathing was not an irreducible activity. >> >> 3b. I say I was lucky to only have this experience fairly late in life, >> because it probably helped to solidify the two irreducible bundles >> (breathing normally versus holding my breath); if I had started scuba very >> early, I may have had such a quick adaptation to the new activity, or it may >> have been buried in so many adaptations to so many new activities, that I >> might not have noticed it as something salient. >> >> 4. My abstraction step is to say that “taking for granted” that there is >> air outside my head is reported, physiologically, in the normal breathing >> activity, and no-longer taking that “for granted” was reported, >> physiologically, in the very different “doubtful” mode of breathing. The >> deliberative and intentional layer of acting can be recognized as separate >> and operating in a context set by much-else that is the foundation-posture >> within which intention operates. >> >> Anyway, without further belaborment, you get the point: There are all kinds >> of physiological reports of when I am taking something for granted. That I >> am standing on a floor in a room and not on top of a flagpole on the Empire >> State building, that my head is not underwater, that there is not an uncaged >> tiger in the room with me, or one of Stephen Miller’s thugs, or some other >> known predatory and sadistic thing whose attention I don’t want on me. >> >> I wanted to assert that the essence of whatever the term “objective” needs >> to refer to, was the taking-on of this posture of de facto taking something >> for granted. The mystics who claim they take nothing for granted, and >> everything is a hypothesis, seem to me to be talking nonsense. Your heart >> takes all sorts of things for granted just by persisting in its beating, as >> we can verify from the cases when it doesn’t do so. When they say >> “everything” they might really be referring to some relatively high-level >> cognitive integrations, but of course if they admitted that, they wouldn't >> be able to hide in their obscurantism and keep everybody guessing whether >> they might be magical. >> >> But back from my rant: I want to claim, here in my armchair, that if there >> are good, stable foundations for terms like “objective”, or Glen’s (and >> proper usage's) “metaphysical commitments”, they should be these: the myriad >> things that lie below deliberative thought, rooted as deep as physiology in >> some cases, and more shallowly as habit in others, that we _always_ “take >> for granted” as part of coordinated mental functioning. Things can migrate >> a bit across that boundary — one can come to breathe quite smoothly through >> a scuba regulator — and one of the fascinating things, to me, about the >> changes that take place as we “come to understand” things that are new to >> us, is that the deep fabric of “understanding” involves a reworking of where >> some activity, experience, assertion, etc., and their attendant states of >> mind, fall w.r.t. this split of taking or not taking for granted. >> >> Relative to the above, “intersubjective” is a quite shallow and procedural >> word, having to do with the mechanics of epistemology, and how we scaffold >> our discourse and our growth-activities of coming to understand things. >> These terms have their own structure, of course, also fine to analyze and >> get good language around, but they are quite different from shifts in >> postures of mind that we might sometimes have parallax to see. (And then, >> “subjective’ is a typological term, about the categories of phenomena that >> we associate with “sensations” etc., and for which meaning is inherently >> about relations, of the phenomenon to some self, the phenomenon to its >> sensation-aspect, etc. So a third, entirely distinct, kind of semantic work >> the term is doing.) >> >> Back to Glen’s branch in the above thread, I could probably imagine an >> analysis in which some of these distinctions do propagate up to how identity >> is formed, and whether or in what ways it is stable or unstable, as in >> borderline personality disorders and associated. Or maybe not, and the >> identity-stability question is a distinct matter (?). >> >> Anyway, thanks for patience or indulgence if anybody read this far, >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> > >> > On 11/24/25 5:06 PM, Steve Smith wrote: >> >> I'm finding your Lean4 fascinating for it's balance between intuitive >> >> enough to (almost) read and (known to be) formal enough to trust to be >> >> testable/executeable. >> >> Reminds me vaguely of the semester I learned BNF and kept finding myself >> >> expressing (only to myself) observations about the world in that idiom... >> >> later Prolog captured that part of me (for a while) . >> > >> > >> > -- >> > ¡sıɹƎ ןıɐH ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ >> > ὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα >> > σώσω. >> > >> > >> > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / >> > ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >> > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,jIIX-vnSRSTFLjqcol2Pj_ZOSJLSn57vbTIaAhJ9P6UHqvMjJS--UBNRWu-Sxzhmyjt2j1qb3_YeIdj2sNtrjs8tfWVTG9hheCU7AZWpsdKjRMwFIqMa9k-Mbhc,&typo=1 >> > to (un)subscribe >> > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,3-fMzma3iL--s7KW1hsZ4W41wVxqtVdybnXokfuTHcbAM-bM8VWFvSiOoaoAWHIDNLrz2O7xntOLfPEszhJWw3uEWqRMXsGsBgHk4RaqIBm0heY,&typo=1 >> > FRIAM-COMIC >> > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,zhwRtMRzjTFOltd7ZZfYp2A7srpxSzAb7uptV65Xx1W02PiQOshg0dgl6bSMedjS4UYKXCV4uilGwnwRG5h-iAzUEnoRV3ZHAmAx52bXEqe8Bg,,&typo=1 >> > archives: 5/2017 thru present >> > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,afVYawFjkRXuyxIx99GuYbltSk1-IRzD6YitkNRZyO5UWDhswY3PSzQ9QmhR_CHz9sYXr8erwuHNExhrU9pFU-Cyqd-ow8YGJ-EbermfCVJcA533nv4,&typo=1 >> > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >> >> >> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / >> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,MduVFI89RotHxTC6wcbmB3y7D_DXSlLGIWHqDgnkh6ideJX1VkZYY6KA6kDCx-ijGf0sTAP9cowvRBMHky-uS3iX3OVX0XaO54Nsy4xu7PfXwSchrY3QWQ,,&typo=1> >> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,g3BhjpDHQXCLbYRpqG8g1ZRvz_7NoG2E05HTJaOjkccDdlT_nXpus6jFnxVXBsU5Avahxz8z4RxxemeqK4WBfKus3ND6en1tJJ4bvGxfxkwx3o7kqEsmqYk,&typo=1> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,87PrTDNWpwEKeqiAKTf1HghChrtC4jXW_pM2n_pIbtuSUgjQijg3NMW3O3t2SNDxwhnqTg_R9_kTrSOSRIILowGaYADX1oQWrCycw6enO470A8EvaQ,,&typo=1> >> archives: 5/2017 thru present >> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,kznKbmu_iS6M6ckV8D6TMmjzFIpJpA5hcl8n7BpTRlU4lFhdyvSJlwtxQsynxJq1TkpaF_oWSiYs_1Y7eFT__w-FIaYGo96BijkWk9eL7XYIvw,,&typo=1> >> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > > > -- > Nicholas S. 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